Conflict, when dealing with power, generally tends to be analyzed in Russian sources through the prism of national interest and power play. New phenomena, such as terrorism, asymmetric warfare, popular uprisings (e.g. Arab Spring), and the controversial notion of globalization, tend to be placed in realist frames of balancing, interest and state politics. This essay uses a constructivist approach to conflict by analyzing the evolution of the ‘Other’ concept and stressing its importance as an element reflecting and cementing the conflict potential at a collective, public level. The argument links the evolution of the Other to its multi-level self-identities, formation of nation-state-self, increase in accessible information flows. By making a socio-historical cut, the essay suggests that conflict ‘others’ today have become more complex, which inhibits conflict resolution and leads us to reevaluate the often neglected role of constructivist analysis.

The analysis of conflicts through the prism of the realism theory has been the dominant view of international relations both in the West and Russia since the time when the academic subject of international relations appeared. It was supposed to explain the occurrence and recurrence of wars. The approach was particularly widely applied to the analysis of “Cold War” conflicts by domestic historians and political thinkers when the balance of forces and interests, the assessment of objective possibilities and the search for counterbalances in the archaic system of international relations were an integral part of the political decision making process. This essay does not aim to negate the realism of this analysis but seeks to supplement theoretical explanations of conflicts with a constructivist vision of the image of “the other”. As with historical development of the conflict and conflict-related information and the modern relationship between the authorities and the society the image was growing complex, the public perception acquired a substantial potential to resolve or create the conflict[1].

Traditional realism explains conflicts with the human nature (Hobbs, Morgenthau) and the physical ability to attain a self goal with regard to other states (the theory of comparative advantage) and reaches its apogee in the “mirror” philosophical formulas of Clausewitz and Foucault describing war as another method of politics and politics as another method of war. Structural realism adds the presumption of the anarchic nature of international relations and explains conflicts with the absence of deterrents and obstacles to them[2] in a system devoid of efficient supranational controlling mechanisms (which is the source of the theory of relatively stable international relations in a bi-polar system).

Theories alternative to realism also tend to view conflicts on the level of reasons and motivations for political decisions and give the priority to the state policy in an international conflict. Conflicts are explained with economic confrontation and property relations (Marxism) or the Western political theory of “the democratic world” (a offspring of liberalism), according to which democracies have no conflicts between themselves, imply objectively lineal development of a conflict as a phenomenon of international politics and its “exhaustibility” upon the attainment of the required economic or internal political criteria. However, admitting the importance of concepts of systemic anarchy and rational (political, economic or value-centered) behavior of states, one cannot disregard the broadening diversity of actors of the international political system and transformations of traditional relationships in the “state-conflict-information-society” system and their perception of each other.

A constructivist approach to the analysis of conflicts, used in this essay as the main analytical instrument, probes the influence of irrational perception and implies an essential role of identity in the conflict. Identity means self-perception by constantly comparing of the actor with “the Other” differing from him. Identity may have an indefinite number of levels, depending on the role of the identity bearer at a particular moment of time (simultaneously such parameters as nationality, political views, social status and others are identified and may be applied to various external factors). Therefore, self-perception happens not as much through determination of an objective difference, which the self-identity deems important[3] and self-generating, as through contact with a group identified as “the other” because of the inconsistency of distinctiveness of “the self” and “the other”. A borderline between “self” and “the other’s” groups is drawn in such contacts[4]: “One understands who he is by understanding who “the other” is[5]”.

The world political processes cannot be perceived without dividing “the self” and “the other” and comparing them. A contact between different identities “creates a spontaneous perception of a stranger as “the other”, alien and different from us”[6], which creates “the self” and “the other” paradigm. The understanding of “the self” and “the other” and association with “the self” determine to a large degree perception of the alien identity and self actions, which are later transformed into political measures and a public reaction to such. This lead-in to the theory is necessary to understand the socio-historical analysis of “the other” concept transformations in the contemporary conflicts. This essay gives historical examples of conflicts, views conflicts from the angle of generalized perception of “the self” and “the other” and intentionally avoids political causes of decisions for isolating the constructivist element. The main thesis of this essay is the complicating image of “the other” alongside the growing awareness of the borderline between “the self” and “the other”, identities in the dense information space, and alternating comparative depth of the conflicts perception in the light of the previous “others”.

