Introduction..............................................................................3
1. Background: overcoming low-profile attitudes ................................5
Focus upon domestic developments...........................................6
Foreign policy disorientation...................................................7
In search for points of reference................................................9
The context of self-identification.............................................13
2. Views on the EU: various paradigms...........................................15
The EU as a model.............................................................15
The EU as a partner............................................................19
The EU: a prospect for accession.............................................22
The EU as a leverage...........................................................25
3. Rapprochement: rationales and limits.........................................28
New motives...................................................................28
Old doubts.......................................................................32
Bilateral or multilateral?.......................................................34
4. Emerging mechanisms.............................................................39
Political dialogue...............................................................39
Strategy documents............................................................42
Summits..........................................................................44
5. Potentials for a joint agenda.....................................................48
Problems of organizing Europe...............................................49
Zones of immediate contacts.................................................59
Broader context................................................................70
6. CESDP: horizons of the Russian perception.................................76
Legacy of the past..............................................................78
Focus on NATO...............................................................80
Reservations and uncertainties................................................85
Prospects of cooperative interaction.........................................88
7. Political challenges of enlargement..............................................95
Traditional attitudes............................................................95
The prominence of the political context.....................................98
Concerns versus opportunities...............................................103
8. Kaliningrad as a test case.......................................................113
Existential uncertainty......................................................113
The double edge of Europeanization.......................................114
Russia"s exclave as the EU"s enclave.......................................117
Assessing the EU role.........................................................119
Developing interaction.......................................................122
9. After September 11: a new context for Russia EU relations?.........127
Conclusions............................................................................135
Introduction
This study aims at analyzing Russia"s perceptions of, Russia"s attitudes towards, and Russia"s interaction with the EU developments as a political phenomenon.
Looking at the EU through the prism of political considerations has always been a remarkable feature of Moscow"s attitudes. This was so even at the very early years of the integration in Western Europe, when its economic agenda was indisputably predominant. With time, this approach only seemed more justified and well-grounded-alongside the growing salience of political aspects in the EU evolution and the consolidation of its political personality. In relatively recent years, Russia"s sensitivities were promoted by those developments that open new prospects for the presence of the EU in the international arena-in particular, its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), as well as EU enlargement.
The main goal of the study consists in promoting a better understanding of how Russia identifies its own interests related to the EU and the extent to which this affects Russia"s priorities, its behaviour in the international arena, both with respect to the EU and beyond.
The analysis is focused upon political aspects of Russia"s interaction with the EU; other dimensions of this problem are only addressed insofar as they play a role in shaping political motivations and assessments. The author, however, does not intend to formulate specific policy recommendations but proceeds from the rationale of promoting the engagement of both the EU and Russia to develop cooperatively their relationship. It is clear that their interaction forms a political equation in which both sides are equally important. This study focuses only on the Russian side of this equation.
Addressing even this relatively limited task poses a number of methodological challenges. There is a need to analyze what Russia"s perceptions and attitudes are, why Russia has these perceptions and attitudes, whether they are adequate to the actual state of affairs on the EU side, whether they are changing and in what direction, to what extent they are translated into policy, how they affect prospects of Russia"s cooperative interaction with the EU. Furthermore, specifically political aspects of Russia"s interaction with the EU should be considered against a broader background. They have to be addressed in the context of Russia"s attitudes and policies to the EU as a whole, on the one hand, and in terms of Russia"s self-assigned broader foreign policy agenda, on the other hand.
The study does not represent a summary of diplomatic record of interaction between Russia and the EU. Rather, it aims at developing a conceptual analysis that would go beyond official documents and draw its conclusion from ideas circulating within the political class and in the society at large-in the form of statements, interviews, articles, unofficial and working papers of policy-making institutions, analytical publications, information provided by the mass media as well as opinions expressed at various conferences and discussion meetings. For understanding the dynamics and the logic of Russia"s political interaction with the EU, this broad intellectual "software" might be even more important than the official policy"s "hardware".
1. Background: overcoming low-profile attitudes
When analyzing Russia"s assessment of, attitudes towards, and interaction with the EU during the last 10 to 15 years, one could be surprised by the lack of dynamism on the part of Moscow during most of this period. Moreover, a question might even arise whether it has overlooked the most dramatic political developments of the European integration.
Indeed, the history of the latter seems to have accelerated from mid-1980s. Since that time, it has brought about more fundamental novelties than during several preceding decades. More importantly, this development has had a significant potential for affecting the international political system, gradually turning the EU into an influential actor on the world scene.
In this regard, even a brief overview looks more than impressive and invites to think about eventual implications for international relations both in and beyond the Old Continent. The European political cooperation, this "parallel" and initially semi-legal system of foreign policy consultations, evolved into the Common Foreign and Security Policy as a "second pillar" of the EU. The EU membership was broadened for the third time, but in contrast to the previous waves of enlargement, that one included three neutral and non-aligned states, those who had been earlier rather firm in considering this impossible. The perspective of a "common defence" ceased to be a taboo and was officially (even if vaguely) recognized as a matter deserving attention. The Western European Union, this almost invisible and abridged shadow of the EU, attempted to resurrect, enlarged its "family" up to 28 countries and then actually was channeled to merge with the EU. The latter engaged in a dramatic endeavor of developing its own crisis-management capability. Finally, new candidate-countries began to form a long queue for joining the Union.
