The launch of the First Artificial Earth Satellite had geopolitical importance. Originally geospace (habitation space on the Earth) was piecemeal, it was a world of distributed locations. Navigation made it more holistic. Aviation made it even more holistic. Communication systems added the final touch to it - geospace became closed. Stages of geospace formation can be measured very approximately, to an accuracy of centuries. As for transition of geospace to a new quality, it happened before our eyes in one moment. And we know the exact date. On October 4, 1957 geospace became unclosed.

Rules of the Game

I suggest we consider the process of unclosing geospace in terms of the mathematical theory of games. By definition, a game is a certain set of rules that describes the formal structure of a competitive situation. If the "players" are states, then the rules that they have agreed upon are nothing else but international law. In brief, the level of competitiveness in a game is inversely related to the volume of rules (law). But what made the rivalry in the launch of the First satellite special was that the space game had started long before its rules were established. This is a unique situation for a game.

The strategies of the players were as follows:

- The USSR tried to win the game without any rules, to win the game using technologies;

- The USA also participated in the race of technologies but it decided to create its own rules that would ensure the victory.

I`ll describe the situation in more detail.

More than fifty years ago, on March 28, 1955, the U.S. National Security Council recommended informing the President that it would be efficient and expedient to establish the principle of "Freedom of Space": "...launching a small artificial satellite into an orbit about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish an early precedent for distinguishing between "national air" and "international space", a distinction that could be to our advantage at some future date when we might employ larger satellites for intelligence purposes".[1] The reason was simple: by accepting the policy that favored the legal regime of outer space which was similar to that established for high seas, the USA could establish a "Freedom of Space" precedent - a precedent of US space vehicles overflying the territories of different countries freely and legally. It is amazing that at the height of the Cold War such a powerful country as the United States was considering international legal grounds for its further political steps. It must also be said that in this respect the United States of fifty years ago was different from the United States of today, when the right of force dominates the force of law in foreign policy development and implementation.

On May 20, 1955 the U.S. National Security Council approved a top-level policy document on U.S. satellite program (NSC 5520). It stated in part:

"Re-examination should be made of the principles and practice of international law with regard to "Freedom of Space" from the standpoint of recent advances in weapon technology..."[2]

Meanwhile the Soviet Union gave practically no consideration to any international legal aspects of space exploration: the first publication on the subject would appear in the USSR only in a couple of years. To be exact, the first ideas concerning future outer space law were voiced in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s - early 1930s, but those ideas can be regarded just as an anticipation of cosmonautics and its future legal problems voiced by the most insightful scientists. In 1926 V.A. Zarzar speaking at a meeting of the Air Law Board of the Aviakhim Union (Organization in support of Aviation and Chemical ("Khimia" - Chemistry) readiness) put forward a supposition that in future, there would be established an international regime for space flights at a specific altitude and it would replace state sovereignty over airspace. According to him, beyond the confines of the airspace of the Earth there becomes effective a special regime of spaceship flights, which is free from earthly jurisdiction.[3] At a conference of lawyers specializing in air law, which was held in Leningrad in 1933, E.A. Korovin made a report "Conquest of the Atmosphere and Air Law" where he focused on the right of the state to take measures to defend its security irrespective of the altitude of flights over its territory. The report was published in a French Journal on International Law in 1934.[4] Basically it was the only doctrine hint at the official position the Soviet Union might take.

Thus we see that at the early stage of space race there were practically no norms of international law applicable to space exploration. However, the military and political competition reached a high point. Considering the fact that space race was gaining momentum, the situation became dangerous. One of the primary ways to reduce that danger was to start drafting international space law. It must be acknowledged that the USA was the first to understand it at governmental level.

The Satellite Problem

History shows that very often the political effect of cosmonautics achievements was of such significance for state leaders that it determined directions for space programs development. In fact, space policy was being formed as a follow-up to military policy, therefore it originally contained an "ad extra - oriented" element. In other words, foreign space policy began to form since the initial steps of space exploration. Strictly speaking, it was space policy that gave an impetus to space exploration.

