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Vladimir Baranovsky**
This paper considers Russia"s attitude towards "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood" concept. It does not pretend to formulate recommendations for the EU"s "Eastern" (or "Russian") policy-they could be found in a number of recent thoughtful publications (from which this paper benefits a lot) . Also, the author does not offer here an overview of Russia"s attitudes towards the EU in general-this was done by him elsewhere . The analyses is focused upon assessing the actual and eventual reactions in Russia towards the very idea of "new neighbourhood"-both its logic and its concrete conceptualization in the recent EU documents.
Moscow"s low-profile reaction
The EU is officially considered by Russia to be one of its most important external partners. Indeed, Russia"s Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 puts a special emphasis on relations with the EU-that in some respects looks even more "privileged" than the CIS, Moscow"s traditional focus during the whole post-Soviet period. The EU has a prominent place in President Putin"s political line of rapprochement with the West; his unambiguous endorsement of the idea that Russia, in terms of its civilization characteristics, belongs to Europe contrasted to numerous lamentations on the country"s "hard and painful search for self identification" and its "Eurasian predicament" . The EU is prominent in various contexts of Russia"s external policy related considerations-regarding economic dynamics, geopolitical stratagems, security challenges. In terms of practical policy, the EU and Russia have developed a considerable degree of interaction, and this specific acquis is an important factor for foreign policy of Moscow.
From this point of view, Moscow has to keep trace of all meaningful developments in the EU, to assess their implications in terms of the country"s interests, and to formulate, in case of need, Russia"s possible reaction thereto. The project "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood" certainly belongs to the category of those EU"s novelties that require Russia"s attention.
However, all these considerations notwithstanding, there is surprisingly little attention in Russia towards the EU"s new "neighbourhood pattern". For instance, the search in the Russian Foreign Ministry web-site , relatively well organized and containing a lot of official documents and semi-official comments, will only produce a couple of references to this issue. "New neighbourhood" was hardly mentioned by the Russian side at both recent summits with the EU (in St.Petersburg in May 2003 and in Rome in November 2003) . In January 2003, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov published a programme-oriented article on the EU Russian relations in the influential daily "Izvestia" -and this contained no traces of "neighbourhood" (neither substantively nor even as a notion).
In fact, the most "elaborated" version of Moscow"s official reaction could be only found in the joint declaration issued after the enlarged European conference in Athens in April 2003. It stated that participants (including Russia) "welcomed the internal discussion on the "new neighbourhood" launched in the European Union. They welcomed the idea of developing further relations with the new neighbours in Eastern Europe, as well as relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in the framework of the Barcelona process" . Since that, the concept seems to have been removed to the background of Russia-EU agenda. Apart from routine interactions between both sides , the very notion of "new neighbourhood" is mentioned only sporadically.
The same could be said about the academic publications that have so far appeared in Russia . It is however important to note that although the concept problems arising from this concept are explicitly or implicitly debated in Russia within the political community and by foreign policy experts.
Also, when analyzing Russia"s perception of, and reaction towards the EU"s neighbourhood policy, one should not forget that Moscow tends to consider any external issue in a broader context rather than just within the concrete bilateral or multilateral pattern. This has three implications. First, in the absence (for whatever reasons) of a specific policy response, it could be substituted by the overall system references. Secondly, the latter might play a disproportionately high role when defining the substance of the former. Thirdly, in some cases even the failure itself to develop a response results from the predominant status of broader policy- or thought patterns. All three elements seem to be present in Russia"s reaction to the "new neighbourhood" concept.
The ovearall low profile of Russia"s reaction to the neighbourhood concept seems to reflect (i) its relatively marginal place in the system of Russia"s EU-related priorities, and (ii) uncertainties about its possible implications.
It is worth quoting here an interview of Mikhail Fradkov who recently became Russia"s new Permanent representative at the EU. Noteworthy, the status of this position was upgraded because Mr.Fradkov was simultaneously appointed a special representative of the President of the Russian Federation for dealing with the EU-related issues-which makes his assessments even more weighty. When asked about the concept of "Wider Europe" and a "ring of friends" initiated by the EU, he said the following:
"We reacted with interest to the proposal of Brussels to begin a dialogue with Russia and other "neighbours" of the enlarging EU in the framework of "Wider Europe" concept. It is a serious document, it deserves to be thoroughly analyzed, and this work is nowadays under way. To be frank, we have certain questions to its authors, but it would be premature to raise them now. We proceed from the assumption that "Wider Europe" cannot be a substitute to the strategic partnership between Russia and the EU" .
It seems that the last phrase points to the most serious problem in Russia"s general attitude towards the idea of "new neighbourhood". The latter could have a very attractive agenda focusing upon numerous important issues that have to be dealt with cooperatively. But insofar as it suggests to inscribe the bilateral cooperative interaction into a new framework, there should be serious arguments for accepting the latter, especially if there is an intention to make it a predominant one.
