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Viktor Kirillov, Igor Putintsev: Relations between Moldova and the EU in 1998-2012 îÁÚÁÄ
Viktor Kirillov, Igor Putintsev: Relations between Moldova and the EU in 1998-2012
Kirillov V.B., Putintsev I.S.

The article reviews relations between Moldova and the EU at the current stage. Reasons for the strengthening of cooperation between Moldova and the EU in these years are being analyzed, as well as the problems that further development of cooperation can face. It describes how relations with the EU influence the prospects of Moldova`s participation in the integration process in the post-Soviet space.

Moldova-EU relations have a rather short history. They were a matter of peripheral attention of political elites and the public in the 1990s. Yet in the 2000th the relationship came to dominate Moldova`s foreign and even domestic policies.

Same as Ukraine, Moldova is on the crossroads of interests of members of big integration projects, European and Eurasian. Eastward enlargement of the EU, "color revolutions" on the post-Soviet space and complications in Russia-Ukraine relations sharpened Moldova`s interest in the European integration project in the middle of the 2000th. The regional situation changed significantly in the early 2010th but the structure of foreign political priorities of Chisinau did not.

Regarding the EU as the most influential foreign force, the Moldovan political administration gave the priority after 2003 to relations with the EU rather than contacts in the CIS. Moldovan political forces that could have promoted integration on the CIS space under certain circumstances fear to question prospects for relations with the EU.

A good example is the conduct of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) in November 2003 and the Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM) in December 2010 when resistance from Western countries forced the parties to drop their plans of rapprochement with Russia.

The predominant orientation of Moldova at the EU may be explained with many factors, among them bolstering of the EU policy with regard to Moldova, growing dependence of the Moldovan political class on the EU, Ukraine`s non-participation in Eurasian integration structures and others. All these political factors curb down Moldovan interest in integration processes on the Eurasian space. Yet the idea about circumstances of the Chisinau foreign policy would have been incomplete without sociological data, which presents the situation in a slightly different light.

Public opinion polls invariably show that the majority of citizens wish to choose Russia instead of the EU as the main strategic partner (52% vs. 21% in April 2008 and 57% vs. 24% in May 2012)[1]. Although most of the population favors accession to the EU (76 % in November 2006, 52 % in May 2012), the scenario of entry into the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan has been lately enjoying comparable support (57% in May 2012). Some 38% of residents said in May 2012 they would back up the entry into the Customs Union and 35% would vote for joining the EU if they had a choice between integration unions.

Foreign political preferences of the Moldovan population show that the course towards primary development of relations with the EU is not as a predetermined as the incumbent administration - the parliamentary coalition Alliance for European Integration (AEU) - may think. Although the EU influence on the Moldovan policy has increased substantially over the past decade, this foreign policy still has an alternative and cannot escape some problems and contradictions.

Moldova did not dub relations with the EU as a primary area of the foreign policy in the 1990s. Due to political and economic reasons the priority was given to cooperation in the CIS, the charter of which Moldova ratified in June 1994. Interaction with separate EU members and international fiscal institutes was the focus of relations with the West.

There had been practically no references to the EU in Moldovan governmental programs until 1998 when relations with the European Union were declared as a strategic priority for the first time ever in the office of the Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc Cabinet (1998 - 1999) and the Prime Minister Ion Sturza Government (1999.)[2]. The next government of Prime Minister Dumitry Bragis (1999-2001) reviewed the emphasis on relations with the EU in favor of prioritized cooperation in the CIS.

A major but not the only reason for the enhancement of the pro-European vector of the Moldovan policy in 1998-1999 was the negative effect of the Russian default of 1998 that weakened the position and motivation of those, who supported the principal orientation at CIS countries. In turn, adjustment of the new policy of Dumitru Bragi? resulted from the wish to stabilize the energy sector after the crisis of non-payments for Russian natural gas in 1999.

A growth of Western countries` attention to Moldova in the early 2000th was testified with the admission of Moldova to the WTO and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 2001. Even though Moldova was admitted to the Pact with some reservations (for example, Chisinau undertook to omit the Transdniestrian conflict issue in the implementation of the agreement[3]), the move showed that Western countries considered the possibility of a broader interpretation of regional boundaries in Southeastern Europe and more profound involvement of Moldova in multilateral affairs of the region, which, in contrast to the CIS countries, was already viewed by the West as a sphere of its major influence.