Space policy as an integral part of the general policy of the state began to evolve after World War II and the USA was pioneers in this respect. The administration of every US president as well as military agencies constantly drafted and revised guideline documents on exploration and use of outer space. It is worthy of note that as early as 1952 a special report was prepared for President Truman on the present status of the satellite problem. In fact, H. Truman discussed it in detail with Brigadier General Wallace Graham, who was Truman`s personal scientific advisor and a physicist. Wallace Graham introduced Truman to Aristid Grosse, a chemist who had worked on the Manhattan Project. President Truman requested Grosse to conduct a deeper study of "the satellite problem". Major General Kenneth D. Nichols, former deputy for Lieutenant General Leslie R. Groves, who headed the Manhattan Project, arranged Grosse`s meeting with space scientists, particularly Wernher von Braun. Grosse completed Truman`s assignment. However it was to President Eisenhower that Grosse reported the results of the study on September 24, 1953.[5] As for the Soviet Union, it was only in 1954 that the satellite problem was submitted for top-level consideration and political decision-making.

As far as research is concerned, both countries were moving almost at the same pace.

In May 1945 Wernher von Braun, who had already arrived in the USA, prepared a report for the U.S. Army discussing the possibility of creating an Artificial Earth Satellite (AES). In October the U.S. Navy proposed its own satellite. On April 9, 1946 the issue was discussed at the Joint Army-Navy Aeronautical Board. However they did not come to any decision and decided to reconsider it a month later, on May 14. Major General Curtis LeMay, Director of USAF Research and Development, immediately decided to commission an independent study of the issue. Project RAND, set up as a division of the Douglas Aircraft Company, brainstormed the potential use of satellites for USAF for three weeks. On May 2, 1946, RAND released "The Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship"[6] (Report No. SM-11827)[7] which described meteorological, reconnaissance and communication satellites. In April 1951 RAND, the Rand Corporation at that time, released its next report "Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaisance".[8] In September 1954 Wernher von Braun formulated new proposals for a Minimum Unmanned Satellite Vehicle.[9] Later the military selected that project as a potential candidate for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) Program but ultimately rejected it in favor of the VANGUARD project. The VANGUARD project started in March, 1955 and was developed by the US Navy. In August 1955 it beat two other projects in a contest - the U.S. Army "Orbiter" project and the USAF project.[10]

Early in 1945 engineer-colonel М.К. Tikhonravov gathered a team of specialists (N.G. Chernishev, V.A. Shtokolov, P.I. Ivanov, V.N. Galkovsky, G.M. Moskalenko, A.F. Krutov and others) on the basis of the Rocket Research Institute which was established by M.N. Tukhachevskiy back in 1933. They were assigned to design a manned high altitude rocket (with a pressurized cabin for two pilots) based on a single-stage liquid-propellant rocket whose specifications would enable it to fly up to an altitude of 200 kilometers. By the middle of 1945 the team had designed a model of the high-altitude rocket (VR-190). On March 23, 1946 the project was submitted to М. V. Khrunichev, the then Minister for Aviation Industry, and on April 12 it was considered by the Ministerial Panel of Experts headed by Academician S.A. Khristianovich. The panel of experts gave a positive evaluation of the project and submitted its decision to one of Khrunichev`s deputies for signing. However the deputy minister procrastinated. The delay was caused by red tape only. By that time there had already been drafted the USSR Council of Ministers` Decree "On Establishing a Special Committee on Rocketry under the Auspices of the USSR Council of Ministers" and it stated rocketry design among its priorities. Khrunichev`s deputy just thought that the design of the rocket-propelled device would be considered at a higher level, by the Special Committee on Rocketry, which would do the decision-making. The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on "Questions of Rocket-propelled Weaponry" that mentioned the Special Committee was released on May 13, 1946.