Russia may be concerned that this prospect undermines the already existing pattern of relationship with the EU. Indeed, the partnership with the EU is regarded as a value in itself that has already brought about significant results. It is therefore expedient to maintain this pattern-and, in any case, to prevent its erosion because of the suggested "new dimension". All arguments in favour of the latter notwithstanding, there may be a risk of losing significant substantive elements of cooperation that have already been tested and institutionalized.
Furthermore, Moscow could have serious motives for maintaining the predominance of the existing pattern of relations between Russia and the EU, because in some respects it has a unique character. Indeed, both sides started to build their interaction in the 1990s proceeding from their strategic importance for each other. For each side, the Partnership and cooperation agreement of 1994 was a new element in their practice of relations with the external world. When the EU adopted its first Common strategy in 1999, it was addressed to Russia. The latter "reciprocated" by a similar document that was also an innovation for its foreign policy. By and large, there are serious reasons to argue that the current pattern of their relationship came into existence on the foundation that was different as compared to the one that has brought about the "new neighbourhood" initiative. The latter could be "added" to the former-but only if without any risk of turning it into a substitute thereto.
This is even more so against the background of some concerns that are associated with the "EU dimension" of Russia"s external policy. By no means they look dramatic or conducive to grave complications; nevertheless, the horizon of Russia-EU relations is not absolutely cloudless. In this regard, observers in Moscow could worry that "neighbourhood initiatives" generated by the EU might either make the existing concerns even more salient or promote the emergence of new ones. Furthermore, this consideration might be exacerbated by the lack of clear understanding as far as the goals and possible outcome of the EU policy are concerned.
Another confusion about the EU"s neighbourhood policy appears in the context of the forthcoming enlargement of the Union. The genetic relationship of "enlargement" and "neighbourhood" is clearly underlined in the official documents that boosted this new policy line of the Union: "The accession of the new member states will strengthen the Union"s interest in enhancing relations with the new neighbours" . Russia"s attitude towards the enlargement of the EU represents therefore a necessary initial point of any analysis that aims at considering Moscow"s eventual reaction to the whole "neighbourhood project".
This attitude was controversial and ambivalent, although less rigid than with respect to the enlargement of NATO. In the final analysis, Moscow has developed a grosso modo positive and cooperative position with respect to the enlargement of the EU. This, however, was accompanied by a number of demands addressed to the EU and towards the candidate countries. The logic of these demands is focused upon the necessity (i) to accommodate to the new situation that will emerge after the enlargement takes place, (ii) to minimize eventual losses that could follow, and (iii) to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines, uncertainties and legal vacuum in Russia"s relations with the enlarged Union and its member-states.
Most of the issues have been successfully discussed and agreed upon; some of them are still awaiting common solutions. Moscow still insists that it is expedient to address the remaining "matters of concern". This element of Russia-EU relationship, both politically and in terms of concrete pragmatic considerations, will be most probably regarded by Moscow as more prominent than the "neighbourhood agenda". On the latter, it seems unrealistic to expect a significant breakthrough until the pending enlargement-related issues are removed from the agenda.
The link between the EU enlargement and its "neighbourhood policy" appears also in a less concrete and more "existential" sense-when the question arises about the limits of possible further enlargements: how far will the EU expand eastwards? On the one hand, the "neighbourhood pattern" could be presented as making this question irrelevant with respect to countries that are included into this category. On the other hand, to consider this prospect as absolutely unrealistic would be also inappropriate. However remote such prospect might seem nowadays, Russia could view EU enlargement eastwards as the first step in this direction.
Indeed, the linear logic of enlargement does not make it impossible that after the next two phases of the EU expansion-embracing Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and then the Western Balkan states-time will come for Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus . Meanwhile, if the eventual outer limits of the EU pass beyond the Western NIS but fall short of including Russia, the latter will most probably consider itself marginalized and pushed even further away from the mainstream of the European political developments. It is true that this scenario looks nowadays rather theoretical-for the reasons related both to the "neighbours" and to the EU itself. Yet even as a theoretical proposition this might be perceived by Russia with the most serious concern. This could be applied to the "neighbourhood concept" as well-insofar as it is viewed as preparing the ground for the future configuration of the EU-based political order on the continent that would exclude Russia.
On a "less existential" and more concrete level, the link between the enlargement of the EU and its neighbourhood-related activity could be seen in the role played by some candidates to the EU in making this policy line of the Union more pronounced. In particular, Poland is known for taking initiative in promoting the "Eastern dimension" within the EU . Russia"s official comments have never pointed to this fact-which however does not exclude the hidden resentment over what is perceived as the expansionist logic brought into the EU by this newcomer.
Russia"s place in the "neighbourhood pattern"
When considering the EU"s neighbourhood policy, Russia is certainly interested in assessing its own place within this new pattern of the Union"s interaction with the external world.