Image of “the other” in the historical context: borderline between “self” and “the other” and their role

It is essential for understanding evolution of the image of “the other” to remember who may be regarded as “the self” and “the other” in the variable context of development of self-perception of identities. The constructivist approach implies that “the other” is not “the self”, i.e. it could be any category outside of the “self” identity that does not share the “self” distinctions. The concept of “the other” is widely spread in political psychology. Yet, the history of international conflicts directly relates “the other” to the relationships between the authorities and the public (political discourse), which have undergone important transformations over the past two centuries.

As a rule, “the other” has the negative image in the conflict and is blamed for it (in the majority of cases, the self identity cannot be negative[7]), but shared or individual responsibility for political decisions of the elite and the society inside the potential “other” is of key importance. The most illustrative example is the discussion about causes of the World War II between supporters of separation of the Nazi ideology and regime from the German ethnos, on one hand, and stereotypes claiming the Germans are “aggressive” by nature, on the other. In both cases the vision of relations between the authorities and the public draws the border on “the other” with his negative attributes and guilt for the conflict.

The authorities-public relations historically had a similar significance for perception of the “self” subject and its possible borders: how large is the objective gap between the access to power and neighboring opportunities between the elites and the people and whether it creates an impediment to the generation of a common “self” even in spite of other major similarities (cultural, language, territorial). Imperial conflicts under monarchic governance give grounds to suggest a bigger split of the “self” identity into social status sub-categories, which determinate perception of oneself in that time. For instance, in the Patriotic War of 1812, French elites were “the other” in the eyes of the Russian political elite but both maintained relations before and after the war (France remained a cultural “self” for the then Russia outside the conflict). There are other grounds for inconsistency between the “self” and “other” identities, on one hand, and state borders of ethnic groups, on the other hand: similarity of the aristocratic status and social structure and interests of both elites. Therefore, outside the conflict, there is a high probability of association between the Russian elite and the French elite rather than the people, within the limits of the aristocratic “self”, in which the main difference from “the other” is prosperity and common values.

On the contrary, the people (excluding the elite) had no pre-war contact with “the other” and, consequentially, had no objective unity or disunity with the French. According to historical and literature sources, the image of “the other” in the people’s eyes in the Patriotic War of 1812 was based on nationality and language stereotypes (French means “the other”), religious stereotypes (Orthodox is “the self”), and external characteristics (military uniforms: cap badges, blue jackets and related popular nicknames of “the other”). Meanwhile, Russian “self” elite and the people sometimes shared no values or even had different visions and understanding of reasons for the conflict.

The same trend can be seen in Russian-Turkish conflicts. Perception of “the other” is based on the same common features the “self” people see in themselves: language and religion (Orthodox as “the self” and Unorthodox is “the other”). “The other” is simplified with stereotypes: “unorthodox”, “evil” and naturally bad (the stereotype created a simple image of “the other” without explaining motives). Significance of perfunctory and external distinctions is likely rooted in the impossible profound perception of “the self” and other criteria of similarity with other members of the “self” identity in the limited information and educational space. The “self” identity traditionally sees oneself positively as “people of the correct behavior”[8].

In a broader sense, such behavior has been historically accurate and distinctions of “the other” in terms of traditions (language, religion and clothes) are an important feature, which draws a borderline between “the self” and “the other” without bigger knowledge and understanding of each other. Hence, the system, where the social status draws borders of the self-identity and gives an important role to the “self” authorities and society. The notions of “self” elite and people may differ and there may be a different level of contact, knowledge and relations between “the self” and “the other.” The borderline between “the self” and “the other” is non-existent: most probably, the identity borderline may be drawn between aristocracy and peasants in the absence of a conflict, and a more consolidated perception of “the self” and the borderline with “the other” may appear developing mutual dependence of the authorities and the society in the modern democratic system of nation states.

Simultaneously, trends towards greater consistency of identities in a conflict within borders of nation states, alongside growing national and patriotic self-realization uniting different kinds of “the self” inside the country”, will promote evolution of the role that the image of “the other” has been traditionally playing before “new wars”. In the 20th century conflicts unprecedented by scale and casualties, a key function of the image of “the other”, were not simply the alienation as somebody “not of our own” with a different behavior, but also his psychological “demonization”, deprivation of the human image and ascription of the ethnic image. This process is based, to a large extent, on the borderline drawn between “the self” and “the other” by visible and external characteristics, but some researchers note[9], it is being fostered by warring sides and governments for cushioning the psychological barrier of mass murders under the varying conditions of the conflict.

