Vladimir Baranovsky: RUSSIA: A PART OF EUROPE OR APART FROM EUROPE?îÁÚÁÄ
Vladimir Baranovsky: RUSSIA: A PART OF EUROPE OR APART FROM EUROPE?
The interaction of Russia and Europe is considerably affected by the ongoing changes of the international political landscape on the continent. In this regard, three issues have been of particular importance: the enlargement of NATO, the wars in the Balkans and the new agenda of the EU. At the same time, this interaction is inscribed into a more enduring framework that includes various components-such as geographic realities, historic experiences, cultural characteristics (to name only few of them). Russia"s domestic developments, be it the hostilities in Chechnya or the change of leadership in the Kremlin, are also a significant factor of relations between Russia and Europe.
Identity and geopolitics
Geographically, Europe and Russia are overlapping realities. Half of Europe is Russia; half of Russia is in Europe. However, politics, in contrast to geography, does not necessarily take this as axiomatic-neither in Europe nor in Russia.
It is true that geography does contribute to this political ambivalence. Europe"s western frontiers are clearly defined by the Atlantic coastal line. Europe"s eastern limit going along the Urals and further southwards is more symbolic than natural. The fact that the Balkans is Europe"s hot spot is undeniable. Whether the Caucasus is (or should be) considered Europe"s headache is far less obvious.
But other foundations for drawing a dividing line between Europe and non-Europe are also confusing. If we use the civilisation criteria, the question "where does Europe end?" would bring about even more Kafkian answers: it ends thousands miles away from Europe (somewhere in the Southern hemisphere, in Australia) and at the same time inside Europe itself (in some remote villages in the middle of Kosovo or Transylvania).
In this regard, Europe is fluid. Whether Russia is a part of Europe may be debatable, but it is certainly a part of Europe"s fluidity.
This goes in parallel with Russia"s fluidity with respect to Europe. Debates on Europe are part of Russia"s history through the last thousand years. Moreover, they are an intrinsic part of Russia"s search for self-identification-the search that is continuing now, at the eve of the next millennium. What is really intriguing is the fact that basic parameters of these debates are actually the same as they used to be centuries ago. The arguments have certainly become more elaborated, but they all point to the same range of conflicting, mutually exclusive conceptions. These belong to three basic groups.
Those from the first group assume that Russia is Europe, that it genetically descends from the Christian civilisation. There are different variations of this approach: Russia is imperfect Europe (that is underdeveloped and lagging behind, or sick, or failed); or, alternatively, Russia is the best Europe (with some European values being more adequately incarnated by intelligentsia and literature in Russia than anywhere else on the continent); or, it as another Europe, evolved in its eastern variant (via the Byzantine empire) and strongly influenced by external factors. But these are just segments of the larger fundamental idea: Russia and Europe belong to the same family .
The second group of ideas underlines Russia"s closeness to Asia in opposition to Europe. The Byzantine Empire which brought Christianity to Russia was itself a deviation from Europe and increasingly Asian entity; the schism of 1054 made the division irreversible, and not only in religious terms. Furthermore, Russians lived over two and a half centuries under the control of the Golden Horde, which irreversibly alienated Russia from Europe. In an alternative reading, this was a period of Russia"s deliberate fundamental re-orientation eastwards which was essential to neutralise threats emanating from the West; even the Russian ethnicity is the result of the centuries-long amalgam of old Slavic and Turcic tribes. In any case, historical destinies of Europe and Russia turned out different, whereas the country"s "Asian predicament" was only reinforced by the subsequent expansion of the Russian state towards Siberia, Central Asia and Far East .
The third basic approach states that Russia is neither the West nor the East, neither Europe nor Asia. The Orthodox religion, its historical core element, stands opposed both to the Latin confession and to Islam. In contrasts to the European practice, Russia is not built upon the notion of ethnicity-it is a specific entity embracing over hundred various people and ethnic groups. As a civilisation, Russia represents a world in itself, a microcosm that follows its own destiny and develops its own rules. In other words, Russia is special; it should not and cannot follow exogenous standards.
Furthermore, possessing vast territory and huge natural resources, maintaining considerable cultural diversity and relatively high educational level, cultivating meaningful social attitudes and ethical instincts, combining in a unique way traditionalist mentality and openness to innovative thinking-Russia may represent an ideal laboratory for developing a viable alternative to, or an organic amalgam of, western- and eastern-associated values. A messianic variation of this approach suggests that Russia may forge an attractive model to be followed by "other worlds" in the light of aggravating crisis of global civilisation .