Meanwhile the procrastination made М.К. Tikhonravov and N.G. Chernishev, who had been waiting for an answer too long, submit a memorandum on VR -190 project to Joseph Stalin. They stressed not only the scientific but also the political importance of the project. It must be stressed that the memorandum did not say a word about military applications of the rocket. (At that time Joseph Stalin still held the office of the Minister for Defense and later the Minister for the Armed Forces along with the offices of the Chairman of the Government and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). It was only in March 1947 that he handed the office of the Minister for the Armed Forces over to N.А. Bulganin.) Stalin entrusted М.V. Khrunichev with studying the project by М.К. Tikhonravov and N.G. Chernishov. It did not take Khrunichev much time and effort to remember that document and find it in the maze of the ministerial red tape. The document was submitted for a second consideration: this time not only aviation industry specialists but also specialists from the Weaponry Ministry and the Ministry for Electrotechnical Industry studied it. On June 20, 1946, М.V. Khrunichev informed Stalin on the possibility of designing a manned space rocket, stressing that in the memorandum Tikhonravov and Chernishev had indicated a one-year term for developing the space vehicle, however upon the consideration of all the documents by the commission Tikhonravov and Chernishev indicated a two-year term. М.V. Khrunichev especially stressed that two years was a minimum term and it was very tough. To the letter М.V. Khrunichev attached the Draft Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on the issue. Stalin however did not endorse М.V. Khrunichev`s letter and the Decree was not adopted.

Proceeding from the "rocket package" idea, М.К. Tikhonravov made calculations and in 1948 he came to the conclusion that technically it was possible to launch an Artificial Earth Satellite (AES) into orbit on the basis of the existing technical achievements.[11] In July 1949 the main documents for the "rocket package" were provided to S.P. Korolev. In March 1950 М.К. Tikhonravov made a public report in which he touched upon the prospects of creating an AES and a possibility of using it for a manned flight. On March 16, 1954 Korolev voiced the idea of creating an AES at a meeting organized by academician M.V. Keldysh. The latter received an approval of the proposal from A.N. Nesmeyanov, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. On May 27, S.P. Korolev submitted a memorandum "On Artificial Earth Satellite" (prepared by М.К. Tikhonravov) to D.F. Ustinov, the then Minister of Defense. In August 1954 the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved the proposals on elaboration of space-flight related scientific and theoretical problems.

The projects under elaboration represented a stage of the military rocket programs of the USSR and the USA, hence what made the launching of the artificial satellite particular was that being regarded as a military step, it could have complicated the already difficult relations between the USSR and the USA.[12]

President Eisenhower followed the advice of his consultants and made a decision to launch a scientific satellite as part of the US contribution to the International Geophysical Year (IGY) - an international effort of scientists from 67 countries that lasted from July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958 and followed the resolution, that called for launching scientific earth satellites during the IGY to support precision-mapping of the Earth. The resolution was adopted by the International Council of Scientific Unions in October 1954.

A statement was written. It was endorsed by Congress and voiced by the spokesperson for the White House:

July 29, 1955

The White House

Statement by James C. Hagerty

On behalf of the President, I am now announcing that the President has approved plans by this country for going ahead with launching of small unmanned earth-circling satellites as part of the United States participation in the International Geophysical Year which takes place between July 1957 and December 1958. This program will for the first time in history enable scientists throughout the world to make sustained observations in the regions beyond the earth`s atmosphere.

The President expressed personal gratification that the American program will provide scientists of all nations this important and unique opportunity for the advancement of science".[13]

The statement did not contain a hint at other than scientific purposes of the program. But it was no coincidence that it was made just a few hours after an official statement on H-bomb stocks that had been created over the last six month as directed by Eisenhower.[14]

To avoid provoking an international debate over "freedom of space", the Eisenhower administration leaders restrained government officials from any public discussions of spaceflight at that time.[15] In the USSR any public discussions of the kind were forbidden for reasons of confidentiality.

In early August, 1955, M.V. Khrunichev, V.M. Ryabikov and S.P. Korolev sent a memorandum to N.S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSCU, and N.A.Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Minister of the USSR,in connection with America`s statement of its intentions to launch a satellite. On August 8, 1955 the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted a decision "On Designing an Artificial Earth Satellite".

                                     A Space Zero Sum Game

The USA more than once stated in numerous polls and surveys that it did not intend to lose and that it would not stand the USSR`s leadership. Politicians voiced that predominant opinion. All the terminology of space race did not admit of any other interpretation of further development of events: the USA would be either ahead or behind, i.e. it would either be a winner or a loser. Such thinking is typical of a zero sum game, a situation in which a participant`s gain or loss is exactly balanced by the losses or gains of the other participant(s).[16]

Academician B. V. Rauschenbach was one of the most prominent specialists in space industry. He was not a politician and called this process in a more lenient manner a process of "sport and romance". He wrote in his memoirs: "The sportsmanship character of the process had two sides. Firstly, all of us who worked in the field of designing space vehicles experienced the emotions that are typical of all athletes - to be the first. The USA was doing something similar and none of us wanted to let our American counterparts be first. It was an absolutely genuine feeling of competition. Secondly, the results of the competition had political importance: in case of success, the leaders of the country could use the international prestige that it had gained and that`s why their assistance was generous. Everything was new, it was being done for the first time, and that`s what made it romantic. There had been no previous experience of the kind, and we considered ourselves explorers like Columbus, who set out to discover new lands".[17]

Up until 1957 the USA had always been ahead: first in creation of the atomic A-bomb, later - in long-range bombers, then came the H-bomb.