When staying in office in 2001-2009, the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) made tangible transformation both of Moldova-EU relations and their perception in the country. The growth of EU influence on the Moldovan political class was especially demonstrative in the light of a drastic change of foreign political priorities of the PCRM after 2003.

The party, which won the election in 2001 under the slogans of entry into the Union of Russia and Belarus and the second official language status of Russian, was so explicit about its policy of European integration in 2005 that its foreign political program became practically indistinguishable from the program of the right-wing opposition (excluding its radical pro-Romania wing).

There were both objective and subjective reasons for that; the first ones explained the logic of operation of the PCRM administration and the second ones - the form the foreign policy change assumed in 2004-2006.

The influence of EU enlargement and a series of "color revolutions" in the CIS were the objective factors. The stages of EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 signified transformation of the EU into a regional neighbor of Moldova and built up the interest of European structures in the national situation. "Color revolutions" caused among the Moldovan authorities fears of experiencing a combination of domestic and foreign pressure similar to the Georgian or Ukrainian scenarios and feeling "detached" from Russia after the change of administration in Ukraine. Having experienced opposition protests in 2002 and 2003 and being aware of vulnerability of their political image in the eyes of Western states, the administration of the PCRM took the events in Georgia and Ukraine as a reason to abruptly shift the foreign policy focus onto the EU.

Cooling in Russia-Moldova relations became the subjective factor; it was linked to the way in which Moldova refused in November 2003 to sign a memorandum on the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict (the Kozak Plan), which had been granted approval on the summit level. Bilateral relations continued to exacerbate until the worst case of 2006 in a series of demonstrative moves of both countries and, in the end, failed to meet state interests of Russia and Moldova (which is proven with the rapid normalization of relations in 2007-2009). The quarrel between Moscow and Chisinau that surprised many gave an additional impetus to the abrupt refocusing of Moldova on the EU.

Another factor that influenced the rapprochement between Moldova and the EU was the electoral considerations of Moldovan politicians that reflected alternations in the public opinion about European integration. Back in November 1997 Moldovan entry into the EU was supported by only 32% of citizens[4], but the scenario gained support of 68% by November 2003. Against that backdrop the authorities and opposition politicians started using more actively the subject of relations with the EU in their election rhetoric. In the end, the broad spread of Euro-optimism in society provided the EU with significant levers of influence on the domestic political situation in Moldova[5].

The effect of the aforesaid factors spurred on Moldova-EU relations in 2005 and brought about a whole range of agreements:

- the EU-Moldova Individual Action Plan was signed;

- the EU special envoy for Moldova was appointed and the sides exchanged diplomatic missions;

- the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was launched;

- the EU was granted the role of an observer in the new 5+2 negotiating format for settling the Transdniestrian conflict.

The EU took a number of new steps in 2006-2008:

- Moldova was granted GSP+ tariff preferences and additional trade preferences;

- the visa regime was relaxed;

- a unified visa center was opened in Chisinau.

Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin and the PCRM administration actively used rapprochement with the EU for foreign political purposes. The signing of the Action Plan with the EU in February 2005 before the March parliamentary election attested to EU approval of the new policy of the Moldovan communists, which denied the opposition a chance to count on the "orange revolution" scenario. The PCRM won the election but did not gain enough parliament seats to elect the president, and the authorities suggested the idea of "national consensus" of political forces of the country on the basis of rapprochement with the EU and European integration. The idea was the cornerstone of the Moldovan parliament`s declaration of political partnership for European integration published on March 24, 2005, and approved by all the parliamentary groups. That declaration was a formal ground, which enabled some opposition deputies to vote for the second term of Voronin`s presidency.

That internal political situation was unusual as the Moldovan political class known for a high degree of its polarization and disconnection manifested atypical unanimity about relations with the EU. As a result, many observers got an impression that the European integration idea might be the foundation of "national consensus" as the only point of contact of Moldovan statists, centrists and pan-Romania unionists.

Probably, the communist party administration expected the "national consensus" idea to secure the PCRM steady leadership in the political system and its role of the main partner of the EU on the Moldovan domestic political landscape. Still, hopes for the EU recognition of the PCRM as its "privileged partner" did not come true. Pro-European rhetoric was characteristic of both the ruling party and the opposition, which made it senseless for the EU to stake on just one political force and bear in mind PCRM interests in building relations with other domestic political actors.