All these approaches appeal to historic developments, religious beliefs, normative values, psychological characteristics, behavioural patterns, cultural orientations and other fundamental factors that allegedly predetermine Russia"s "Europeaness" (or, alternatively, its absence). None of them could claim to have an upper hand in intellectual evolution of the country. All three pretend to influence its politics and policy. Each may evolve into a milder formula (Russia is a specific part of Europe-or it is the most European-oriented part of Europe"s "near abroad"). This is, so to say, the existential paradigm of Russia"s thinking about itself and its external environment.
Indeed, is there anything fundamentally new in this existential ambivalence by which Russia"s attitudes to Europe have been marked through centuries? For Russia, Europe was always both charming and frightening, appealing and repulsive, radiating light and incarnating darkness. Russia was anxious to absorb Europe"s vitality-and to ward off its contaminating effects; to become a fully-fledged member of the European family of nations-and to remain removed from it; to become an object of its courtesies and even its devotion-but at the same time to inspire fear and trepidation. Indeed, the whole history of Russia is cast in this contradictory feeling: its own centuries-long territorial expansion towards Europe-and memories of invasions from Europe; all the tormented searching of Russian sociological thought with its European-oriented "westernism"-and the anti-European zeal of both the Orthodox church and the communal identity as negation of individualism. The 300-year long record of social experiment from Peter the Great to this day is the most painful manifestation of this paradox, when models imported from the West (such as communism recently or "unrestrained" capitalism nowadays) evolved into such grotesque forms that even wider rifts opened between Russia and Europe.
It is true that Europe reciprocated with similar ambiguities. As a remote and almost exotic peripheral land with significantly different life-style, Russia alienated the Europeans-and at the same time fascinated them. Its vast territorial space put Russia in a unique position in Europe-and generated fears about its expansionism. Its huge demographic potential inspired respect and consideration-as well as the feeling that the value of human life was treated as being significantly less in Russia than in Europe. Russia was (still is?) regarded as possessing enormous resources which might eventually make it Europe"s important component-were it not for its anachronistic and corrupted economic system incompatible with European ways of doing business. The impressive military might of Russia has been traditionally perceived as threatening Europe-although, eventually, redirecting other threats away Europe and absorbing them.
This ambivalence persists nowadays, especially in Russian perceptions of European attitudes. Russia is no longer a military threat-but NATO intends to continue as the military alliance against an eventual re-emergence of threat emanating from Russia... The enlargement of NATO should not antagonise Russia-but Russia"s involvement in this process is not considered even as a hypothesis... The EU addresses its first "common strategy" to Russia-and threatens it with sanctions... Russia"s peacekeepers are welcomed to participate in KFOR-but they do not get their own sector of responsibility (like leading western countries do)... The cold war logic of "keeping Russians out" seems to many of them being substituted by a double-track task: how to prevent Russians from getting disengaged, without however letting them in.
What many Russians see as a new European logic, as described above, does not make their European choice easier. In any case, this does not promote the "pro-European" trend in public consciousness. This is even more so, since the debate on Russia"s European/non-European identity remains as fascinating as it is inconclusive.
In addition, it is accompanied (and disoriented) by Russian"s suddenly increased interest to geopolitics. Indeed, in terms of culture and civilisation, the distance between Russia and Europe is meaningless in comparison with what separates Russia from Asia. However, geopolitically Russia is undoubtedly in between. Russian "westernizers" would criticise the concept of Russia"s "Eurasian identity" as an attempt to find a justification for consolidating the country"s social and political backwardness, preventing modernisation and undermining reforms. But they would hardly disagree that numerous external risks and challenges that Russia is facing are of a non-European origin-indeed, in terms of these challenges Russia is a Eurasian entity.
Thus, in Russia"s case cultural/civilisation and geopolitical identities are not necessarily the same. Failure to differentiate between them gets confused all the time. The European-oriented representatives of intelligentsia want Russia moving westwards (which concerns its civilisation orientation), but they are blamed for making the country hostage or satellite of the West (which is geopolitics). Similarly, failing in domestic transformations inspired by the West (or believed so) leads to reconsidering relations with the West and their significant cooling. Or, as an opposite, but not less superficial link, there was a serious risk that NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia might deliver a severe blow against Russia"s fragile democracy.
Meanwhile, expanding geopolitical ideas to the realm of civilisation is as wrong as making foreign policy only on the basis of cultural affinities. Compared to a Muscovite, a Russian resident of Vladivostok would not feel himself less European (although he lives 10 time-zones eastwards); but he would be much more sensitive, both positively and negatively, about China and Japan as his immediate neighbours.