The approach of the Commission seems in this respect very clear: first, Russia is part of the EU new neighbourhood; secondly, Russia represents a distinct category within this neighbourhood, one of its three constituent parts (with two others being the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean) . The italics in the previous phrase deserve some comments; in both cases, what is involved is not only how the EU assesses Russia"s role as a subject of external interaction, but also how this assessment is perceived by Moscow (and, accordingly, how Russia positions itself vis-a-vis the EU).
The fact that Russia is considered by the EU as part of its neighbourhood may be regarded as trivial. Indeed, even a quick look at the map would seem sufficient for considering any discussions on that matter superfluous.
However, politics (and political psychology) may disregard obvious facts stipulated by geography-or interpret them in a paradoxical way. There could be even various interpretations, some of them being mutually incompatible or pointing at directions diverging by 180 degrees. The encouraging appeal "to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity [...] beyond the new borders of the Union", and "to develop a zone of prosperity [...]-a "ring of friends" with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations" could be welcomed as responding to Russia" genuine interests in Europe. But within less enthusiastic, more sober or just suspiciously oriented approaches one could ask if these nice words only represent a rhetorical "coverage" hiding other perspectives, not necessarily beneficial for Russia-or, at least, rising some questions that are not followed by obvious answers.
Thus, the very fact of belonging to those countries "that do not currently have the perspective of membership of the EU" looks extremely disappointing for many proponents of the "pro-European thinking" in Russia. They believe that the country should aim at joining the EU-even if not in the immediate future. The very prospect of the EU membership, according to this line of thinking, would create strong incentives for promoting domestic reforms, developing a sustainable democracy, transforming the "oligarchic capitalism" (or, as a variant, the "bureaucratic capitalism") into a genuine one modeled upon the existing European pattern . For those who support this paradigm, proclaiming Russia part of the EU"s "new neighbourhood" means first of all denying to it the realistic prospect of membership rather than inviting to extended cooperation. Certainly, the latter should be encouraged, developed and promoted-but it does not allow to carry out a qualitative breakthrough that is only possible on the basis of clearly defined goal of membership.
Worse-the "neighbourhood pattern" for Russia is perceived to be suggested as an alternative to, rather than a step towards membership. The latter becomes less realistic than prior to the appearance of the neighbourhood pattern. At that time, the issue of membership, however controversial it might be, was a matter of debate and could be advocated, supported and promoted by those who believed that Russia should join the EU. Nowadays, it becomes senseless: the EU itself selected those who cold become its members, where as Russia was not included. "Neighbourhood" becomes a kind of consolatory offer for those who are denied a perspective of membership.
In addition, it is seen not only as a substitute to the membership, but also as a kind of a "second class" status that will result in maintaining the peripheral position of Russia or even aggravating it and making it in fact irreversible. Within this thought pattern, Lord Ismay"s formula of "keeping Russia out" (as one of the foundations of NATO) has re-emerged under new circumstances, as an explanation of the EU"s motives and goals. And this explanation does not promote sympathy towards the "neighbourhood policy"-which therefore could be regarded as discriminatory and dividing all external actors into two categories: those who have a chance to get involved into the elite club, and those who don"t. Russia as a "neighbour" fits into the latter category.
The artificial character of the thesis on "discrimination" is obvious: the difference between "participation" and "non-participation" in any structure is unavoidable, otherwise membership would be senseless. It is however remarkable that some observers in Russia seemed to expect that the country might enjoy the advantages of membership without accepting its burden-for instance, by getting access to the EU institutions. Thus, according to this logic, Russia should have been involved in discussions on the EU constitution (in the framework of the European Convention or afterwards). And when the EU neighbourhood policy stipulates that it aims "to provide a framework [...] which would not, in the medium term, include [...] a role in the Union"s institutions" -this sounds as an attempt to downplay partnership with Russia, to prevent it from taking a really valuable scale and form.
By focusing upon this logic and developing it even further (as some Russian analysts really do), one could easily come to a conclusion that Russia"s interest in the EU is very limited (or, at least, cannot become a prominent factor of the country"s foreign policy agenda). Indeed, "how could there be an interest towards the organization in which Russia does not participate?" This demagogic thesis was formulated with respect to NATO , but it could equally be applied to the EU. If so, even raising the question on Russia"s interest towards the EU"s neighbourhood policy becomes groundless.
Some negative connotations may arise with respect to the fact of becoming an object of the EU"s neighbourhood policy. It is associated with the idea of being a passive side in the relationship that is initiated, shaped and defined by the other side who plays a leadership role. And this in itself generates a complex of inferiority and dependence.