Therefore, the "national consensus" policy, which strengthened PCRM positions in 2005, led to a number of problems later on:

- firstly, it increased dependence of the national administration on the EU policy;

- secondly, there was a need to normalize relations with Russia for economic and electoral considerations;

- thirdly, the EU kept criticizing Moldovan administration for attempts to limit the influence of unionist non-governmental structures;

- fourthly, Romania became a EU member in 2007 and its administration was extremely negative about the prospect of the PCRM stay in office;

- fifthly, abortive attempts to mount the economic and political pressure on Transdniestria in 2005-2006 caused regress in the negotiations.

These reasons led to normalization of relations with Russia in 2007- 2009 and resumption of the direct dialog with Russia and Transdniestria on the Transdniestrian conflict settlement. Hence, the Moldovan foreign policy turned somewhat multi-vector by 2009, which failed to meet EU interests. Meanwhile, Moldovan opposition forces that understood "national consensus" in the narrow (foreign political) sense of the word unrelated to the need for further support to parliamentary activity of the PCRM as the biggest party seeking rapprochement with the EU strengthened their positions. Polarization of political forces traditional for Moldova was displayed again in the local elections of 2007 and actually put an end to "political consensus"[6]; deepening contradictions resulted in a full-scale political crisis in 2009.

The crisis of 2009 was rooted to a large degree in the increase in political ambitions of Moldovan big business[7] united around Vlad Filat, Serafim Urechean and, later on, Vladimir Plahotniuc, during the second presidential term of Vladimir Voronin (2005-2009). Unionist forces grew active, as well, and enjoyed practically open support from Romanian President Traian Basescu. In this context the events of 2009 meant the capture of power by centrist political parties united around business interests of their leaders that hoped for the EU support jointly with the radical unionists who played the role of "cavalry" in the Chisinau riots in April 2009.

The accession to power of the Alliance for European Integration (AEU) in September 2009 created a new situation in the Moldova-EU relations. Although relations with the EU had been a key priority of the Moldovan authorities even before (since 2003), the change of administration in 2009 implied the end of attempts to balance the growing dependence of Moldova on the EU that were made in 2007-2009. The EU policy after 2009 simply confirmed presumptions that the EU regarded the PCRM as a forced partner from the very start and did not rule out significant broadening of cooperation with the accession to power of centrist parties.

First of all, that was proven with the EU reaction to the Chisinau riots after the parliamentary election of April 2009. Although the protesters were extremely aggressive and looted the presidential and parliamentary residencies, the EU criticized the Moldovan administration for rather feeble efforts to stop the disturbances. The attitude contrasted with the much more reserved reaction to the harsh dispersal of opposition rallies in Georgia in November 2007. Notably, the election of 2009 positively evaluated by international observer missions (as recorded in tentative conclusions of the OSCE mission[8]) was later described in EU documents as a ballot held with violations[9].

Secondly, financial support to Moldovan authorities increased a lot: EU financial support to Moldova stood at 270 million euro from 1991 through 2009, and allocations of 550 million euro[10] were approved for 2010-2013. Moldova enjoyed simultaneous bigger support from concrete Western countries and organizations - the IMF, the U.S. and Romania. Their total allocations before 2013 (together with EU programs) may top $2.6 billion, half of that sum (52%) to be assigned gratis[11]. This sum is equivalent to 45% of Moldovan GDP in prices of 2010 and is comparable with external support to Georgia after the war of 2008, which amounted to $4.55 billion in 2008-2010 (36% GDP in prices of 2008).

Thirdly, AEU parties were not criticized by Brussels for a number of political actions doubtful from the legal point of view. Such examples have been numerous:

- flagrant violations of the presidential election procedure in November 2011 - February 2012;

- the secret agreement (divulged) on the division of state posts, which cannot be divided between parties by law, on party principles;

- the Constitutional Court chairman was forced from the office on politically motivated grounds;

- the NIT main opposition channel was banned;

- ambiguous actions of the Central Elections Commission in the Chisinau mayoral election in 2011;

- the communist symbols, which are also the symbols of PCRM - the biggest opposition party in Moldova, were banned.

Disregard of such actions stands in stark contrast with the excessive attention given to the supremacy of law in Moldova in 2001-2009.