In a broader sense, there is certainly a strong link between Russia"s culture, mentality, historical legacy, on the one hand, and the country"s national interests and ambitions in the international arena, on the other hand. But this link is not overwhelming; it does not necessarily command Russia"s attitudes and policies towards the external world. In this respect, Russia"s "Europeaness" does not guarantee its rapprochement with the West, whereas "non-European" (or "insufficiently European") characteristics of the Russian civilisation do not create insurmountable obstacles thereto.
Furthermore, even if Russia"s geopolitical identification with Eurasia is recognised as different from its civilizational identification with Europe, what follows from this in terms of foreign policy implications may be a matter of serious controversy. The question is about choosing among theoretically available strategies aimed at minimising Asia-related risks. One approach would consist in promoting "Asia first" policy and developing preferential partnership with Russia"s potential challengers in this area. Another one, on the contrary, would focus upon Europe, with the aim of consolidating Russia"s European connection and secure Russia"s rear. In this case, it is assumed that Russia"s Eurasian geopolitical status makes it imperative to promote rapprochement with Europe.
Russia"s European uncertainties
Contrary to expectations of the early post-cold war period, the last decade has not reduced this overall "existential" ambivalence of Russia"s perceptions of, attitudes to, and policies towards Europe.
It is worth recalling that the post-Soviet Russia came onto the international scene with a strong pro-western orientation (that was, ipso facto, also a pro-European one). Destroying the old regime, getting rid of the communist past, proclaiming itself decisively in favour of democracy and a market economy-this all was considered to provide Russia with a ticket into the "community of the civilised countries". For a time, yesterday"s foes were regarded as the most reliable friends. They were expected to welcome with enthusiasm the new Russia as an equal partner-both in Europe and elsewhere. Indeed, Russia"s interests in the international arena were considered to be completely identical to those of the West. Operating together, they would constitute a nucleus of the "new world order".
Thus, Russia was both politically and psychologically ready to join the club of the international elite and to be recognised as a full-fledged participant of the emerging pan-European pattern that was to replace the bipolar organisation of the continent. Such hopes, however, did not last long. There may be different explanations to which extent this is due to the initial excesses of the post-cold war euphoria or, alternatively, to the mishandling of the emerging issues by various major international actors, including (or even beginning with) Russia itself. But one thing is obvious: in many respects today"s Russia feels less at ease with Europe than it was the case ten years ago.
Even Russia"s ideological re-orientation, bringing it closer to Europe on the level of some fundamental values, is not necessarily making the two more compatible. Ironically, even the contrary may prove true. Indeed, it was sufficient for the former Soviet Union simply to proclaim its "Europeanise" to gain a sympathetic reaction from Europe. This is no longer the case for post-Soviet Russia: since it pretends to operate as a "normal" member of the international community, the quality of the factors certifying its participation in the family of "civilised" countries (democracy, human rights, market economy and so on) becomes a critical test. Serious difficulties that the country experiences in this regard represent a challenge for Russia first of all, but also for its European engagement. This might even lead to the paradoxical conclusion that Russia would have better chances of interacting with Europe as an "outsider" rather than as an "insider" since the criteria of the latter pattern are more demanding and more difficult to observe.
The situation is even more depressing when geopolitics comes to the foreground. Indeed, the fact of Russia"s significantly reduced position in Europe is impossible to deny. It is true, however, that there are different explanations for this phenomenon. In fact, Russians began asking "who lost Europe" much earlier than Americans started to look for "who lost Russia".
Attributing Russia"s "departure" from Europe to the badly conceived and inadequately implemented foreign policy is one explanatory theory. It goes back to the Soviet perestroika period: the "new political thinking" is blamed for unjustified concessions along the whole spectrum of Moscow"s interaction with Europe and, in a broader sense, with the West as a whole.
Noteworthy, this criticism emanates not only from quarters professing communist orthodoxy and believing that Gorbachev and Shevardnadze betrayed the country"s interests. The thesis that the rapprochement with the West was inadequately negotiated and poorly compensated seems to be shared by many professional analysts not associated with any particular ideology. The retreat of the Soviet armed forces from the centre of Europe, acceptance of the unification of Germany, and dissolution of the "outer empire" are all regarded as powerful bargaining chips that could have been traded for significant compensations to Moscow, but instead were simply given away.
A more liberal line of thinking suggests another reading of this phenomenon. Russia"s retreat is predominantly viewed as the logical course of events arising from the poor historic record of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the disengagement from Europe allowed Russia to get rid of unnecessary commitments and an excessive external burden. This burden is seen as one of the major causes of strain that resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia, according to this line of thinking, should regard its reduced position as an asset rather than as a loss.