Indeed, equal relationship assumes that partners have similar status with respect to each other, whereas the idea of the EU"s neighbourhood contains hierarchical elements-or, at least, could be interpreted in this way. In a Russian mind, it would not create an image of, say, two villagers whose houses and lands are located next to each other-but that of a big country estate belonging to powerful landlord, and numerous terrains of small landowners around it. The EU"s "neighbourhood" presupposes a pattern within which there is a core area radiating its influence-and the adjacent periphery which is expected to be receptive, accommodating and grateful. Russia would hardly be excessively enthusiastic about such vision-neither politically nor psychologically. Perhaps, in order to re-establish the comfortable "equal" status, Moscow would have to proclaim its own neighbourhood policy-targeted at the EU, but also at Japan, North Korea, China, Mongolia and so on. Two overlapping "neighbourhoods" might correct the misbalance created by the fact of having only one of them.
One more argument for developing a cautious, rather than a benevolent attitude towards the EU neighbourhood policy may come from the assumption that Russia-for whatever reasons-deserves a special treatment. Meanwhile, it is included into the category of "neighbours" together with some other countries. This could be interpreted as an approach putting Russia at the same level as Tunisia, Moldova etc.
Here, one could easily see parallels with a number of other cases when Russia tacitly expected (and sometimes even urged) to be treated "not-like the others" (as it was, for instance, with the Partnership for peace programme). Considerations of diplomatic correctness would not allow to express this argument officially and publicly, but it does exist in political mentality of the country. In a sense, it is echoed by the existence of similar assessments outside Russia, and the notion of "special relationship" with it does not sound as something absurd and deprived of any rationale. This in itself becomes a source of a certain aberration-when attempts to fit Russia into a "normal pattern" could be regarded as deliberately oriented towards "keeping Russia down".
There is one more reason why such a line might be considered unfair if carried out by the EU. The latter in fact does not exclude a logic of "special treatment" with regard to its external partners; indeed, Turkey for many years has benefited from a close relationship pattern which goes well beyond the relationship between the EU and non-candidate neighbours. Russia would hardly find it convincing if its case is considered "less exceptional".
It is true that the EU, when launching its neighbourhood initiative, was very careful in underlying "special" attention towards Russia. In addition, it is stressed that the new neighbourhood policy "will only constitute one pillar of the overall EU/Russia strategic partnership" . However, the syndrome of the past "greatness" as well as the country"s increasing self-confidence may eventually produce exaggerated attention to symbolic signs of "being treated with due respect" (or their absence).
By and large, if being among the EU"s neighbours (with or without direct borders) was a "natural fact of life", becoming a part of its officially proclaimed "new neighbourhood" generates ambivalent feelings. Paradoxically, if there are some disappointments and confusion because of being considered as part of the EU neighbourhood, these might have been even stronger if Russia had not been included therein. In such case, one could easily imagine Russia"s grievances: the EU does not treat Russia even as a neighbour; Russia is excluded from its "narrow circle"; it is an attempt to disengage Russia from those CIS countries who are considered as "neighbours" (especially from Ukraine); and so on.
Concerns about the "intermediate zone"
As mentioned earlier, one dimension of the "neighbourhood pattern" may be a matter of Russia"s special attention-namely, the focus upon three CIS states as objects of the EU"s neighbourhood policy. The problem here is broader than just their eventual accession to the EU, highly problematic for the time being.
The policy of neighbourhood might be regarded as an energetic attempt to re-orient the political attention of "new neighbours" towards the EU. With respect to what is regarded (even if not officially proclaimed nowadays) as the "zone of Russia"s vital (special, preferential, legitimate etc.) interests"-i.e. the CIS space, this perceived motivation of the EU policy may look disturbing and even challenging.
In a sense, this tradition is inherited from the Soviet Union, although at that time it was focused upon Moscow"s Comecon/Warsaw Pact clients-Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other participants in the "Socialist Commonwealth". From mid-70s, when Soviet analysts discussed the possibility of establishing "official relationship" with the European Community, one of serious obstacles was seen in its anticipated prospect of becoming more active and even assertive with respect to the allies of the USSR. The latter, however, was even more sensitive with regard to these very allies themselves. Indeed, they were suspected of dreaming to engage in a drift towards the European Community, if the latter was officially recognized and thus elevated to the status of a respectable partner. The ultimate development of this trend might allegedly bring about a European political framework extending "from P to P"-from Portugal to Poland, or "from B to B"-from Brest (on the Atlantic coast of France) to Brest (on the western Soviet frontier). In both frameworks the participation of the USSR was not envisaged-which would in fact mean the beginning of the erosion of the Soviet outer empire. Such a prospect generated in Moscow a kind of existential obsession-which was at the same time a powerful source of suspicions as regards the EC.
Noteworthy, if such thought and policy pattern is in fact re-emerging, this is taking place against the background of the tectonic shifts in the eastern part of Europe, and especially in what used to be the Soviet Union. The focus of this obsession has certainly changed: the place of "sister-republics of people"s democracies" is nowadays occupied by the western CIS countries. But the structural characteristics of the above-mentioned logic have persisted through all dramatic changes of the last 10 to 15 years.
