Like it or not, the time when Russia was meant to listen carefully to lessons from the "civilised world" is over. Not because those lessons have been learned (some have) or because they have turned out to be misleading (some did), but because the "pedagogical" relationship is over and done with.
Three factors contributed to its demise. They can be taken in any order, and none of them alone is crucial. But taken together they have radically changed Russia"s international positioning.
Politically, Russia has become more sustainable and more governable and more predictable. At what price and with what implications for the country"s political future is another question, and in the long-term perhaps, a very serious one. Indeed, Russia today looks less democratic, less liberal and less pluralistic. Power is too serious a matter to be put at risk - this seems to be the credo of the Russian neo-cons, who are even more inward-looking than their American opposite number. But Russia no longer faces the risk of political chaos or disintegration, as it did in the 1990s. This allows Moscow to feel much more confident of its "rear" when dealing with outsiders. And for them, the outcome of the 2008 presidential elections is clearer in Russia than in the US. Does not this make Russia more predictable? Business especially likes future stability and is not necessarily inclined to worry overmuch about its democratic credentials.
When it comes to Russia"s economic dynamic, providence taken a hand by supplying it with enormous oil and gas resources at a time when these are so much in demand. Back in the nineties, Moscow didn"t know where to turn for the funds it needed to service its debts to the IMF. Nowadays, it doesn"t know what to do with the billions it gets from sky-rocketing energy prices. Gazprom may be the object of firm criticisms for its monopolistic status, lack of transparency, bad management and it refusal to operate within basic market principles, but would-be western partners stand in line to buy shares in a company that has become one of the world"s top three energy majors. Russia"s pretensions on the status of energy superpower make it compare unflatteringly with Saudi Arabia, but Europe does not seem to have a realistic alternative not only to its dependency on Russia but also to competing with China for Russian oil and gas.
Russia"s bad luck with easy access to petro-dollars could once again undermines the structural transformation of its economy, just as it did back in the 1970s; but the possibility of Russia becoming the biggest economy in Europe doesn"t look all that unlikely (even though it may take 20 years).
Psychologically, Russia"s period of national self-disparagement has now gone on far too long. It started before to the collapse of the USSR, and reflected the dramatic erosion of the state and society"s ideological raison d"#234;tre. It persisted for more than a decade in post-Soviet Russia, when the country felt frustrated by what was broadly perceived as a geopolitical catastrophe and the loss of assets accumulated by generations. The Russian consciousness cannot now afford any more years of remorse without risking an irreversible loss of national identity.
Europe, in this context, has nothing to reproach itself for "losing Russia". The pendulum of Russian self-confidence was in any case about to start swinging back. Not so much because of a "syndrome of revenge", but instead as a reflection of a growing belief in one"s own future, the long-awaited feeling of having arrested a historical retreat, re-emerging self-respect and a strong desire to be respected by others. It is true that these sentiments could all too easily generate a fresh assertiveness in Russia"s relations with the world, but it is equally clear that they are not conducive to the model in which Russia would be cast as an assiduous student.
Russia"s elites have convinced themselves that the country is able to decide independently on an increasing number of international issues. In this regard, western leverage over Moscow is gradually becoming a thing of the past. Persuading rather than compelling is the formula in Mr. Maynes" article that seems to me the most appropriate operational guideline for dealing with Russia. Russia does not want to be taught lessons, but if it believes to be treated as an equal and respectable partner, the soft approach may indeed turn out the most effective form of influence.
The "Four Spaces" clearly don"t open a miraculous way towards a dramatic breakthrough in EU-Russia relations, but they do provide a broader framework for cooperative interaction. The latter could get a new quality if Russia and the EU were to engage in, say, joint developments in aircraft design, nuclear energy and high technology in general (where at present Russia feels discriminated against). I doubt, however, that devising some kind of "half-membership" status for Russia would be particularly attractive to either side. But promoting mutual understanding (with the eventual aim of joint policies) on international issues, especially those relating to the CIS geopolitical space, would be a task of utmost importance for the EU and Russia-although certainly not the easiest one.
Vladimir Baranovsky is Deputy Director of IMEMO the Institute of World economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. baranovsky@imemo.ru
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