The image of “the other” is not simply something different (a Frenchman, an unorthodox) but intentionally disgusting and less humane (the trend that develops into the modern threat of the terrorist “other”). Along the growing number of global and inter-civilization conflicts rather than transboundary confrontations (post-colonial conflicts between various cultures and races, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and others), the West develops a faceless but disgusting racial stereotype of the exaggerated quantity (the demographic image of Asia), the image of “the other.” This trend emphasizes a conflict between the constructivist approach and notions of realism regarding the natural aggressiveness of people: demonization of “the other” is spreading alongside the development of military technologies and growing scale of destruction and casualties, thus reconciling “the self” with the violence around (that is, violence is rejected by human psychology rather than it is an inseparable part). The effect of demonization demonstrates the increasing significance of the image of “the other” for maintaining the conflict potential.

Demonization of “the other” and, consequentially, accumulation of reciprocal aggression are encouraged not only with the wish to smooth over and accept the degree of violence but also with the abundant information. The World War I becomes a crucial point for the heroic military epic: the appearance and growing accessibility of information about casualties, war crimes and the technologically possible level of violence create a repulsive image of war not only in historical documents but even in popular culture, while the scale of destruction makes military conflicts economically unprofitable[10].

War crimes of the WWII gave the final touch to the negative image of the military conflict: war stops being attractive and economically beneficial with the development of international institutions and the UN and from the point of view of the image.

“Other” concept in modern conflict: information and comparative complexity

The information revolution and the changed attitude to war and the scale of conflicts complicating the subject and functions of “the other” image resulted in a modern image of “the other” in a conflict. The processes of demonization and attribution of clear distinctions in the appearance and behavior of “the other” have been preserved until now one way or another[11]. Yet traditional forms and images of “the other” have acquired new peculiarities caused by further development of earlier trends:

– changed nature of conflicts (the appearance of new and asymmetric wars);

– accessible and quickly distributed information;

– new ability of “the self” to realize the “self” identity and compare it with other conflicts (higher levels of political self-perception and education).

This section is analyzing several trends proving the complicating image of “the other” and his role:

1. Change of the “self” perception and image of “the other”. The previous examples displayed gradual evolution of the relationship between the authorities and the society and the influence of the elite-public division on the perception of homogeneity and unity of “the self” and “the other”. This relationship provided, to a considerable degree, confidence in the image of “the other” offered by “the self”. In a divided system (monarchic, for instance) of relations between the authorities and the people, the people’s “self” tended to create stereotypes and search for distinctions from “the other” in the conflict, which occurred irrespective of the will of the people’s self. For instance, the people’s self had only a general idea about causes of the conflict in the wars against Napoleon and Turkey and followed the decisions of the elite “self”. The simple and objectively unfounded image of “the self” (for instance, a Turk – an unorthodox – evil) was a mechanism of psychological adaptation to the presence of the enemy and the imposed conflict as such.

In the modern relationship between the authorities and the society, especially in the democratic environment and discussions between “self” actors, the possibility that “the other” will not be doubted is much lower. The distance between the authorities and the society has reduced a lot, and now amid the increased contacts with “the other” in the globalized and open economies and the influx of daily information about “the self” and “the other” in a conflict involving everyone, the simple belief in the alien nature and hostility of “the other” is not enough.

The structure and self-awareness of “the self” is undergoing crucial changes with the development of the democratic system: “the self” is being institutionalized in the nation state. The public “self” becomes involved in the political process through elections, the impact of the public opinion, parties, protests and other forms of political expression. People’s feeling of the direct participation in political decisions and creation of “the others” develop with the establishment of political rights and freedoms. As education and political awareness are growing, the society starts to believe in its ability to comprehend and investigate causes of political phenomena, including conflicts. People have an illusion that their knowledge is correct. There is a third person effect[12], which demonstrates different effects of the media influence on the public perception: everyone believes, one can handle the bulk of information and understates the media influence on one’s own opinion while attributing dependence on the media to other people. Therefore, the public “self”, which is a combination of individuals, develops a different kind of awareness and perception of one’s abilities in political decisions and creation of “the others”. In the modern conflict the image of “the other” is formed by the society by its own conviction and, as a result, illusory knowledge of “the other” (the society can understand political processes).