It is true that there is an enormous difference between the current Russian EU relationship and the practice of 1970s or 1980s. In contrast to uncertainties and hesitations of those times, the key words nowadays are "partnership" and "cooperation". But this apparently does not exclude competitive elements, paternalist instincts, political resentment etc. Ideological confrontation has been replaced not only by requirements of interdependence, but also by false or real challenges of geopolitics. In the case of Russia, this is exacerbated by the painful search for political and/or psychological compensation for "what was lost" during the post-cold war period: allies and clients, influence and predominance, ideological integrity and military might.
Positioning itself as a country with growing self-confidence, ascending economy and even a certain degree of foreign policy assertiveness is a significant element of Moscow"s political mentality at the beginning of the new century. In particular, this line is associated with the self-assigned task of forging a network of support within/from the CIS states-on the basis of their economic dependence on Russia, Moscow"s engagement in their domestic politics, inherited influence on the level of elites, common interests in responding to new trans-national threats (uncontrolled migration, organized crime, illegal transactions, terrorism) and so on. Maintaining Russia"s predominance in the CIS area is considered by Moscow as one of the "pillars" of its international agenda. In a paradoxical way, Russia"s apparent disillusionment regarding the CIS as a multilateral mechanism goes in parallel with increasing inclination to consolidate its influence within the CIS as a geopolitical space. Noteworthy, the new configuration of the international system, with the US predominant role therein, makes this trend more explicit.
Against this background, Russia could believe that it faces a risk of "losing" its clients to the EU as powerful competitor, if the latter is determined to make them a focus of its special attention . Meanwhile, thinking along this line is promoted by one aspect of the EU"s neighbourhood pattern-that is, the introduction of a new category of Western NIS which includes Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.
Interestingly, comments of Russian observers and analysts practically do not mention the fact, the one possible reading of the "neighbourhood policy" towards these three countries may point to the desire to make the level of their expectations with respect to the EU lower. The alarmist trend in these comments is undoubtedly prevailing.
It is assumed, in particular, that the EU"s innovation with WNIS invites to consider the three countries, notwithstanding all differences between them, as belonging to a single space. A suspicious-minded Russian observer would argue, that this approach is only motivated by the desire to singularize this area in a juxtaposition with respect to Russia, to destroy the "Russia plus" space that has emerged on the ruins of the USSR. Meanwhile, what these three countries really have in common is their location between the future enlarged EU and Russia. Another common feature is the fluidity and unstructured character of their political space containing numerous unsettled problems, both in domestic developments and with respect to external interactions. Finally, the controversial combination of Russia"s influence and Russia"s weakness therein could be also considered as a common characteristic of the western edge of the CIS (although this also applies to the CIS as a whole).
In many respects, Russia"s objective role in this area is considerable; it is becoming even more so in the light of relatively more successful domestic developments in Russia in comparison to the erosion of economy and political structures in some of its western neighbours. Russia might therefore believe (and realistically expect) that its unique position within this area will be recognized and respected. However, there are within this field some potentially or actually disturbing aspects for its relations with the EU. The means which Russia considers necessary and legitimate for protecting and promoting its interests in the post-Soviet space could be viewed by the EU as inappropriate or unacceptable. Attempts to build up a Russia-dominated "velvet empire" would most probably meet similar reaction. Moscow"s reluctance to let other international actors operate within its "sphere of vital interests" may also have a discouraging effect on relations between Russia and the EU.
This said, it is clear that Russia"s sensitivity will vary depending on size of different states and their specific circumstances. Thus, Ukraine"s political maneuverings seem to be viewed in Moscow as the most disturbing challenge in this regard. This is partly due to the fact that Kyiv might consider the prospect of its rapprochement with, and eventual accession to the EU as quite realistic, whereas for Moscow developing coherent arguments against this policy orientation would be more than problematic. Also, when political crises emerge in Russian-Ukrainian relations, observers in Moscow do not fail to mention the intention of Kyiv to join the EU and NATO as an "aggravating" factor . At the same time, Ukraine is hardly satisfied with the fact that the shadow of Russia seems always present in its relations with the EU-which might be one more incentive for Kyiv to capitalize upon the EU"s neighbourhood pattern , thus making it even more allergy-fraught for Moscow .
It is obvious that Belarus nowadays represents a special case. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to consider it as a model of various complexes that might emerge within the interaction of Russia and the EU"s neighbourhood pattern.
The reputation of the current regime puts the country in the category of pariah states in the perceptions of the EU. For Russia, its domestic record is also an additional burden rather than an asset. Moscow, however, pursues a patronizing policy line because of various considerations that cannot be disregarded. This may bring about collisions between Russia and the EU. In principle, this could easily take place on the ground created by the EU"s neighbourhood policy.
Thus, the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council confirmed that the Union should take the opportunity offered by enlargement to enhance relations with its neighbours on the basis of shared values -such as democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. But what looks as a routine formula here may in fact represent a matter of contentious interpretations, turn into a divisive issue when coming closer to concrete details.