Asset or not, but with the end of the bipolar division of Europe, Russia unexpectedly found itself pushed to the periphery of the continent. What used to be the immediate neighbourhood of the country that controlled half of Europe is now separated from Russia by two territorial belts: the former Warsaw Pact allies and the former western republics of the Soviet Union.
The problem is not only in becoming the most remote territory of Europe. A number of traditional parameters affecting the security status of the country, such as access to the high seas, availability of critical resources and so on, have been significantly deteriorated with the disintegration of the USSR. Russia has also lost some important tools that were available to the former Soviet Union in terms of exercising influence on Europe. Suffice it to mention the redeployment of significant armed forces one thousand miles eastwards, in the context of troop withdrawal from Central Europe.
When looking at military developments in a broader sense, it is obvious that Russia"s overall military might in Europe has dramatically diminished during the 90s. This is due to a number of factors: first of all, the collapse of the USSR; secondly, the unprecedented economic decline and financial crisis, making appropriate allocations of resources for military purposes impossible; thirdly, the need to fulfil obligations according to the international agreements and the existing (or anticipating) arms control treaties. What remains at Russia"s disposal can by no means be compared to the Soviet capabilities.
Indeed, for the first time since the mid-1930s Russia"s conventional forces will be soon reduced to the scale of just a large European nation; thus, the comfortable and secure feeling of being the first military power on the continent is doomed to disappear. This is accompanied by similar trends on the level of strategic nuclear weapons: while still possessing numerical parity with the United States, Russia is likely to be incapable of maintaining it in the next decades. Furthermore, mass obsolescence of weapons and equipment and severe curtailment of procurement programmes seriously affect Russia"s holdings. Since the mid-1980s, the scale of weapons procurement in Russia has dropped by as much as 80-90 percent and in some cases by two orders of magnitude.
Such developments, alongside other factors, have significantly decreased Moscow"s ability to affect developments in Europe. This new situation is recognised and basically accepted both by the country"s political class and by public opinion. Moreover, it is by and large considered irreversible. Concerns about Russia"s assertiveness with respect to what it has lost in Europe seem ungrounded or, at least, highly exaggerated; even more so a possible re-emergence of "Russian threat" to Europe. There are no political forces in Russia today that believe that re-establishing the status quo ante is a practically achievable goal. In this sense, the rise of any significant revanchist trend in Russian foreign policy seems impossible, whatever domestic changes might occur.
At the same time, this basic acceptance of new realities by Russians is coloured with certain bitterness, since retreat from Europe looked like a panicked flight rather than a result of a deliberate policy. Furthermore, Russia often regards itself as a victim of unfair treatment by other international players, who have taken advantage of its poor domestic situation. The predominant feeling is that even if Russia could not retain its position in Europe, it certainly did not deserve to be forced out ruthlessly and treated as a defeated country.
Justified or not, this complex of resentment does exist in Russia"s thinking about Europe. It is reinforced by the increasingly uncomfortable feeling that Russia is being relegated to the sidelines of European developments. The debate over NATO enlargement has brought additional weight to such a proposition. Even analysts without a hint of anti-Western feeling focused upon the argument that while NATO is gradually turning into the central element in the overall organisation of the European political space, Russia is denied access to this structure. This can only exclude it further from the decision-making with respect to crucial issues in Europe .
Worse, Russia finds itself in the painful position of having lost all the old allies and being unable to attract any new ones. The rhetorical cordiality of the West is often turned into watchfulness, suspicion and reluctance to take Russia"s view into account. The former Warsaw Pact partners have all adopted a strong anti-Russian stand. The Baltic States are openly unfriendly. Even the reliability of the CIS countries is doubtful. There is a strong sense that Moscow cannot realistically count on being supported by anyone in its international activities. Not surprisingly, Belarus becomes the only possible partner for alliance building, all reservations with respect to President Lukashenko"s regime notwithstanding.
This "no allies" situation has also another consequence: it draws Russia away from Europe, both geopolitically, and ideologically. Indeed, if allies are not available in Europe, they should be looked for outside it; if Russia is considered not fitting into the European standards, it should not regard them as "sacred cows"; if the Europeans are unwilling (or unable) to accept Russia"s right to be specific, there may be other less intrusive interlocutors. The most significant example of how this logic is translated into policy is manifested by Russian-Chinese rapprochement. Although Russia"s connection with "rogue states" should not be exaggerated, some of them may be predictably regarded as potential candidates to partnership "by default", just because alternative options, particularly in Europe, do not look available.