An indirect consequence of the evolution of “the self” and realization of one’s limits and relation to politics and conflicts is the dynamics of formation and alternation of the image of “the other”. The alien nature of “the other” is more doubted in the beginning of the conflict, it is increasingly difficult to change the image of the once alienated “other” if “the self” is confident of one’s convictions. As an example we can view the Cold War remnants in the modern Russian-U.S. relations: once the “other” stereotype was formed, the society has been unable to change its impression for several decades;

2. Speedier information exchange and the eventful image of “the other”. The modern information society proceeds from the idea of common human rights and values. The exclusiveness of one’s correct behavior (the previous formula of “the self” as “people of the correct behavior”) is put in the context of common aspirations: the behavior may differ externally but final goals of “the self” and “the other” are the same. The distinctions of behavior or appearance may still be used as elements of the alien “other” but in a modern conflict the image of “the other” often becomes event-centered.

With the information being spread more quickly (television, the Internet, blogs, YouTube and twitter), the role of separate events and related information grows drastically at the initial stages of the “the other” image formation. The influence of information on the political behavior of democratic states grows proportionally: election cycles make brief the political conclusions about “the other”. Media and Internet reports and amateur videos of clashes between insurgents and governmental forces in Libya or Syria had a significant influence on the formation and perception of the image of “the other” in Europe and the United States”. Easily accessible information, which displays the shocking proximity of violence and triggers the political surge for action, creates an illusion of authenticity and lasting alienation of “the other” before the conflict: current events are taken for an additional proof to what “has been known for long”[13]. This way, the image of “the other” Qaddafi and al-Assad creates an illusion of temporal authenticity.

The event-centered formation of the image of “the other” is accelerating. The character of the conflict changes, as well: in contrast to long inter-state wars, the majority of modern hostilities are asymmetric conflicts or clashes with non-governmental forces. The period between an event, a related report and formation of the image of “the other” on the basis of this information has been minimized. Hence, the public perception of “the other” is not only fragmented into concrete events but also accelerates objectively;

3. Deepening comparative element of the image of “the other”. The illusion of the past in the present-day context may have the opposite effect: the modern “other” is frequently associated with images of the past events. This change of “the other” image also becomes possible thanks to two parallel trends. On one hand, this is brought about by the complexity of the information space and political knowledge. On the other hand, “the self” is consolidated within nation states, which makes it possible to store the former images of “the other” in the collective memory of the “self” identity relatively stable within borders. There has been a substantial growth not only in the ability to compare images of “the other” in the search for their alien attributes (comparative function), but also credibility of the image of “the other” due to stable parallels it evokes (associative function).

This change complicates the image of “the other” through metaphorical stereotyping. In addition to the external distinctive features, there are also associations of the alien nature of “the other”, which are not based on the real events or external differences. Metaphors (comparisons) referring to the well-known and single-value events of the past “shift the meaning and evaluation of one event to another”[14]. For instance, description of unclear or little known events with parallels with Hitler, Nazism or genocide creates a strictly negative framework for the original perception of “the other” (e.g. the Western perception of the Arab Spring). The image of “the other” accumulates negative features: aggression, violence, disrespect for human values and other stereotypes. On the other hand, political actions can also be compared: the Russian public views NATO interference in the Libyan crisis due to the negative impression from the U.S. interference in Iraq in 2003[15]. These events are viewed as similar and the perception of the past events may be extrapolated into the present events.

Comparative complication of the image of “the other” is demonstrated not only in the influence of associations on the alienation of “the other” but also in the placing of a concrete “other” into the global context of the perception of “the self” and “the other”. The growing political mutual dependence and spread of information involves the “self” identity into the conflict of third groups (“the other” vs. “the other”). The “self” is placed into a supranational context: in spite of political disagreement with the allies’ invasion of Iraq, Russia, Germany and France do not associate themselves with the Iraqi “other”. Previously, the third parties’ attitude to conflicts was formed on the level of political interest (e.g. non-involvement of some European countries in anti-Napoleon coalitions), but now “the self” reaction is put into a global system of coordinates “rather self” and “rather other” and becomes a part of mass perception.