Meanwhile, most of these developments did not provoke any strong political emotion in Moscow. The latter (at least until recently) paid remarkably little attention to new political realities in and around the EU. In any case, they were by no means in the centre of Moscow"s political agenda. Moreover, even if comparing to the defunct USSR, post-Soviet Russia seemed less politically inclined and professionally ready to consider what this might mean for its interests. Indeed, the Soviet Union was sometimes suspicious about the integration in the western part of the continent, sometimes more positively oriented, but almost never indifferent. As far as "new" Russia is concerned, at the beginning of the 1990s and even later it often looked apathetic with respect to the political developments generated by the EU.
This could be explained by two major reasons, one generated by Russia"s domestic developments and another one related to the sphere of foreign policy.
Focus upon domestic developments
From mid-1980s through mid-1990s the country turned out predominantly inward-looking and relatively less passionate about what was happening in the external world. Indeed, the access of Michael Gorbachev to power in 1985 and the beginning of "perestroika" were producing by far more thrilling scenario than the Single European Act and debates related thereto. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty was a small, ordinary episode against the background of the disappearance of the Soviet Union-which was the event indeed. The enlargement of the EU passed almost unnoticed in the country that came up to the threshold of civil war which could only be prevented by shooting at the parliament with tanks. Even the debate in the EU on security and defence matters looked light years away from realities in Russia engaging in the Chechen war.
This list could be longer, although it certainly does not look methodologically convincing. Indeed, in most countries domestic affairs, as a rule, have predominance over the external developments. Foreign policies could rarely compete with interior ones. However, Russia"s phenomenon of indifference was remarkable by its scale even in the framework of this general rule.
It was also remarkable in comparison to the country"s own tradition in two respects. On the one hand, Moscow"s foreign policy during the Soviet period had been traditionally considered as assertive (or "active", if one uses the political and propagandistic clich#233; of that time), whereas at the beginning of 1990s the country looked invalidating this tradition. On the other hand, the general public during the Soviet period had been by and large interested in foreign affairs (even if only because it was impossible to manifest interest towards domestic ones), whereas in the early post-Soviet period this interest declined to almost zero level.
At the same time, keeping in mind the scope of transformation, the intensity of domestic political debate on the course to be adopted, the rigidity of struggle between competing interest groups and other similar factors, there seems nothing abnormal in such excessive concentration on the country"s own problems. Relative decrease of interest towards the external environment was the price to pay for exciting domestic developments.
Certainly, the importance of domestic developments does not necessarily make foreign policy a low profile issue. Any country could face situations when the role of external factors becomes crucial in terms of its domestic developments. However, this was not exactly the case of the Soviet/Russian history during the last ten to fifteen years-both in terms of actual development and as far as its perception is concerned.
It is true that some policy-related analyses tend to make the West responsible for the demise of the USSR, the most dramatic event during this period. In principle, within this line of thinking, the EU could be a subject of negative attention. But Russian intellectual debate does not support this abstract assumption. Indeed, the conspiracy-oriented theories (focusing upon external influence as decisive factor of the collapse of the country) represent only a meaningless part of the whole spectrum of the debate. In addition, even within these theories, blaming the EU would mean focusing upon the wrong "responsible" since this role is undoubtedly reserved to the United States.
There was an opposite vector in some Russian assessments regarding the interplay of domestic and external factors-when the support of "democratic West" was regarded as crucial for ensuring Russia"s political, economic and social transformation and preventing its return to the past. It would be logical, within this approach, to expect considerable support from the EU and to focus upon it in a more significant way. However, in practice this relationship emerged only later; at the initial phase after the demise of the USSR, the unlimited support was expected as granted and did not seem to require any specific intellectual or political efforts on the part of Moscow (in particular, with respect to the EU).
Foreign policy disorientation
Notwithstanding all reasons for focusing upon domestic issues, explaining the lack of adequate reaction to new EU-related phenomena only by predominantly inward-oriented character of Russia"s political developments seems neither satisfactory nor sufficient. Part of the explanation (and perhaps a very significant part) could reside in the realm of foreign policy per se.
It is worth recalling that the post-Soviet Russia came onto the international scene with a strong pro-Western orientation. Destroying the old regime, getting rid of the communist past, proclaiming itself decisively in favour of democracy and a market economy-all this was considered to provide Russia with a ticket to the "community of the civilized countries ". Now, yesterday"s foes were regarded as the most reliable friends; they were expected to welcome the new Russia with enthusiasm as an equal partner-both in Europe and elsewhere. Operating together, they would constitute a nucleus of the "new world order".
Thus, Russia was both politically and psychologically ready to join the club of the international elite and expected to be recognized as a full-fledged participant therein. This vision had three basic implications for designing Russia"s perspectives on the EU.
First, there was a kind of tacit assumption (even if it was not proclaimed publicly): Russia "s interests in the international arena are basically identical to those of the West. Evidently, this fully applied to the EU as its organic part. The developments in and around the EU are to be accepted as such, without any concern and unnecessary doubts, since they, by definition, cannot be incompatible with Russia"s interests.