This syndrome of alienation from Europe is aggravated by strongly disappointing signals that the vector of Russia"s development is opposite to that of the majority of the continent. The economic performance in its western part is only one source of this perception, although meaningful in the light of dramatic hardships and failures of the on-going transformation of Russia"s economy. Another source of thinking along this line is the significant breakthroughs achieved by the European integration during the 1990s, while all of Russia"s efforts toward CIS integration have dramatically failed. Moreover, while the EU states are becoming closer to each other, Russia is in danger of losing its own territorial integrity.
Not only Russia and the rest of Europe are in different phases of their evolution, but also the continent"s centre of gravity is shifting westward. The EU and NATO expand their activities and membership, their roles on the continent are increasing, the western core of Europe is becoming stronger and more consolidated, it attracts and absorbs practically all countries of the continent... This is how Europe is viewed from Moscow nowadays: prosperous and strong, but not very reassuring as far as Russia is concerned.
It is true that a lot in this perception is related to Russia"s considerable difficulties in adapting itself to the country"s radically changed situation-a phenomenon not unfamiliar to some former European colonial powers. Indeed, even in the most liberal-oriented circles the loss of superpower status continues (almost ten years afterwards) to be a source of considerable unease and confusion, which are often exploited by conservatives, nationalists, proponents of the restoration scenarios, those who believe that Russia is in an "imperial predicament", and so on.
Certainly, this residual superpower/great power syndrome affects Russia"s relations with Europe. They are damaged by Russia"s frustration and irritation, by Russia"s instinctive orientation towards re-establishing itself as "not-like-the-others" player, by Russia"s erratic attempts to position itself as a privileged partner of the United States and a complex of superiority towards the Europeans, however ungrounded this complex might be. At the same time, there are some other motives as well.
Under certain circumstances, still existing elements of "great power" psychological self-identification, mentality and historic memory could be even helpful. For instance, to de-dramatise grievances with respect to challenging behaviour of some Europeans, like former Warsaw Pact clients or Baltic states: the lack of respect on their part could be attributed to their complex of inferiority and considered meaningless in terms of Russia"s interests and even not deserving proper reaction. But in general, having lost its "superpowerness", Russia is becoming more commensurate with European dimensions and scales, less frightening for the Europeans and more acceptable for them. On the other hand, if Russia"s ambitions are to be downscaled to the level of "regional great power", it is in Europe that Russia could hopefully play this role, to avoid excessively antagonising other international actors and even to be recognised by them in this capacity.
Focus upon Europe
However ambivalent Russian thinking about Europe might be, it is by no means an anti-European phenomenon, and even less so its policy-related implications. It is true that Russia may look as a hesitant, inconsistent or reluctant European. Nevertheless, prevailing are the arguments for considering Europe as by far the most important region in terms of Russia"s fundamental interests in the international arena. Europe, according to this logic, is the major would-be focus of Russia"s long-term international strategy.
In the post-cold war period, Russia"s relations with Europe are promoted by several fundamental factors. The ideological parameters of the classic cold-war pattern have become a thing of the past and are unlikely to re-emerge; traditional military-related considerations, based on the assumption of a major conflict on the continent, are no longer relevant; Russia"s interest in economic links with Europe has considerably increased, due both to the imperatives of domestic reforms and to a desire to obtain better positions in the world market; and political interaction with the Europe is essential to respectable international status for Russia. In addition, the centrality of Europe for Russia has only been reinforced by the failure of "entente cordiale" with the USA. Also, Russia has all reasons to believe that other international actors will consider its involvement in the European affairs as absolutely legitimate.
Russia"s major interest within the European dimension of its policy consists in consolidating its international role and preventing the development that might marginalise Russia. Apart from that, some sub-regions in Europe are of special sensitivity for Russia, which explains its focus upon the Baltic Sea area, the Black Sea area, and the Transcaucasus.
Moscow has manifested a considerable political and diplomatic activity to promote a "pan-European security architecture". However, if there were earlier temptations to appeal for a totally new post-cold war organisational pattern for the continent, they have been abandoned. Instead, Russia is trying to articulate its attitudes towards, interaction with, and eventual participation in the existing multilateral structures in Europe. In this context, it is worth outlining Russia"s basic approaches to them.
Russia"s nervous reaction to the prospect of NATO"s enlargement eastward has clearly revealed that the alliance is still perceived as a challenge to Russia"s security interests. Another and even more significant rationale is to prevent the central security role in Europe being played by a structure to which Russia will not have direct access. Nevertheless, "special relationship" with NATO was considered as a more practical strategy than promoting the re-emergence of the confrontational model; this was confirmed by the decision to sign NATO-Russia Founding Act-the decision pushed through by then Foreign Minister Primakov against considerable domestic opposition.