And now it was all about a satellite. The USA did not doubt that it would be the first as usual; nevertheless the specialists closely monitored what the USSR was doing in that field.

On July 5, 1957, Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence wrote a letter to Donald Quarels, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in which Allen W. Dulles gave his assessment of the reconnaissance data:

"...Information concerning the timing of the launching of the Soviet`s first earth-orbiting satellite is sketchy, and our people here do not believe that the evidence is sufficient as yet for a probability statement on when the Soviets may launch their first satellite.

However, data has been recently received that Alexander Nesmeyanov, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, stated that, "soon, literally in the next few months, the earth will get its second satellite". Other information, not so precise , indicates that the USSR is probably capable of launching a satellite in 1957, and may be making preparations to do so on IGY World Days ... The U.S. community estimates that for prestige and psychological factors, the USSR would endeavor to be first in launching an earth satellite ... The Russians like to be dramatic and could well choose the birthday of Tsiolkovsky to accomplish such an operation, especially since this is the one hundredth anniversary of his birthday ..."[18]

The US was right in indicating one of the political and psychological factors - desire to be the first. On September 25, 1955, when the Moscow Bauman Higher Technical School (MVTU) celebrated its 125th anniversary, Sergei Korolev, an MVTU graduate, chief designer and Associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences said in his report at the anniversary session:

"Our goal is to ensure that Soviet rockets fly higher and earlier than anyone else`s.

Our goal is to be the first in a manned spaceflight with a Soviet man onboard the rocket

Our goal is to ensure that the First Artificial Earth Satellite is made in the Soviet Union by the Soviet people."[19]

There was nothing bad about it. Similar approaches also existed in the USA: Eisenhower`s special adviser, N. Rockefeller, convinced him that it was inadmissible for the USA to lose in space race, the domineering form of relations between the two countries in space in those days. The policy of rivalry determined very much.

And on September 17, 1957, on the day of Tsiolkovskiy`s 100^th anniversary, the day that the U.S. reconnaissance indicated as a possible launch date for the first satellite, S.P. Korolev made a report in the House of Columns devoted to the famous scientist. He said one important thing: "In the very near future the USSR and the USA will do the first test launches of artificial earth satellites for scientific purposes".[20] He had known by that time that the Soviet satellite would be launched on October 6. But it so happened, that S. P. Korolev, without any concordance with Moscow top-level officials, shifted the launch to October 4 by his own authority right at Baikonur.[21] On that day the world learned that the Soviet Union had launched the First Artificial Earth Satellite, which ushered the Space Age.

The Americans had almost made it to being the first in launching a satellite however for them the level of competition did not supersede the legal constraints that were to be first introduced. For example, the successful launch of the US two-stage rocket booster Jupiter C on September 20, 1956 happened only after a Pentagon representative had done a thorough inspection for a possible third stage under the nose fairing that could launch some payload into the orbit.[22] From the military and political perspective, such strict requirements and careful attention were justified, taking into account the tense international situation.

Geospace Unclosing

The attitude in the White House was generally dismissive of the Sputnik launch for about 24 hours, before the public and scientific reaction of the country became known, stated General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower`s staff secretary.[23] Then they remembered that Eisenhower had been warned plenty of times of the propaganda effects of such a satellite launch but had always dismissed them. "The Memorandum of the Meeting with the President of October 8, 1957" prepared by Goodpaster said that, when the President asked about the possibility of a satellite launch he received a positive answer that "it had been possible to do it a year before and even earlier. However the Consulting Committee on Science thought that creation of an AES must go separately from developments in the military sphere. One of the reasons was to emphasize the peaceful character of this program and the other was the strife to avoid the use of military rockets technologies to which foreign scientists could get access".[24]