Secondly, with such "radiant future" in view, there was no need to be excessively specific in assessing the developments within the West. The latter as a whole was the target of Russia"s policy of new friendship, and losing time and efforts for dealing with meaningless details was simply not necessary. The EU was too small for new Russia"s "grand strategy" that was globally oriented. In a sense, this was a democratic variant of megalomanic ambitions inherited from the past .
Thirdly, the EU could hardly be Russia"s preferable choice for organizing the European political space. New Russia was thinking about a new post-cold war pattern in a new Europe, with all interested countries participating in its construction as equal partners. The emerging pan-European pattern was to replace the outdated bipolar organization of the continent. Meanwhile, the EU was an element of the past, and it did not include Russia-therefore the latter had all grounds for not focusing its foreign policy upon this structure.
Certainly, the above description only gives a schematic picture, but it reflects the character of Russian thinking in the early post-Soviet period. This thinking was full of expectations, hopes and illusions that all prevented Moscow from paying due attention to the EU developments.
Moreover, even political actions of the EU addressed to what was disappearing as a single state, USSR, and what was becoming something new, passed practically unnoticed in Moscow. This was, for instance, the case of the EU decision to elaborate criteria for recognizing the new states emerging on the territory of the former superpower-criteria that were adopted by the foreign ministers of "the Twelve" on 16 December 1991, but did not meet interest in Moscow. Meanwhile, they included notions that were of significant importance for Russia, such as guarantees to ethnic and national minorities, respect of non-violability of frontiers, recognition of international obligations, commitment to settle disagreements by negotiations and so on. At the least, this created a good starting point for developing constructive interaction with the EU at the very early period of post-Soviet Russia. This opportunity, however, was missed or, rather, passed unnoticed.
In search for points of reference
The initial euphoria with respect to anticipated "entente cordiale" with the West did not last long. Explanations differ as to what extent this was due to the very fact of having a simplified approach towards the international life and excessive optimism of the post-cold war over-excitement-or, alternatively, to the mishandling of the emerging issues by various involved countries, including (or even beginning with) Russia itself. But one thing is obvious: very soon Russia started to reflect on its own international interests in a more specific way, rather than proceeding from the assumption that they are fully identical to those of major western international actors.
This was a painful process, since in many respects Moscow"s foreign policy found itself disoriented and deprived of clear points of reference. However, it would be unfair to reproach Russian foreign policy makers and thinkers for the frustration that reflected the fundamental changes being experienced by the country. Indeed, it had entered a phase of profound transition: the highly centralized economy based on the overwhelming predominance of state ownership was to give way to a market economy; the totalitarian political system was to be transformed into a democracy; and what used to be a single country-the USSR-had been replaced by 15 new independent states, with the patterns of relations among them still to be crystallized.
None of these processes was complete or produced any relatively stable pattern which certainly created a highly volatile situation. Previous values, beliefs, structures, institutions, links, economic mechanisms and behavioural patterns had been either destroyed or discredited, while new ones were either non-existent or just beginning to emerge. In these circumstances, uncertainty and inconsistency in external policy were inevitable opening up the way for different scenarios of relations between Russia and the outside world.
Replacing the political terminology of the communist period with a thin layer of democratic rhetoric was certainly not sufficient for creating a solid conceptual basis on which to build an effective foreign policy. At the same time, the legacy of the past could not disappear instantaneously; inertia persisted on various levels and in various spheres: perceptions and norms, enduring empire/superpower mentality, a clear sympathy of powerful interest groups for isolationist protectionism or even confrontational assertiveness rather than for openness, adaptation and cooperation.
With respect to Europe, gradually getting rid of the old obsessions, suspicions and fears with regard to the West was certainly essential for clearing the way for a pan-European pattern which could include Russia among the international actors operating on the continent. However, although the collapse of the old regime made Russia ideologically closer to Europe, it was not necessarily making the two more compatible. Ironically, even the contrary may prove true: it had been sufficient for the former Soviet Union simply to proclaim its "Europeanism" to gain a sympathetic reaction from Europe, but this was no longer the case for post-Soviet Russia. Since it pretended to operate as a "normal" member of the international community, the quality of the factors certifying its participation in the family of "civilized" countries (democracy, human rights, market economy and so on) was becoming a critical test-the test that the country experienced serious difficulties to pass.
Geopolitically, with the end of the bipolar division of Europe, Russia has unexpectedly found itself pushed to the periphery of the European space. What used to be the immediate neighbourhood for the state which controlled half of Europe turned out separated from Russia by two territorial belts comprising the former socialist countries and the former western republics of the USSR. Having suddenly become the most remote territory of Europe, Russia lost some of the options that had been available to the former Soviet Union, and its ability to affect developments in Europe significantly decreased.
This was the background of formative period of the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era. Earlier illusions and perceptions began to give way to calculations, statements and actions aimed at promoting Russia as an influential international actor. By the mid-1990s, deliberations on Russia"s "great powerness", "special responsibilities" and "sphere of national interest" have become a new obsession-sometimes evolving into arrogance, assertiveness and what was perceived by other international actors as neo-imperial inclinations.
There were two alternative readings of this phenomenon.
On the one hand, it was ascribed to legitimate-or at least understandable-attempts to overcome post-imperial frustration, to compensate for the mistakes committed in the initial period of the new Russian statehood and to develop an adequate understanding of the country"s national interests in the international arena.