Certainly, what is at stake here is by no means a theoretical discussion-but an eventuality of it becoming politically relevant. Today"s Belarus is by no means the incarnation of democracy and respect for human rights, both included in the list of those shared values that should represent the basis of neighbourhood relationship. Promoting these values, in the case of President Lukashenko"s regime, does not promise to be particularly successful. It is easy to anticipate a chain of events that would start from the legitimate disappointment on the part of the EU and might evolve into political demands as regards opposition, freedom of press and so on. Russia"s relations with the EU and Moscow"s attitudes towards its neighbourhood policy could be affected by such developments in two ways.
First, Moscow might see this as an interference in domestic affairs of the country that is Russia"s closest ally. Although President Putin and President Lukashenko have rather complicated personal relationship, the former might react nervously to external pressure over the latter (even if only out of the desire to monopolize the possibility of such pressure). Secondly, Russia"s own record of democratic standards is rather ambivalent in the last years. Reproaches within this dossier may be addressed to Russia as well, and tolerating them in the case of Belarus would undermine the consistency of Moscow"s position when (and if) this takes place and Russia itself becomes a target.
In addition, the pro-Russian orientation is still a dominating political vector in Belarus, but by no means an unchallengeable one. Its alternative could be shaped around the idea of rapprochement with the EU. The so called "European coalition" has appeared in November 2003 as a new political force building upon a set of slogans that look increasingly attractive in the country: open frontiers, introduction of euro, European living standards and so on-all fitting into the logic of "new neighbourhood". Some observers believe that even President Lukashenko could be tempted to play with this line . A bluff or a genuine attempt to broaden the regime"s international options, Moscow would be very likely to perceive this as a hostile exercise. Thus, the "neighbourhood pattern" could be associated with trends that might inflict harm to Russia"s influence in the "fraternal Belarus".
The case of Moldova brings two problems into the pattern of Russia"s relations with the West in general and with the EU in particular. One concerns the country"s political drift westwards, including its eventual re-unification with Romania; however, the political relevance of this issue seems to have become considerably lower than in the early post-Soviet years a decade ago. Another one touches upon the Trans-Dniester region with overwhelming Russian ethnic population claiming independence from Moldova. Although the prevailing mood in Russian political quarters seems to prefer downplaying this conflict in order to prevent it from turning into a new "hot spot", warnings against eventual attempts to pressurize Russia out of that area time and again re-emerge in Russian political debates and mass media . Competitive influences of western countries are often mentioned in this regard. If the EU"s neighbourhood policy is associated with this perceived "anti-Russian" orientation, reaction in Russia will be predictably negative.
By and large, the EU could hardly expect that Moscow would react dispassionately on its consistent efforts to provide Kyiv with additional political potential for balancing Russia, or to engage more actively in the developments in and around the Tran-Dniester region-even if this is taking place within the "neighbourhood pattern". Indeed, there are no legal obstacles for the political "penetration" of the EU onto the territory of the former USSR. However, if such developments are not backed by appropriate political accommodation with Moscow, the latter might be inclined to perceive them as promoting further erosion of the post-Soviet space-not only the remaining symbol of what used to be one country, but also a rational stake in Russia"s search for a more prominent international status.
Yet, this erosion has been politically and psychologically accepted only in the case of three Baltic states, with their developing alienation from Russia (which means much more than just getting independent). However, even their forthcoming involvement in NATO is still a traumatic phenomenon. With respect to other post-Soviet territories in the western vicinity of Russia, similar effect might be produced by their drift towards the EU, however less challenging this might be seen in comparison to NATO membership. Indeed, Russia seems to apprehend that the political distance might turn out too short between outsiders" involvement and irreversible re-orientation of its western CIS neighbours.
In the triangle configuration composed by the EU, Russia and WNIS, one more issue is to be mentioned as a matter of Russia"s eventual concern. A meaningful component of its policy consists in promoting the integration within the CIS zone. It is at the same time one of the most problematic dimensions of Russia"s external activities. Without touching here upon numerous controversial CIS-related problems that Moscow is facing, it is worth considering how the EU neighbourhood policy may fit into, and interact with this pattern.
On the one hand, Russia is interested that its relationship with the EU is not undermined by the pro-integration CIS efforts. Noteworthy, more than once Moscow discussed the issue with its EU counterparts. They were informed on the developments that was taking place both at the CIS level and within its subregional structures-for instance, on the decisions taken by the CIS summits, on the progress towards creating the "common economic space" with four participating countries (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan), on the evolution of the five-lateral Euro-Asian Economic Community (EurAsEC-Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and so on . Russia argues that these do not contradict its agenda with the EU , and that all integrative tracks should be synchronized . The EU is more than reluctant to agree with this approach .