Fourthly, direct political contacts between the Moldovan administration and ruling elites of the Western states intensified after 2009. One of the outer manifestations of such intensified contacts were the visits of top-ranking Western politicians to Moldova within a brief period, among them German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, European Union Council President Herman van Rompuy, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and U.S. Vice-President George Biden. East European countries have also taken a bigger interest in Moldova: in addition to the traditionally active Romania, political contacts with Poland and Hungary were intensified. The Polish interest was based on leadership ambitions in the Eastern Partnership program, while Hungary wished to balance Romanian attempts of mounting its influence in Moldova.[12]

The fact that Moldova is the biggest recipient of EU and Western financial aid per capita in the CIS (with the exception of Georgia) requires an additional explanation. Incorporation of the policy of European countries as regards Moldova in the context of EU interests in Ukraine seems to play the main role in this process. The Ukrainian admission to the EU is not possible for objective regions but the official recognition of that fact by Brussels and European capitals is not possible either. Therefore, the EU may view relations with Moldova as an example for Ukraine: Chisinau may be "a testing ground" for various forms of privileged cooperation with the EU bound to present to the authorities and people of Ukraine the advantages of orientation at Brussels. The small size of Moldova and its geographic proximity lets the EU to be guided with political rather than economic considerations in such matters as the scope of financial programs, trade and migration regimes and the like. There is an interesting comparison of the EU policy on Moldova and the U.S. policy on Georgia: both the EU and the U.S. have a wish to have a "junior" partner on the post-Soviet space, relations with which would absolutely fit the logic of relations with larger neighbors.

An important factor is the Moldovan policy towards legal rapprochement with the EU. A key condition set by the EU at negotiations on new agreements with Moldova (a free trade zone, association and visa regime liberalization) is the Moldovan commitment to reconcile its legal norms with the EU norms. According to some estimates, the adoption of over 20,000 legal norms is pending, and about 10,000 of them have been adopted and entered into force. This creates political and legal difficulties for Moldova`s involvement in integration structures of the post-Soviet space - legislative adjustments strengthen the priority of European integration as a foreign policy objective. Under these circumstances even a change in the regional situation or a change of administration in Moldova may not be sufficient for reviewing the structure of foreign political priorities of the country.

Measures towards the involvement of Transdniestria in financial support programs are a part of the EU policy as regards Moldova. A practical step to the effect is the creation of the Dniester euro-region in Ukraine`s Vynnytsa region, six Moldovan regions and two districts of Transdniestria (Camenca and Ribnita).

The Dniester euro-region is the fourth project of the sort implemented in Moldova: the first euro-regions Northern Prut, Siret-Prut-Dniester and Lower Danube were formed in 1998. The main difference of the new euro-region from the previous projects is the inclusion of Transdniestria in its orbit. The question of the special status and borders was avoided, and the Moldovan territory was viewed as a single unity. The discussion of the Dniester euro-region plans started in 2008 but the political crisis in Moldova and the lack of a clear support from Transdniestrian President Igor Smirnov deferred the agreement until February 2012, right before which the Transdniestrian administration changed.

The EU allotted 12 million euros in 2011 for rapprochement of two banks of the Dniester River. The program targeted promotion of unity of the Republic of Moldova and the opening of centers to support small business (the so-called business incubators) in Tiraspol, Bendery and Ribnita for setting forth the creation of business networks throughout the Republic of Moldova[13]. According to estimates, the EU provided 20 million euro worth of trade preferences to Transdniestrian manufacturers and businesses. It is also planned to engage local authorities in EU programs.

The entire territory of Moldova, including Transdniestria, is the sphere of application of such EU programs for 2007-2013 as the border cooperation program of Romania, Ukraine and Moldova with the total budget of 126.7 million euro and similar programs for Black Sea countries (17.3 million euro) and Southeastern Europe (2 million euro). Presumably, the engagement of Transdniestria in EU financial programs is an attempt to give an alternative to Russian economic support rendered to the region. The possibility to attract bigger attention of the public, particular population groups and the media of Transdniestria to EU programs may become a factor of the EU higher influence on the policy of the Transdniestrian authorities and the Transdniestrian conflict settlement.

The scope of EU programs in Transdniestria is much smaller than Russian economic assistance to the region, which is a deterring factor for Brussels. For instance, Russia plans to assign 3 billion rubles worth of assistance in 2013, and considering the existent model of gas relations the real economic support to Transdniestria is much higher than its official amounts. The EU may enlarge allocations for its programs in the future, but the potential of Transdniestria`s involvement depends a lot on the readiness of Tiraspol to participate.