On the other hand, there was a more worrying, even alarmist, interpretation-that Russia opted to aim to re-establish the legacy of the past (associated with the USSR, or the tsarist empire, or with both) and to consolidate its international status as an expansionist, militaristic and confrontational power.
Paradoxically, in any case attitudes towards the EU were to change from neglect and disregards towards attempts to develop a more specific understanding of what advantages (or disadvantages) it could provide in terms of the task of positioning Russia in the international arena. It is worth recalling in this respect how the EU was treated in the first "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" adopted in 1993 . In a sense, this document reflected the on-going trends in Russian foreign policy thinking-both the above-mentioned initial syndromes and the emerging search for changes.
Interestingly, the section on Europe is listed in this document only on the fifth place, giving way to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), arms control, the promotion of economic reforms and the USA. This is telling: Russia assessed itself first of all in terms of dissolved USSR legacy (other post-Soviet states as the major focus of attention, arms control as an attribute of superpower"s policy, the USA as the main external interlocutor). As far as the EU is concerned, it appears only within one of regional dimensions of Russia"s would be foreign policy.
Altogether the EU (EC) is mentioned six times (if the WEU is counted as well), but in four of them it is enumerated together with other multilateral structures, such as the UN, the OSCE, the OECD and G7. Specific issues are addressed only once: "finalizing the negotiation with the European Community on the development and conclusion of a treaty on promoting relations in all spheres, including the political one" and "setting up an effective mechanism of cooperation (regular political consultations, joint commissions and working groups on the parliamentary level and so on)".
However, this is presented as the first task in Russia"s relations with Western Europe. It is also worth noting two particular emphases related to the EU. First, the prospect of developing relations in the political sphere was specifically underlined. Secondly, apart from the bureaucratic task of finalizing a treaty (which does not contain anything "conceptual"), the idea of developing "effective mechanism of cooperation" on various levels was promoted. These two indications pointed to the on-going re-assessment of Russia"s attitudes towards the EU. The latter was gradually ceasing to be almost non-existent in the radars of Moscow"s foreign policy.
The context of self-identification
One more factor was important for promoting Moscow"s attention to the EU. Russia started (or, rather, re-started) search for civilization and/or geopolitical self-identification-an intellectual and political exercise that has continued for centuries and remains nowadays both fascinating and inconclusive. Schematically, it is possible to distinguish three main lines of thinking in this regard :
a European paradigm (Russia belongs to Europe),
an Asian paradigm (Russia is closer to Asia), and
a Eurasian paradigm (Russia is special, it represents a world in itself that follows its own destiny and develops its own rules).
Depending on which one of the three is chosen (or on their combination), the EU could be regarded by Russia differently-both in terms of assessment and as far as the policy line is concerned.
Indeed, within the European paradigm, Russia would see itself as an organic part of Europe, and if the latter is increasingly associated with, concentrated in, and incarnated by the EU, Russia should be a part of it. This might have two implications for Russia"s policy-thinking. On the one hand, it would be only natural to define prompt accession to the EU as one of the imperatives for the country"s foreign policy (or even as its most urgent priority)-as it was done by the former socialist countries in East-Central Europe. On the other hand, failure to achieve this goal, for whatever reason, might generate a political and psychological complex of unfair treatment denying to Russia the status that it deserves-which in itself is fraught with resentment and, eventually, the reaction of alienation. Thus, in a paradoxical way, Russia"s self-identification with Europe might result in grievances against the EU if it does not meet the idea of Russia"s membership with support and enthusiasm.
The Asian paradigm makes the question of membership irrelevant. Furthermore, it orients Russia away from the EU stipulating that the country"s main interests, prospects and would-be assets are to be associated with non-European options. In addition, Russia"s "Europeanness" could be a burden complicating the country"s future-oriented search for a better destiny. In its extreme version , this line of thinking would argue for protecting Russia against the expansionism of the West (and, ipso facto, that of the EU), with chances for effective protection being considerably increased if Russia is supported by, or even allied with one or few Asian powers (China, India, Iran and so on).
The intellectual stereotype of Russia"s Eurasian vocation is vague and allows for various interpretations of its foreign policy implications-interpretations that sometimes conflict with each other. This concerns, alongside other matters, the assessment of, and Russia"s would-be policy towards the EU. Thus, if Russia represents "a special case" in the development of civilization, it should not worry about eventual incompatibilities with external partners, such as the EU; it cannot and should not follow exogenous models, in particular, that of the EU; the inclination of the latter to expand its zone of influence might be a challenge to Russia, and so on.
At the same time, there may be another interpretation of Russia"s "Eurasianness" pointing to the fact that its unquestionable belonging to the European civilization goes in parallel with its geopolitical location making it vulnerable to challenges from Asia (for instance, associated with China). This must make Russia more sensitive to the Asian dimension of its foreign and security policy. Noteworthy, this guideline may advise against focusing excessively upon the West in general and the EU in particular-or, alternatively, argue in favour of forging strong cooperative relations with them, in order to have a secure "rear" in case of unpredictable developments in Russia"s Asian "fronts".
Against the background of these competing self-identification contexts, the character of Russia"s re-emerging attention towards the EU was by no means predetermined. In fact, all the above mentioned trends affecting Russia"s policy-oriented thinking in the 1990s were conducive to a whole variety of images of the EU and Russia"s would be policy towards it.