Trends of development of “the other” image and historical examples presented in this essay allow us to present the scheme showing how this phenomenon has been evolving and becoming complicated:

We have already been able to distinguish further trends in evolution of “the other” and “the self”. On one hand, the internal conflicts and protest movements are leading to fragmentation of the “self” from the national level to other collective identities. On the other hand, social and value globalization develops the trend of context association of “the self” with other “selves” and shifts the border of identity to the field of values (for instance, a democratic “self”). Alongside the complexity of the image of “the other” and the changing realization of “the self”, evolution of identity in the conflict exposes the growing importance of the constructivist analysis, which explains a conflict not from the position of rational behavior but via reconstruction of stereotypes, ideas and analogues that determine both collective and state perceptions.

Evolution of the Other in Modern Conflict: a Constructivist Experience of Conflict

By D.V. Chernobrov

Conflict, when dealing with power, generally tends to be analyzed in Russian sources through the prism of national interest and power play. New phenomena, such as terrorism, asymmetric warfare, popular uprisings (e.g. Arab Spring), and the controversial notion of globalization, tend to be placed in realist frames of balancing, interest and state politics. This essay uses a constructivist approach to conflict by analyzing the evolution of the ‘Other’ concept and stressing its importance as an element reflecting and cementing the conflict potential at a collective, public level. The argument links the evolution of the Other to its multi-level self-identities, formation of nation-state-self, increase in accessible information flows. By making a socio-historical cut, the essay suggests that conflict ‘others’ today have become more complex, which inhibits conflict resolution and leads us to reevaluate the often neglected role of constructivist analysis.

Key Words

Identity, conflict, political psychology, self and other, constructivism; perception

Notes

[1] A more detailed analysis of the conflict potential of the image of “the other” is done in the essay “Information Change of the Image of “the Other” in the Solution of International Conflicts” written by D.V. Chernobrov.// Vestnik No 5 (20), 2011. This essay develops the earlier conclusion and puts into the historical context of evolution of the image of “the other”.
[2] One of the main theses of K. Waltz.
[3] Barth F. (edited) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1998.
[4] An example of the formation of this border may be religious intolerance as a level of identity (in this case based on religion). Amid numerous objective distinctions between an abstract religious group and other people (gender, age, nationality, social status, personal preferences, and attitude to politics or art), the question of religion becomes the socially “designed” distinction and a borderline between the “self” and “other” identities. Nevertheless, before the conflict this distinction is not a group-forming for “the other” and, until the conflict begins, neither “the self” nor “the other” exist in the mutually exclusive form the border takes in their encounter.
[5] Todorov, T. The Conquest of America: the Question of the Other. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. p. 254.
[6] Idem, p. 86.
[7] Pennebaker J., Paez D., and Rime B (edited) Collective Memory of Political Events. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997, pp. 147–175.
[8] Hafer C., Olson J., and Peterson A. Extreme Harmdoing: a View from the Social Psychology of Justice. // Esses, V. and Vernon R. Explaining the Breakdown of Ethnic Relations. Why Neighbors Kill. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 17–40. p. 29.
[9] Including Braestrup 1983, Dower 1986.
[10] Keynes J. The Economic Consequences of Peace. Harcourt, 1920.
[11] Examples are demonization of the regimes of Qaddafi and al-Assad by the Western media in the past two years, the significant level of ethnic stereotypes and creation of anti-Islamic prejudices after the spread of global terrorism and preservation of nationalism using similar methods to form the image of “the other” in Russia and abroad.
[12] The third person effect was suggested by sociologist Davison in 1983 and supported with experiments of R. Perloff in 1999.
[13] Zizek S. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso, 2008. p. 59.
[14] Jackson P. Civilizing the Enemy. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2006. С. 29.
[15] Proven with scientific experiment (Chernobrov D.V.) staged at the MGIMO (U) of the MFA of Russia in September 2012 to model the effect of analogs and comparisons on the perception of the Arab Spring.

Dmitry Vitalyevich Chernobrov– Cambridge University doctoral candidate, Associate Professor of MGIMO (U) of the MFA of Russia. E-mail: dmitry.chernobrov@gmail.com

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Опублик.: 08.07.13
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