Eisenhower attempted to downplay the significance of Sputnik, but in vain. He also admonished his officials not to comment on the issue of whether the United States could have "beaten" the Soviets into space. He wanted to avoid the interpretations of space exploration as a space race.[25]

Henry Kissinger tried to play down the importance of the first satellite in "Diplomacy". He writes: "When the Soviets launched an artificial satellite - a sputnik - into earth orbit on October 1957, Khrushchev interpreted it as a one-time achievement, as evidence that the Soviet Union was ahead of democratic countries in scientific and military respect. ... President Eisenhower was practically the only one who refused to share the panic. As a military man he understood the difference between a prototype and a military operations issue type".[26]

Eisenhower understood the situation very well, but at that particular time he was most of all concerned about international legal aspects of the flight of the first artificial space vehicle. Sputnik was making one orbit after another over the territories of many countries. The USA closely followed the reaction of those countries. There was practically no reaction in the world in terms of diplomatic demarches or rallies of protest. Four days after the launch of the satellite Eisenhower decided to discuss that significant event with his team of advisers and top officials. "The Russians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space," Deputy Secretary for Defense Quarles said. "The President asked the group to look ahead five years, and asked about a reconnaissance vehicle. Secretary Quarles said the Air Force has a research program in this area and gave a general description of the project".[27]

The first Soviet satellite made it possible for the first time ever to measure the upper-atmosphere density, to receive data on radio signals propagation into ionosphere regions, to work out insertion related issues, to optimize thermal regime and to solve other technological problems. But the political effect of Sputnik was much more important. The launch evoked a worldwide response. The USSR`s international prestige had immensely risen just overnight.

Establishing space game rules seems to be of even more importance and the credit for initiating these rules belongs to the USA. Therefore, launching the First Satellite was a common gain.

The USA wanted to win the race, but what it won was that later the game was played according to its rules.

The USSR won the race in terms of technology but had to agree with the rules of the game.

The USSR and the USA began to play a non-zero-sum game and it was their common gain.

Humankind also gained a lot in having the rules of the game and a technological foothold established for followers.

This is how October 4, 1957 witnessed the transition from geopolicy in the space of the globe to the policy in the unclosed space of cosmos, which we can call caelumpolitics[28]. Indeed, in the first decade the UNO and member-states of this reputable international organization were concerned about establishing the rules of the game for exploration of the Moon and other planets (the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies came into effect in 1967). Then there was a long pause because space exploration turned out to be a longer and more challenging task than it was assumed in the times of the First Satellite.

Almost half a century has passed since that day. In 2004 US President George W. Bush announced new vision for space exploration which envisages returning Americans to the Moon, building an outpost on the Moon and sending an expedition to Mars. The USA, the only remaining superpower on the planet Earth, finds the limits of international relations too narrow.

In 2006 the USA adopted a new national space policy which already has all the features of caelumpolitics. The purpose of the document is to enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to protect U.S. interests. ("The USA preserves its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space. Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power"). The U.S. new space policy is characterized by the USA distancing itself from international law. The USA will not commit itself to any arms reduction treaties that will impede the development of systems designed to protect U.S. national security interests. The Directive underlines the refusal of Washington to conduct any formal negotiations on arms control that may limit U.S. access to or use of space.

Russia, China, Japan and India have also announced their plans to establish outposts on the Moon. The USA and Russia have manned missions to Mars on the agenda. A new space race has begun. The USA appears to begin it by establishing its own rules of the game once again. It augurs an absolutely new era for international relations. There has just been a regular succession of epochs: "He who governs the World Island governs the world"; "He who owns seas is the Master of the World"; "He who has superiority in air space rules the world". And finally, "he who has control over space is the future Lord of the World". In this respect we can already today say that the transition from geopolitical paradigm to caelumpolitical paradigm has happened, the transition that began on October 4, 1957, when the First Satellite was launched.

                                                                                          Yuri Baturin (Russia)

(Translated by Varvara Burova)

Published in:   Space: the First Step. - SpaceResearchInstituteRussianAcademy of Sciences. - 2007, p.108-117.

Док. 508450
Перв. публик.: 20.10.07
Последн. ред.: 01.12.10
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