Moreover, Moscow seemed to be open to further rapprochement with NATO (although conditional upon a number of factors, first of all non-expansion onto the former Soviet territory). However, this option was seriously undermined-first, by the failure to provide the established Permanent Joint Council Russia-NATO with notable role; secondly (and most dramatically) by NATO"s actions in Yugoslavia; and thirdly, by the adoption of a new strategic concept of NATO at its 50th anniversary summit in Washington. Re-establishing the cooperative pattern in Russia-NATO relations remains a formidable and challenging task.
The European Union is regarded as being the most powerful economic partner and important political actor in Europe. Russia-EU relations are considered to develop successfully and to have good prospects. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and Europe has been complemented by two unilaterally adopted "strategies" that both sides addressed to each other. The overall positive image of the EU is well illustrated by Russia"s attitude towards its forthcoming enlargement: paradoxically, for a time Moscow seemed to welcome this prospect even more enthusiastically than the EU"s participants did-apparently, as a preferable alternative to the enlargement of NATO.
However, remaining outside the EU which is expanding its territorial space and functional scope may exacerbate Russia"s concerns about its own role in Europe. For the time being, these concerns have not been articulated in a very explicit way-supposedly, due to Russia"s obsession with the issue of NATO enlargement. But further consolidation of the EU will sooner or later make it clear that the dividing line between members and non-members might become much more fundamental than in the case of NATO. There is, however, a growing understanding in Russia that this trend might damage its interests and its prospects in Europe, unless mitigated by significantly stronger incentives for further rapprochement with the EU.
The OSCE-in terms of its genesis, composition and operational mode-is by far the most attractive multilateral institution for Russia. It corresponds to many of Russia"s concerns regarding the organisation of the continental political space, and one would expect Russia"s consistent efforts to promote this institution. However, Russia"s attempts to increase the role of the OSCE are often perceived as motivated by the intention to oppose it to NATO-an effort which cannot but discredit any pro-OSCE design. Furthermore, Russia seems to fear that the OSCE might limit its freedom of action within the post-Soviet space (particularly with respect to peacekeeping, as was manifested in the developments around the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh) or even within Russia proper (for instance, with respect to attempts to suppress separatism in North Caucasus). Thus, while having a clear interest in upgrading the OSCE, Russia remains one of its "difficult" participants.
When Russia became a member of the Council of Europe this was viewed as an important political gain attesting to the quality of the changes in Russia. It is feared, however, that failure to satisfy the Council"s high standards regarding human rights and democracy would leave Russia vulnerable to severe criticism that might seriously damage its prestige. Within such a scenario, there is a risk of pushing Russia to reconsider the very idea of becoming internationally accountable. The recent condemnation of Russia"s actions in Chechnya by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe pushed some politicians and analysts to argue for withdrawing from this organisation.
Moscow is involved in a number of sub-regional structures operating in Russia"s immediate vicinity (such as the Baltic Sea States Council or the Black Sea Economic Cooperation); they are considered important for addressing some of Russia"s immediate economic or political concerns. Strategically, they may contribute both to forge a more developed network of interdependence and to alleviate conflict-prone issues. Also important for Russia is its unquestioned right to be a full-fledged participant in these structures and even to count on a certain prominence, as well as their potential for operating independently from the NATO-centred European system.
Russia"s interest in developing a "pan-European architecture" is accompanied by Moscow"s orientation towards promoting bilateral relations with a number of key players in Europe. Moreover, there seem to be a growing conviction that the bilateral track is more promising than the multilateral one. By the end of Yeltsin period, France and Germany were considered to be the major partners on the European scene; Russia"s new leadership "upgraded" Great Britain to this status. Each of these three is attractive for Russia on its own way: France by what is perceived as its independent policy and its reluctance to accept a submissive pattern with respect to the USA, Germany by its crucial geopolitical position in Europe and undeniable prominence in terms of its economic might, Great Britain by its role as one of the leading world political and financial centres, as well as by its expected ability to patronise re-introducing Russia, with its new leadership, into the international elite.
Russia"s attitude towards the American involvement in Europe has a contradictory character. Moscow"s official policy line recognises the essential role of the USA in the European developments; Europe is traditionally one of central issues discussed by Russians and Americans bilaterally. However, there is also a considerable amount of negativism in Russia"s perceptions of, and reactions to the US actual and virtual presence in Europe. This negativism is partly a residual phenomenon inherited from the cold war era. But there is also a kind of neo-anti-Americanism emerging from the vision of the unipolar world in the making, with the only remaining superpower that pretends to be the centre of Universe and operates in the international arena without paying any attention to legitimate interests of others (including the interests of the Europeans, both allied and not allied with the USA).