There are signs of a bigger interest of the new Transdniestrian administration than President Igor Smirnov used to have. EU interaction with Transdniestria is growing amid the resumption of the direct dialog between Chisinau and Tiraspol, which reflects the EU bigger wish to strengthen its position in the Transdniestrian peace process. The elaboration and holding of a unified foreign policy of the EU in the relations with Moldova encounter a number of problems nonetheless. The first group of problems is related to the weakening euro-optimism of the Moldovan population. The open support to the ruling coalition against the background of polarization of political forces causes disappointment of some residents in the EU: 76% supported the entry in the EU in November 2007 and 8% were against; the indices stood at 61% and 18% respectively in May 2010 and 52% and 30% in May 2012, which were the lowest and highest rates in the past decade. Other factors that may prompt the lowering of EU popularity are tiredness of a part of the population of waiting for membership in that organization (the effect of excessive expectations) and bigger public attention to socioeconomic crises in the EU.

The second group of problems is the amassed potential of deeper inter-ethnic confrontations over the foreign political focus of Moldova. The majority of members of ethnic minorities supported accession to the EU in the middle of the 2000s, but the number of EU supporters exceeded the number of opponents only amongst ethnic Moldovans in 2012, while the entry into the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was favored by the majority of Moldovans and ethnic minorities. The dynamics negative for the European Union was triggered with the presence of the nationalist Liberal Party in the EU-backed ruling coalition and its policy causes a strongly negative reaction of national minorities.

The events of early 2012 when Moldovan authorities illegally tried to cancel the constitutional procedure of the presidential election, which caused criticism of the Council of Europe president and the Venice Commission but not of the European Commission, sent an alarming signal. Moldovan regions with ethnic flavors (the Russian-speaking Balti, the Gagauz autonomous district and the Bulgarian Taraclia) responded with disobedience to the government, which created the most serious crisis in the relations between the center and regions after 1992 and led to the annulment of the decision of the ruling coalition. The EU reaction to these events mirrors insufficient attention to the specifics of ethno-political processes in the country. As a result, national minorities develop a conviction that the EU ignores their interests.

The third group of problems is related to consequences of the Romanian entry into the EU in 2007 and the search for an optimal correlation of EU and Romanian interests on the Moldovan track. A leading role in the definition of the EU policy regarding Moldova is traditionally played by Germany supported by France. That was proven, in particular, with the format of negotiations on the Transdniestrian conflict settlement held at the summit of Russia, France and Germany in Deauville in October 2010. Already in the 1990s Germany took the leading position in Moldovan contacts with EU states[14] and it is the main sponsor of European programs of financial support to Moldova at present.

In turn, Romania aspires for a special role in the definition of the relevant EU policy and its own policy is uncoordinated with Brussels in many aspects. Such elements of this policy as Moldova`s definition as "a second Romanian state", active support to Romanization of the Moldovan media and the cultural and educational space[15] and extensive issue of passports to Moldovan population fail to meet the interests of a number of European countries, among them:

- Germany in the part of coordination and final objectives of the EU policy on Moldova;

- Italy and Spain due to the enhanced attention to the labor migration problem;

-Hungary due to its traditional rivalry with Romania;

- Bulgaria due to the negative attitude of the Bulgarian minority in Moldova to attempts of Romanization of ethnic processes;

- Romania`s denial of recognition to Moldovan national identity is inconsistent with the EU principles of ethnic policy[16].

Coordination of an EU common foreign policy is a thorny task under these circumstances. Hence, attempts are being made to balance the Bucharest policy. Romanian experts note that Hungarian representatives[17] were chosen repeatedly to take the positions of the EU special envoy for Moldova and the head of the EUBAM mission. Serious contradictions over the conclusion of a Moldovan-Romanian border treaty have just been removed. Under the pressure of Germany and France, the Romanian authorities revoked their initial objections and agreed to sign the treaty in October 2010. Obviously, it was not a coincidence that the event happened simultaneously with the visit of Chancellor Angela Merkel to Bucharest and the summit of Russia, France and Germany in Deauville, which fit the context of negotiations on the Transdniestrian conflict settlement.