2. Views on the EU: various paradigms
Plurality of Russia"s perceptions with respect to the EU is related to various contexts in which the latter is (or could be) regarded as meaningful and deserving attention. Schematically, what might provoke Russia"s interest could be described by four formulas:
the EU as a model (that could be a source of political or organizational inspiration),
the EU as a partner (for cooperative or competitive interaction),
the EU as a structure for eventually incorporating Russia as a member-state, and
the EU as a channel of leverage for attaining results beyond bilateral relations with the EU per se.
In practical terms, the actual policy line is based on a mixture of these perceptions. Analytically, each of them deserves some attention.
The EU as a model
The EU might represent for Moscow a fascinating model of how to organize relations between sovereign states in such a way that they become increasingly able to operate as an entity without losing their individual characteristics or by mutually accommodating them. The EU is generally considered to be a success story, and its example looks particularly impressive against the background of spectacular failures of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), this post-Soviet structure that Russia would be interested to turn into a viable and sustainable organization.
Indeed, the differences between the EU and the CIS are so enormous and substantive that even comparing these two structures might seem absolutely inappropriate. But some approaches, tools, organizational schemes and policy archetypes that have been successfully tested in (and by) the EU could be eventually considered relevant in the CIS context. In fact, some of these have been "copied" by the CIS (which predictably does not provide this organization with additional viability, because of superficial character of adopting them).
The idea of "integration with variable geometry" is also used for describing what is happening within the CIS, and some parallels with the EU are being drawn in this respect also. For instance, neither the Economic and monetary union nor the Schengen zone embrace all member-states of the EU. And this serves as an additional justification for different speeds of consolidation in the CIS, with some of its participants preferring very vague and soft integration, while others discussing custom union ("union of five"), and two of them even building a "joint state" (Russia and Belarus).
Amazingly, although the latter case has no chances of being considered seriously as long as it is associated with ungracious political figure of President Lukashenko of Belarus, even in this model some analysts would be ready to see resemblance with the EU. Indeed, they point to the fact that the EU has a de facto "core zone" of integration, and the idea of transforming it into something more official is debated not only as a purely academic question. If this represents a part of reality in the EU, the most developed integration pattern in the world, then there should be no reasons for considering this impossible within the CIS.
Serious analysts are rather cautious when considering the very possibility of using the EU experience for developing integration in the CIS. The most radical approach in the "no" part of the analytical spectrum underlines that this is impossible in principle, just because the economic basis is absolutely different in the two cases-so that even applying the word "integration" to the CIS would be absolutely groundless . Others would recommend to expand the analysis of the EU for understanding the overall logic of its development . Sometimes, when making comparative studies, analysts look for possibilities to pick up specific "technologies" of the EU .
Policy-makers seem to be more enthusiastic when a happy idea of modeling upon the EU occur to them. Noteworthy, infamous "oligarch" Boris Berezovskiy, when holding the post of deputy secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (1996-1997), tried to promote the idea of "using the EU experience" in developing the CIS. Since his campaign was mainly focused upon overcoming the principle of unanimity in the decision-making process, this was rejected as an attack on sovereign rights of member-states. Nevertheless, in the "Eurasian Economic Community" that was set up in 2000 by five CIS countries , the decision-making is based upon the principle of majority voting with weighted votes -which is slightly reminiscent of rules existing in the EU Council. It remains to be seen whether this structure survives and, if so, to what extent its decision-making scheme becomes operational.
What seems obvious even now is that these are typical examples of attempting to do quickly what requires years of consistent efforts. In the EU the process of gradually passing to majority voting has taken decades. And the EU experience has convincingly shown that adopting this principle cannot be only based on a political decision. It should be based on a vast and durable cooperative practice implemented on various levels of political mechanism. Otherwise, the very idea of supranational elements in the development of integration could be discredited, or the process itself could be blocked, as it happened in the EC in 1965-66. Russian "imitators" of the EU are often either ignorant about the EU or proceed from excessively self-assured confidence that they could do better and faster.
However, even when (and if) there is an adequate knowledge, practical implementation always differs from theoretical schemes. With this qualification in mind, the idea of "modeling upon the EU experience" might be considered for application even in a broader sense, both below the national level and above it. For instance, the case of the sub-national level seemed to become relevant for the Soviet Union in 1990-91, at the very end of its days, when it was already in disarray and the de facto growing autonomy of the constituent republics clearly pointed to the disintegration of the country. One of the directions of thinking on how to save its integrity pointed to the EU (EC)-the direction that was not seriously considered at that time, or rather simply overtaken by the avalanche-type collapse of the country.
In an amazing way, the analogy between the Soviet Union and the EU is developed in the other way around as well, with the former presented either as a would-be model for the latter, or as the warning on dangerous risks that might bring any multinational endeavor to a failure. The "apologetic version" of this intellectual approach is well reflected in a dubious compliment addressed to the EU by the chairman of State Duma Guennady Seleznev: "The European Union is a very clever organization that has adopted all useful [things] from the Soviet Union" .