From this image comes a spontaneous suspicion that the consolidation of the Trans-Atlantic relations might damage Russia"s interests and push it further away from the main lines of the European developments. This is coupled with sporadic attempts to play on what is perceived as American-West European contradictions and to promote "pure European" approaches as a counterweight to excessive involvement of the Americans in the affairs of the continent.
All these trends have been dramatically affected by the developments in and around Kosovo during the last year and a half. In fact, the Kosovo phenomenon has influenced Russia"s ideas on its relations with the outside world in a more fundamental way than most other events during the last decade. This could not but have a considerable impact on Russia"s attitudes towards, and policies in Europe.
This "European connection" of the Kosovo case for Russia might seem distressing if it is only regarded as inscribed into the overall context of Russia"s relations with the West. Indeed, the military operation against Yugoslavia was assessed as a flagrant violation of the international law, as a heavy strike against the existing UN-based international system, as an attempt to establish a "new world order" by force allowing the arbitrary interference into internal affairs of states (on "humanitarian" or any other grounds). Also, Russia was strongly (and painfully) affected by the fact that the decision to use force was taken against its objection which was interpreted as an additional manifestation of insulting disregard towards Russia and as one more attempt to disassociate it from crucial European issues.
The air strikes against Yugoslavia, as viewed by Russia, were the most convincing justification for its negativism with respect to the prospect of establishing a NATO-centred Europe. Indeed, the Kosovo phenomenon has contributed to the consolidation of Russia"s anti-NATO stand more than the whole vociferous campaign against the enlargement of NATO. For a while, Moscow"s major concern seemed to consist in preventing the enthusiasts of a new cold war from taking the upper hand in domestic debates on how to respond to NATO"s aggression.
At the same time, it is quite remarkable that Russia"s indignation with respect to NATO military actions in Yugoslavia was oriented predominantly and almost exclusively against the USA-as if the Europeans did not participate at all. The fact that the EU supported the war against Yugoslavia and even contributed to it both politically and economically, passed almost unnoticed in Russia. By and large, the European states involved in this campaign were basically viewed as operating under the American pressure.
This perception, even if amounting to simplification or ignorance, redirected Russia"s negativism away from the Europeans. Certainly, their record in Kosovo, as viewed by Russia, was very poor; their ability to operate independently from the USA turned out considerably lower than it had been expected. Moreover, the predominance of NATO in dealing with Kosovo was interpreted as undermining the process of building a strong "European pole" . At the same time, it was hoped that the Kosovo crisis would promote the self-identification of the Europeans and their more energetic search for a more prominent (and more independent) international role .
Thus, one of the side-effects of Kosovo has been Russia"s increased attention towards Europe. Certainly, to a significant extent Russia"s attention is promoted by anti-NATO rationale. This is also true with respect to Russia"s neutral or even positive attitude towards security and military related developments within the EU.
This trend is promoting the decreasing US-centrism of security arrangements in the western part of the continent, which draws attention both in Moscow and in Washington. But Russia"s attention seems to be primarily connected with grievances against the USA. Meanwhile, the extent to which the emerging CEDSP has a potential of evolving into an "extra-NATO" pattern may represent a matter of some misperceptions and/or illusions in Moscow. At the same time, even if one presume a hypothetical model of a militarily strong and politically self-reliant "united Europe", it is unclear whether this might alleviate Russia"s NATO-related concerns or just refocus them (and, eventually, even reinforce them).
However, arguments in favour of developing interaction with CEDSP might have their own validity. By and large, a possibility of cooperating with the EU in this extremely sensitive area is regarded as deserving thorough consideration, and eventual rapprochement might be a very significant contribution to Russian-European interaction.
Even to a larger extent this concerns Russia"s possible involvement in multilateral efforts aimed at organising and consolidating the European security space. For instance, this could be Russia"s engagement in the modernisation of the armed forces in East Central Europe. Another and even more promising project could aim at developing the European tactical ballistic missile defence with the participation of Russia. This would be an essential step towards minimising or even eliminating Russia"s re-emerging threat perceptions associated with NATO (since joint air and missile defence is by definition possible only between non-enemies). Also significant is the fact that Russia"s involvement in the project would be far more than simply symbolic-its superb S-300 and S-400 systems might eventually constitute its core.
New prospects?