Finally, the fourth group of problems complicating Moldova`s latching on to the EU political orbit is about Moldovan foreign economic relations, which are still not centered on the EU but are divided between the EU and the CIS. Remarkably, the significant intensification of political relations with the EU in 2004-2011 was not accompanied with a serious increase of the EU role in the structure of Moldova`s foreign trade. In that period the share of exports to 27 EU countries in the overall structure of Moldovan exports enlarged from 40.7% to 48.9%, and the share of post-Soviet republics (twelve CIS countries) dipped from 51.0% to 41.5%[18].

The change was not gradual; it mostly resulted from the Russian ban on imports of Moldovan wine, which was in effect in 2006-2007. So, the interests of a number of large Moldovan producers are steadily linked to markets of Russia and other CIS countries, which have a certain projection on the political sphere. As certain Moldovan experts justly say, one should not overestimate the role of orientation at the EU plays in the settlement of key problems of the Moldovan society[19]. There has been no serious improvement in such keynote problems of Moldova as the scale of labor migration, prosperity of residents, quality of infrastructure and so on.

The energy situation remains complicated. Moldova`s affiliation to the EU Third Energy Package in October 2011 displayed the impossibility to implement some of its provisions. Following negotiations with Russia, the Moldovan government decided in October 2012 to delay for four years (until 2020) the time of the package`s entry into force on the national territory. Execution of Moldovan commitments under the EU Third Energy Package is unthinkable with the preservation of the current structure of the country`s gas market. Moldovagas, the main shareholders of which are Gazprom (50%), the Moldovan government (35.3%) and the Transdniestrian administration (13.4%), handles the entire cycle of gas supply to Moldova. The company makes important decisions with no less than 90% of shareholders` votes[20], which means the intentions of the Moldovan government to restructure the company cannot come true without consent of Gazprom. The Russian side officially declared its position at negotiations in October 2012: it set as one of the conditions for the 30% gas price discount Moldova`s abandonment of its energy commitments to the EU in 2010 - 2011.

It must be noted that by declaring the wish to join the EU Moldova preserves its membership in the CIS and related benefits, among them visa-free travel with Russia. Moldova`s entry into the EU alongside membership in the CIS would be impossible but the majority of political leaders ignores this contradiction and does not indicate the possibility of the country`s secession from the CIS. The reason is the economic and electoral considerations of Moldovan politicians. Russia is the main center of attraction of Moldovan labor migration, the biggest importer of Moldovan wine and food, the sole supplier of energy resources and the major intermediary in the Transdniestrian settlement negotiations. In this situation preservation of the CIS membership has always enjoyed public support comparable with the scenario of accession to the EU: most of the population does not see the contradiction, which would have been unavoidable in real life.

Summing up, it must be noted that relations with the EU declared as the main foreign political priority of Moldova are in the center of attention of the Moldovan political class. Nevertheless, the country has a number of prerequisites which, under certain foreign circumstances, may lead to more intensive participation of Chisinau in integration processes on the post-Soviet space. Ukrainian accession to the Customs Union or a more profound debt crisis in the EU than expected could become external conditions to bring about this scenario. As the policy of Moldova-EU rapprochement encounters a number of problems and contradictions, the emergence of these circumstances may lead to alternations in the structure of Moldovan foreign political priorities.

If the aforesaid foreign circumstances do not emerge, the EU is likely to retain its competitive advantage over the Customs Union in the medium and shorter prospect in the eyes of Moldovan politicians. The European Union and the Moldovan administration are taking significant effort to preserve the status quo for a long prospect. Contemporary Moldova is lacking influential forces to unwaveringly support the priority of integration on the post-Soviet space. Possibility for maneuver in relations with Russia is narrowing alongside Moldova`s bonding to the EU in such issues as external funding and legal rapprochement. Therefore a mandatory condition for preservation of the Russian position in relations with Moldova is a more consistent and systemic policy oriented towards long-term goals - preservation and intensification of Moldovan participation in structures on the post-Soviet space.

Kirillov V.B., Putintsev I.S. The Relations Between Moldova and the EU in 1998 - 2012.

Summary: The article reviews the relations between Moldova and the EU at the current stage. Reasons for the strengthening of cooperation between Moldova and the EU in these years are being analyzed, as well as the problems that further development of cooperation can face. It is described how relations with the EU influence the prospects of Moldova`s participation in the integration process in the post-Soviet space.