The opposite way of thinking addresses alarming signals to the EU: "In the final analysis, the future of the EU will be settled neither by economic integration and free movement of working force, nor by joint financial system and even joint armed forces-this all used to exist in the Soviet Union". That"s why "the Europeans should be more serious about the experience of another Union that has recently collapsed". In particular, the disintegration of the USSR started by the adoption of "laws on languages" and the explosion of linguistic passions in its constituent republics, which allows for worrisome parallels in the case of the EU, with its 11 official languages and the preponderance of one of them, "reflecting the economic and political dominance of a non-European power" .
However, comparing the EU and the USSR is a backward-oriented exercise whereas Russian developments appeal for analyzing the relevance of the EU model for the country"s current challenges . For instance, a case could be made for applying the EU experience by introducing the subsidiarity principle into the domestic political structure of the Russian Federation. This idea could be politically attractive, if one takes into account the complexity of relations between the centre and the provinces (regions) in Russia-complexity fraught with serious implications either in terms of the country"s disintegration (as it happened to the Soviet Union), or in terms of its bureaucratic and autocratic over-centralization. The only problem is that the very concept of subsidiarity provokes even more confusion in Russia than in the EU .
A broader approach in terms of thinking about the EU as a model is possible not only "downward" but also "upward", with respect to the level of international relations in Russia"s surrounding. For instance, this could be the case of Russia"s concerns with respect to some areas of its "near abroad", such as Transcaucasus. If pacifying and stabilizing them is considered as Russia"s serious interest, a possible way of achieving this might consist in promoting integration between the belligerents (a model of French-German reconciliation through the ECSC/EC/EU), with Russia operating as external integrator... However, this scheme is derived from very broad thinking about the integration in the EU rather than represents eventual elements of Russia"s political agenda associated with this organization.
The EU as a partner
The EU as a partner is another way of considering this organization when looking from Moscow. Actually, this is the most developed line of thinking, the one that usually comes to the foreground when the issue of relations with the EU is raised in political and academic debates as well as on the level of the decision-making process within the governmental structures.
Obvious factors make this line of thinking predominant in Russia. The EU accounts for approximately 40 per cent of Russia"s external trade; it is the largest source of foreign investments providing more than two thirds of them; it generates the lion"s part of economic assistance directed to Russia from the outside world. By all these parameters, the EU is the most important counterpart of Russia and is certainly appreciated in this capacity which makes Russia"s cooperative interaction with it imperative .
This is of particular importance in terms of Russia"s crucial self-assigned task of ensuring economic sustainability of the country. Against this background, incentives towards promoting the EU to the very top in the list of Russia"s foreign policy priorities look very powerful indeed.
Moreover, there is a general belief in Russia that the EU approach determines the overall dynamics of Russia"s relations with external partners. If the EU develops trade with Russia, or provides credits, or becomes more active in terms of investments, or manifests flexibility in settling Russia"s debts, and so on-this is expected to be a strong signal to other international partners that will most probably follow suit. In other words, the EU as Russia"s external partner sets the pattern of behaviour to other actors. It is therefore not surprising that Moscow pays considerable attention to the EU position on some specific problems. For instance, the EU support is considered essential on such issues like Russia"s accession to the WTO or the recognition of Russia"s status as market economy country .
The economic power of the EU generates both respect and apprehension. Respect is a more "direct" reaction to the EU strength which is expected to take part in promoting Russia"s economic development. Apprehension relates to some longer term assessments which makes Russia think about the EU in competitive terms. Indeed, if a scenario of Russia"s economic resurrection proves true, the EU might become a challenger rather than a source of support.
Many in Russia would consider this scenario over-optimistic as far as Russia"s economic recovery is concerned; for them, the EU economic strength as a problem for Russia is a very remote prospect. Others would argue that competitiveness in relations with the EU is an existential problem. Even nowadays, the EU as a partner might be also a source of irritation. There are numerous complaints about anti-dumping procedures and other "discriminatory practices" by the EU against Russia. Thus, at the beginning of 2001, Russia"s "losses" because of the EU export quotas (on metals, chemical productions) and twelve on-going "anti-dumping measures" were assessed at $2,5 bln.
Building "organic" cooperative relationship with the EU requires considerable adjustments on Russia"s part. Proponents of rapprochement with the EU believe that this is essential not only for developing relations with this organization but also in terms of promoting Russia"s further transformation. In fact, the large-scale "Europeanization" of Russia"s economic pattern, political mechanism, judicial system, social norms and so on should consist in adopting the EU standards, both to make Russia compatible with the EU and, even more importantly, to make it modern and sustainable. Some opponents of this approach, those who profess irreconcilable anti-western beliefs, would reject it as a matter of principle; others would argue that introducing the EU standards is an enormous time- and effort-consuming operation requiring both patience and cautiousness. The "pro-EU" extremists would reject such objections and reservations as meaningless; they would argue in favour of enhanced rapprochement at any price and believe that the ultimate advantages would outweigh any eventual costs of Russia.
There is a peculiar combination of economic and political motives in Russian thinking about the EU as a partner. Economics is predominant in "technocratic" thinking; indeed, there are numerous examples when the line developed by various governmental institutions is only focused upon clearly "countable" parameters: volume of trade, flow of investments, norms of profit, specific clauses in agreements and so on. In fact, this is often characterized by a surprising lack of assessing the political aspects of partnership with the EU. Political calculations, on the other hand, may look superficial, proceeding from normative stands and insufficiently aware of real requirements, constraints and obstacles. Ensuring an adequate combination of both approaches is a formidable challenge in developing Russia"s attitude to the EU as a partner.