On the other hand, one could assume that Moscow would not welcome an "EU neighbourhood pattern" that might create obstacles to the integration within the CIS space or parts of it. Two possible concerns in this regard, associated with competitive attractiveness of the EU, are of a very general character, pointing to the eventuality of (i) Russia"s decreasing leadership role in the CIS zone and (ii) the erosion of the incentives for integration within the CIS space as a whole. But the third one might establish a direct link between the EU neighbourhood policy and the centrifugal trends within the western edge of the CIS area.
Indeed, as recognized in the EU neighbourhood policy documents , the most important difference between its "Mediterranean" and "Eastern" components consists in the character of the "regional dimension" in both cases. In the EU Mediterranean policy, there is an explicit focus upon encouraging the development of intra-regional cooperation-affecting political, security, economic, financial, social, cultural and human fields; supported by the institutional frameworks (such as regular meetings of the foreign and sectoral ministers in the format of 15+12); bringing about specific regional initiatives with adequate financial support. Nothing of this kind exists within the "Eastern" direction of the EU neighbourhood policy-i.e., with regard to three western CIS states (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) and Russia. Meanwhile, the idea of supporting regional cooperation is promoted by the EU even outside the "neighbourhood pattern" (for instance, in Western Balkans) .
The absence of this dimension in the EU"s policy with respect to its "Eastern neighbours" is explained by the already existing strong cross-border interactions there-inherited from the Soviet times and promoted by Russia"s prominence in the area. On the Russian side, however, this pattern is not considered as sufficient; Moscow is also worried about its future-in particular, because of possible role of external influences. If the new neighbourhood policy of the EU is regarded as aggravating such concerns, Russia"s positive attitude thereto will certainly not be encouraged. It is therefore expedient that the EU does not allow any ambivalence in this regard.
The Commission has limited itself by promising that "new initiatives to encourage regional cooperation between Russia and the countries of the Western NIS might also be considered" . It seems to be a very vague formula-which will hardly be sufficiently convincing unless specified and translated into a more concrete language (for instance, by applying the Mediterranean pattern to the policy of the EU towards WNIS and Russia).
Unclear practical prospects
In practical terms, Moscow might only appreciate the EU"s neighbourhood policy if the latter provides some new possibilities for relations with Russia. Where the added value of this policy resides and what it consists of still remains unclear. There are no doubts that a number of the envisaged measures will be important-such as increasing the effectiveness of the existing instruments aimed at encouraging the cross-border cooperation, promoting the coordination of Interreg, Phare, Cards, Tacis and Meda programmes, and eventually developing, on this basis, a new Neighbourhood Instrument that will operate according to the unified principles and rules . However, all these seem to be related to the routine bureaucratic organization and re-organization rather than to a certain political project that might generate a new dynamism in relationship between the EU and its neighbours.
Meanwhile, some innovative approaches would seem appropriate indeed within the "neighbourhood pattern"-even if only confined to the EU-Russia relationship. For instance, the Partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) of 1994 was a significant step forward in relations between Russia and the EU. But today, many Russian observers criticize this document as "outdated" and believe that both sides have to develop a new official framework for their relationship. Others point to the fact that many specific items of the PCA are still to be fulfilled, and developing a new agenda when the previous one has not been implemented would in fact undermine its credibility and could be perceived as reflecting the intention to focus upon bureaucratically advantageous paper work rather than upon hard efforts on substantive issues. Without reproducing here all pro and contra arguments, it is worth noting that a new approach within "new neighbourhood" policy could be a realistic compromise for the proponents of both lines. But this potentiality still remains theoretical.
There are other examples when the correlation of the "neighbourhood concept" with some important current or prospective dimensions in Russia-EU relations seems rather vague. The summit of Russia and the EU in St.Petersburg (May 2003) has introduced in their joint agenda the idea of developing "common spaces" in such areas as trade, economics, domestic and external security, freedom and justice, science and culture. Another big issue in Russia-EU relations concerns the development of "four freedoms" within Wider Europe. Numerous practical problems have also to be addressed by Russia and the EU with respect to the WNIS-for instance, when discussing secure and reliable energy supplies from Russia across their territories .
Whether (and to what extent) the implementation of these strategic projects require the "neighbourhood concept" in its current form remains unclear. But a possibility of elaborating it and putting it in a broader context could certainly be explored-which would also allow to provide a higher profile to the idea of "new neighbourhood". The same could be said about the controversies around the issue of visas. The overall goal of creating a visa-free EU-Russia zone, as proposed by President Putin, is considered to be rather remote, although consultations on ways to facilitate visa formalities have continued from the summit in St.Petersburg in May 2003. Meanwhile, the very idea of "new neighbourhood" could be instrumental in promoting some new approaches in this field.