Keywords

Moldova, European Union, Russia, Transdniestria, Customs Union, euroregions, Alliance for European Integration (AEI), Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM)


Kirillov Viktor Borisovich - - Ph.D., Professor of the Russian Foreign Ministry MGIMO University Department of European and American Studies, Academic Pro-Rector, E-mail: vestnik@mgimo.ru

Putintsev Igor Sergeyevich - Russian Foreign Ministry MGIMO University regional studies master`s student. E-mail: vestnik@mgimo.ru


Notes

[1] Hereinafter (excluding the description of the situation in the 1990s) we use data of sociological polls held regularly after 2001 by the Chisinau Institute for Public Policy and published under the name "Public Opinion Barometer" [an online resource]. - Available at http://www.ipp.md/lib.php?l=ro&idc=156

[2] Barbe a. Euro-integration as a national idea of the Republic of Moldova. // Revista de istorie a Moldovei. - 2008. - No3 (75). pg. 96.

[3] Popescu N. Moldova between Southeast Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. // 10 years of the CIS - search, losses, gains. /Edited by í. í. Narinsky, A.V. Malgin; Russian Foreign Ministry MGIMO Center for Post-Soviet Studies. - í.: Publishing House VolGU, 2001. pg. 216.

[4] Gud?m A. Uniunea European? ?i Republica Moldova ca parteneri. - Chi?in?u: TACIS, 2002. pg. 2.

[5] Kennedy, R. Moldova. // The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and Failures. / Ed. by D. ? Beach?in and A. Polese. - N. Y.: Routledge, 2010. pg. 78.

[6] Varzari P., T?b?r?? I. Evolu?ia statului Republica Moldova prin prisma func?ionalit??ii elitei politice ?i a societ??ii civile. // Revista de filozofie, sociologie si ?tiin?e politice. - 2011. - No1. pg. 76.

[7] Botan I. Parties and Democratization in the Republic of Moldova. // Governance and Democracy. - 2008. - No 1. pg. 42.

[8] Statement on Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. / International Election Observation Mission (Parliamentary Election, Republic of Moldova - 5 April, 2009). [online resource]. - Available at http://www.osce.org/odihr/50781

[9] Republic of Moldova National Indicative Programme 2011 - 2013. / European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. pg. 14. [online resource]. - Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enp_nip_moldova_en.pdf

[10] Devyatkov á. V. Moldova on the Crossroads of Relations with Russia and the EU // Topical Problems of Europe. - 2011. - No 2. pg. 190.

[11] Cairanean N., Veverita E., Veverita P. The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis in the Economies of the Former Soviet Union - the Case of Moldova. / CASE Network Reports No. 99. - Warsaw: Center for Social and Economic Research, 2011. P. 66.

[12] Gabor D. Hungary and Moldova in 1991-2011. Hungarian Interests: Theory and Practice. // Revista moldoveneasc? de drept interna?ional ?i rela?ii interna?ionale. - 2011. - No 4. pg. 142 - 143.

[13] Annex 2: Action Fiche for the Republic of Moldova - AAP 2011. / European Commission Implementing Decision of 13/07/2011. Pg. 10, 14. [online resource]. - Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2011/af_aap_2011_mda.pdf

[14] Vorobyova L.M. Relations between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova // Moldova: Contemporary Development Trends. / Edited by Y. M. Kozhokin; RISI. - í.: ROSSPEN, 2004. pg. 160 - 163.

[15] Ciobu E. Apari?ia ?i dezvoltarea statului Republica Moldova: probleme ?i perspective ale identit??ii. // Revista moldoveneasc? de drept interna?ional ?i rela?ii interna?ionale. - 2011. - No 4. pg. 133.

[16] Galushenko O.S. Dynamics of Moldovan numbers and inhabitance areal in the late 19th century - early 21st century. // Revista de etnologie ?i culturologie. - 2008. - Vol. IV. pg. 147.

[17] Dungaciu D. Cine s?ntem noi? Cronici de la Est de Vest. - Chi?in?u: Cartier, 2009. pgP. 166.

[18] According to the Moldovan National Statistics Bureau. [online resource.] - Available at: http://www.statistica.md/

[19] Burian A. Geopolitical Transformations in the South-East Europe and Institutional Reforms in the Republic of Moldova. // Revista moldoveneasc? de drept interna?ional ?i rela?ii interna?ionale. - 2007. - No 1 - 2. pg. 52.

[20] Moldova on Crossroads? // Gas Business. September 2012. [online resource] - Available at: http://gb2012.ru/?p=3600

10 ÉÀÎÑ 2013

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