The inertia of considering the EU as an economic entity par excellence affects the character of Russia"s understanding of "partnership" with this structure. However, the on-going trend consists in considering the EU also as a political actor.
The EU itself, with its significant transformation in the 1990s, has certainly played a role in promoting such changes of the Russian attitude. But they were also generated by the evolution of Russia"s foreign policy thinking-in particular by the emerging understanding that Russia has to search for its own place and role in the international arena. This required adequate assessment of other actors, either as potential cooperative partners in the international political interplay or as potential rivals and competitors. Assessing in this context the EU is becoming a growing necessity, because of the EU"s developing Common Foreign and Security Policy that also starts embracing military-related issues.
By and large, this has turned into a kind of a two-ways street: the international political identity of the EU becomes more prominent, while Russia experiences growing need in political interaction with other actors on the international scene. Both processes represent independent variables; their intersection is not inevitable, but the chances for them to reinforce each other are by no means meaningless.
Here again, one could refer to Russia"s first "Foreign Policy Concept" of 1993 where possible political interaction with the EU was mentioned with respect to some international issues. This concerns, for instance, the eventual involvement of the EU in preventive diplomacy and conflict management-in particular, in Yugoslavia.
It should be added, however, that the view on the EU as potential competitor of Russia could be applied to the political dimension even to a greater extent than to the economic one. Indeed, if "recovered" Russia tries one day to re-establish its influence in Europe, the EU as a political power will be a serious obstacle thereto. In a broader sense, the EU as a global actor in the making could also undermine prospects of Russia"s "greatpowerness". It is true that such propositions look theoretical and politically irrelevant, without affecting much Russia"s thinking about the EU. But within a more narrow focus-for instance, in regard to the CIS zone where Russia pretends to have "special interests"-the vision of the EU as Russia"s rival does not look as something generated only by ill-grounded intellectual exercises.
The EU: a prospect for accession
This vision suggests to aim at Russia"s accession to the EU; moreover, this is recommended not as a long-term goal but as a practical task that should be clearly defined nowadays. In this context, even the notion of "partnership" is considered inadequate and outdated: what Russia should be looking for is not partnership with, but participation in the EU. Furthermore, the EU is criticized for not thinking along these lines on future relations with Russia, and energetically advised to endorse this prospect.
This over-ambitious design could be partly attributed to the lack of understanding with respect to the EU. According a critically-minded expert from St-Petersburg, "Russian politicians traditionally perceive the European Union as one among other international organizations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO. They do not take into account the key specificity of this political entity, namely, its supranational and quasi-state character" .
There is also a lack of professional thinking on what Russia"s participation in the EU would mean for Russia, to what extent this would be acceptable and "digestible" for the EU, and what adjustments on Russia"s part this would entail. Noteworthy, proponents of accession strategy never even mention (perhaps just being unaware of) the notion of the acquis communautaire that any country joining the EU is obliged to accept by adapting its administrative and legal systems and incorporating about 20 thousand normative acts therein .
But the idea of accession is also backed by a political rationale (or, at least, what is considered to be one): should the prospect of Russia"s integration into the EU be officially endorsed, this would leave no other choice to economic and political actors within Russia but to accept accommodation with EU standards, even if reluctantly and with the understanding of inevitable painful transformations that otherwise would be rejected. In other words, this would be a means of forcefully promoting the EU-based norms, patterns and requirements in Russia. Without doing this "from above" and on the basis of politically motivated decision, incremental rapprochement with the EU would take several decades (if it happens at all).
The arguments of those who reject the prospect of Russia"s eventual membership could be grouped in two clusters. One would include the whole variety of ideologically or politically motivated anti-Western and anti-European approaches, as described earlier. Another one would develop rational considerations for a more skeptical attitude. Thus, two of them are highlighted by a prominent Russian expert of the EU when arguing that the objective of Russia"s membership is unrealistic and does not respond to the country"s strategic interests:
First, the EU member-states will hardly agree with such a prospect, apprehending that the EU will be unable to "digest" the huge eastern neighbour with all its historic, economic, social, geopolitical and cultural specific features.
Secondly, Russia has vital strategic non-European interests (for instance, in Central Asia or in the Pacific area). EU-related commitments and binding decision-making patterns would limit Russia"s freedom of actions in the international arena .
As far as the official stand on this issue is concerned, for some times it remained ambiguous. The idea of Russia"s accession to the EU as full-fledged member was more than once mentioned in the past . However, alongside the development of Russia"s growing rapprochement with the EU, the position of "no accession to and no association with the EU" seemed to be adopted; indeed, it was included into the Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000-2010 .
Three reasons might explain this approach.
First, the financial crash of August 1998 in Russia revealed the extreme vulnerability of its economy and superficial character of the on-going reforms. This in itself was a strong warning and raises serious question about Russia"s ability to get accommodated to the realities of the EU.
Secondly, there is a strong pressure for a more protectionist policy generated by considerable part of the business community fearing external competition. At the same time, criminal and/or corrupted elements in all segments and on all levels of Russia"s economy are by no means interested in making it more transparent and law-abiding.