In this regard, it is appropriate to mention that three big countries on the EU side (Italy, Germany and France) seem to endorse Putin"s visa-related proposal more enthusiastically (or, at least, less reluctantly) than the EU as a whole. And this brings about the old dilemma that Moscow has faced in its policy towards the EU through decades and until the most recent times: to deal with its member-states bilaterally or to interact with the EU as an entity operating on the international arena and becoming a de facto influential actor. The overall dynamics consists in the gradual erosion of the traditional pattern that gave undoubted predominance to the "bilateral track"-alongside the increasing prominence of the EU"s international personality. In a sense, the very fact that the EU intends to elaborate and carry out its "neighbourhood policy" might be considered as one more argument in favour of the "multilateral track".
However, if Russia assesses skeptically this policy (either in terms of its sustainability or in terms of its substance correlated with Russia"s own interests), this may become an incentive for focusing more energetically upon the traditional "bilateral track". In a simplified way, this logic of Moscow could be presented in the following way: the EU"s "neighbourhood concept" contains too many uncertainties, challenges some of our interests, fails to address the most important practical issues in our relationship with Europe-that"s why we should better deal with our direct counterparts in Paris, Berlin or Rome, rather than with Euro-bureaucrats from Brussels.
An additional argument here points to pragmatic considerations: it is easier to find a common ground bilaterally rather than within a committee of 15+1 (or 25+1) participants, especially when the EU member-states disagree among themselves . In a broader sense, one could notice that Russia"s skepticism towards multilateral partners (and patterns) has become more pronounced during the last two years. Whether this trend has a long-term character is yet unclear, but one could presume that Russia"s attitude towards the EU"s "neighbourhood policy" may be somehow affected by it.
Concluding remarks
The above overview allows to make a number of conclusions. They are deliberately formulated in a schematic way-but eventually could be used for developing more concrete policy recommendations.
1. Russia has a clear preference for the first part of the "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood" formula and seems rather reluctant to endorse the second one. The notion of "Wider Europe" is associated with a prospect of becoming a full-fledged, respectable and influential participant in the European international order in the making. The notion of "neighbourhood" is less clear conceptually and problematic in political terms.
2. The "neighbourhood" as an alternative to Russia"s membership in the EU provokes negative reaction-even among those who are not proponents of Russia"s accession to the EU. Russia may prefer the "constructive ambiguity" between the two notions, rather than establishing a clear-cut relationship between them.
3. Russia does not feel sympathy towards a neighbourhood pattern wherein it is "dissolved" alongside many other participants. It believes it deserves a "special treatment" on the part of the EU-as a strategic partner, strategic ally, strategic neighbour and so on.
4. The concept of "neighbourhood", as it is presented in the EU documents, looks excessively bureaucratic and technocratic. Although its specific components may be considered necessary and valuable, the whole project fails to suggest an inspiring political perspective (or, at least, does not look inspiring). Meanwhile, Russia tends to prefer "weighty" political declarations rather than "boring" substantive documents. These two factors contribute to the relatively low attractiveness of the "neighbourhood pattern" for Russia.
5. Russia may formulate a general positive attitude towards the EU"s "neighbourhood policy"-but only insofar as it is not regarded as a substitute or a challenge to the existing pattern of relationship between Russia and the EU. The existing pattern should certainly prevail over the "neighbourhood"-unless the latter becomes considerably more ambitious and wide-ranging. A radical approach might consist in developing a new "new neighbourhood" concept ("neighbourhood plus") that would have a more comprehensive character and a more pronounced strategic orientation.
6. Russia proceeds from the assumption that the CIS is (or, in any case, should be) a zone of its predominant influence. Whether (and how) Moscow manages (or fails) to implement this approach into practice is another issue. But Russia"s "neighbourhood" relations with the EU should be considered, inter alia, against this background. Russia"s "neighbourhood" with the EU should not be perceived as damaging to its "neighbourhood" with post-Soviet states."
7. Russia will be particularly sensitive towards the emerging pattern wherein the countries of the CIS western edge (WNIS) become objects of the EU"s neighbourhood policy. Eventual problems arising in this field should be addressed cautiously, with a clear understanding that this might touch upon some delicate or tough issues. But failure to address them could be even more counterproductive-although this argument does not seem to be seriously assessed in Russia. The interests of both Russia and the EU in this area might be better served by their broader cooperative pattern of relations than by its absence-not to mention the alternative of confrontation.
8. At the same time, Russia"s active involvement in WNIS does not necessary prevent the latter from getting closer to Europe; on the contrary, it could be instrumental (and perhaps even indispensable) in promoting these countries" rapprochement with the EU . From this point of view, a political dialogue between Russia and the EU could be reinforced by the involvement of the three western CIS states therein. This would promote their self-esteem and their repositioning vis-#224;-vis Russia from dependence to partnership-without, however, antagonizing Russia and provoking suspicions and nervousness on its part.
9. A more ambitious "neighbourhood plus" approach (as mentioned above, in point 5) might include a weighty "out-of-area" component. Both sides could have a significant interest in building a pattern that would allow them to address various issues emerging not only within the zone of their immediate contact but also beyond it. However, both sides seem to be reluctant, for the time being, to engage in such endeavor. This may become a central element of their future joint agenda.