The long-awaited transition to the post-Yeltsin era in Russia seems to affect the country"s European perspectives in two ways.
On the one hand, the war in Chechnya that accompanies this transition has significantly worsened the background for relations with Europe. Not only the excesses of the war are strongly condemned by the Europeans, but also their criticism is much more vociferous than the one emanating from the Americans. In addition, this criticism was energetically endorsed by some "pure European" multilateral structures, including the EU and the Council of Europe.
Meanwhile, the war (at least during its initial stage) was supported by the Russian public opinion as a tough, painful, but indispensable operation to re-establish control over this break-away territory that had been turned, by its separatist authorities, into a nucleus of anarchy and terrorism threatening to expand onto the whole country. Against this background, Europe looked obstructing the fight against terrorists. Furthermore, this criticism was regarded as hypocritical and proceeding from double standards in the light of what had happened in Kosovo.
By and large, it would be hard to imagine a worse situation for promoting Russia"s rapprochement with Europe. In this context, it seems important to note that Moscow"s new leadership has chosen a relatively moderate line for dealing with this issue in relations with outsiders, including the Europeans. Suffice it to mention Mr. Putin"s numerous meetings with European politicians and patient (even if not very successful) attempts to explain them Moscow"s logic of dealing with Chechnya , spectacular absence of dramatic reaction to various statements and resolutions on this matter (that otherwise could have easily been qualified as a scandalous interference in Russia"s domestic affairs) , and even a certain degree of growing openness in North Caucasus in response to Western demands.
It is true that there may be some simplification in what seems to be a prevailing expectation in the Kremlin: "we"ll finish with Chechnya, and the normalisation of relations with the West will follow soon". However, one could easily suppose that Moscow"s response to "intolerable interference in Russia"s domestic affairs" might have been much more arrogant and irreconcilable. Instead, whatever Russia"s hypersensitivity towards the issue of Chechnya might be, it is not considered as an obstacle for "business as usual" relations with the West, or even for promoting an ascending trend therein.
And this touches upon another (and by far the most important) aspect of the problem, that is the overall orientation of Russia"s new presidency in the foreign policy area. In this respect, a number of points deserve mentioning as the crucial ones.
First, in the afore-mentioned never-ending debate about the European, Asian or Eurasian nature of Russia, Mr. Putin has unambiguously positioned himself as a Europeanist. His "westernism" looks more radical than the overall mood in the country (or even that of the political class) would allow to expect. In the new version of the National Security Concept , broadly (and inadequately) commented as outlining the confrontational approach towards the West, it is pointed to objective commonality of Russia"s interests with "leading states of the world", and the cooperation "first of all" with these countries is particularly underlined. The message cannot be more unambiguous: Russia wants to be with them and among them.
Secondly, Moscow seems ready to go far (and to go quickly) along this line in terms of practical policy. In this regard, Mr. Putin has sent very strong signals, such as the ratification of START-2 and CTBT, the confirmation of Russia"s readiness to develop arms control further on. The decision (supposedly, taken against considerable domestic resistance) to "defreeze" relations with NATO is especially impressive after all what was said about this alliance in the aftermath of Kosovo.
Thirdly, the foreign policy is to be inscribed into the new regime"s broader "philosophy", with its core element represented by the idea of building a strong state-functional, viable and sustainable. Such a state has to be confident of itself, but not necessarily assertive in the international arena. There is no doubt that the ability to resist to external pressures is essential politically and has to be supported by adequate potential militarily-in this respect, Mr. Putin by no means look hesitant. However, "the power of a country is determined not so much by its military might, but rather by its ability to be a leader in developing and using modern technologies, to ensure high living standards to its population" . Russia"s integration into the world economy is by far the most important component of the state-building super-task -trivial as it might look, this thesis proceeds from a different orientation as compared with those which put emphasis on the military might as the country"s major would-be priority, and especially the nuclear weapons as the only available tool of "greatpowerness".
From the point of view of Russia"s European perspective, this all looks too good to be true. One should certainly warn against deterministic view on the substance of Russia"s future foreign policy. As any other political leadership, Mr. Putin and his administration will be object of various pressures. These pressures will be generated by different interest groups, ideological trends and political schools of thought operating in Russia: westernizers and nationalists, moderates and extremists, communists and democrats, right-wing conservatives and left-wing liberals, proponents of international openness and protectionist-oriented business communities, and so on. Also, Europe"s responsiveness will be essential for consolidating Russia"s emerging "new course" in international affairs.
However, Russia seems to enter the new millennium with encouraging signs of searching to overcome the ambiguities of its European policy.