Thirdly, the prospect of accession would provide the EU with the most powerful political leverage vis-a-vis Russia, making it vulnerable to eventual pressures. Without this tool, rare attempts of the EU to exercise political pressure on Russia will most probably have no discernable impact on Moscow (as it was proved in the case of the conflict in Chechnya). In this sense, "no accession" policy means less responsibility and less accountability on the part of Russia (and probably less demands on the part of the EU).
Nevertheless, to consider the case closed would be premature. Noteworthy, a new formula was suggested in 2001 by Russian diplomacy (although only in a quasi-official way): "Russia would like that its relations with the EU member-states would be similar to those that these states have between themselves" . If ordinary logic tells that this means membership, in a political parlance this might mean something very advanced but falling short of full membership (with its burdensome responsibilities).
The EU as a leverage
Unclear accession prospects, on the one hand, and the risk of political rivalry with the EU as a competitive partner, on the other hand, might be compensated by its involvement in addressing those issues in the international arena that Russia considers important for reasons other than associated with the EU itself. The extent to which Russia is able to use the EU as leverage with respect to other international actors should certainly not be exaggerated. Furthermore, the EU and Russia could proceed from different motivations-but if their policies have similar vectors, Moscow would have reasons to consider the international activity of the EU as responding to its own interests. Making this a component of Russia"s attitudes to the EU is only natural, even if Russia"s debates do not reserve prominent place to this aspect of relations with the EU.
Thus, the influence of the EU may be helpful in promoting some concrete approaches backed by Russia, or alternatively in blocking those that provoke Russia"s objections or concerns. The case in point is Russia"s claims against some Baltic states (first of all with respect to alleged discrimination of Russophone minorities). Indeed, even if these claims are not fully supported by the EU, its contribution to making the policy of those countries more responsive to Russia"s demands is difficult to deny.
In international conflict management there could also be situations where the EU and Russia have interest to operate in parallel ways or even jointly. It is true that this is perhaps a theoretical assumption rather than an observation from practical policy, since the record of the EU-endorsed conflict management is still rather limited. However, this area of activity becomes more salient both in Russia"s perceptions and in those of the EU. There are no intrinsic reasons that would prevent them from cooperatively interacting in most of conflict-management situations. For Russia, this may be one more argument for considering political interaction with the EU valuable.
Notwithstanding all Russia"s concerns about eventual "alien" involvement in the CIS zone, the policy of the EU could be in resonance with some Russia"s objectives even there. The case in point is the definition by the EU of criteria for recognizing post-Soviet states, which was mentioned earlier. They may have contributed, even if in a limited way, to ensure a peaceful character of the disintegration of the USSR. In a broader sense, the endorsement by the EU of democracy and civil society building in the new independent states, by the very fact of contributing to their stability, also corresponds to Russia"s interest in having a predictable and relatively stable immediate external environment.
Eventual interaction with the EU in building a new pan-European political system is another matter that is of interest to Russia. Here, the situation is ambiguous: the EU might pretend to have a prominent place in this system (which does not necessarily provoke Russia"s excessive enthusiasm), but it could also be considered a counterweight to NATO-centrism (and in this capacity supported by Russia).
The later subject evolves into a wider and even more contradictory theme: that of Russia"s views on, and expectations with regard to the role of the EU in the Atlanticist component of the international system. This is a "big issue" in Russia"s assessments of the EU, and Russia"s EU-related political rationales are to a very considerable degree inscribed into this system of coordinates.
By and large, Moscow tends to assess relations between Russia and the EU as having a certain positive potential in terms of implications for international developments, both with respect to some specific problem situations and globally. But there could be a "negative leverage" as well, because Russia"s economic dependence on the EU makes it vulnerable to eventual political pressures. The theme of "interference in internal affairs", old-dated and traditionally annoying for Moscow, could also be a by-product of dynamism in political dialogue between two sides.
However, various arguments in favour of developing cooperative political interaction with the EU outweigh those that appeal for cautiousness and reservations. Cautiousness and reservations do not disappear but they seem to be deliberately pushed to the background of Russia"s thinking. Their re-emergence cannot be excluded, but seems only possible if the rapprochement with the EU turns out inconsistent, impractical and, worse, counter-productive. The grounds for such pessimistic scenario, in the context of recent developments of political relations between Russia and the EU, look narrow indeed.
3. Rapprochement: rationales and limits
During almost the whole decade of the 1990s, while the EU was gradually becoming more "visible" from Moscow, Russia"s debates on Europe were nevertheless focused upon NATO. The EU was regarded as being the most powerful economic entity on the continent, but its political role seemed rather limited. Indeed, answers to a number of key questions remained unclear:
To what extent is the EU able to translate its economic potential into political influence?
To what extent deserves the EU attention as an integrated international actor rather than a structure for defining a common denominator of national policies that otherwise operate individually?
To what extent is the changing international landscape in Europe affected by the EU rather than by other multilateral mechanisms (among which NATO has undoubtedly the most prominent place)?
But at the turn of centuries, the ascendant trend in Russia"s relations with the EU becomes more discernible. To a considerable extent, this trend is generated by the growing international personality of the EU and the overall CFSP problematique. On the Russian side, this was promoted by several new motives in assessing the desirability of rapprochement with the EU-in addition to more general considerations addressed in the previous chapter.
