Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. Ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky.îÁÚÁÄ
Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. Ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky.
I. Introduction (in: Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. Ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Baranovsky, Pierre Hassner, Robert Legvold, John Roper and Adam Daniel Rotfeld
This book addresses the interaction of Russia with Europe as it is emerging in a post-cold war setting. It is a formidable task for historical, political and analyti#172;cal reasons. Indeed, even the definition of the problemóRussia and Europe-might be questioned, since half of Europe is Russia. However, politics, in contrast to geography, does not necessarily take this as axiomatic. What seems nevertheless indisputable is the extremely complicated and contradictory pattern of relations between the two entities-both inherited from the past and generated by new circumstances.
I. The enduring connection
Over the past 1000 years, Russia and Europe have developed a peculiar pattern of relations, with variable combinations of centrifugal and centripetal trends and intermingling elements of mutual attraction and repulsion.
For Europe, Russia was a remote and almost exotic peripheral land-a sig#172;nifi#172;cantly different civilization alienating and at the same time fascinating the Europeans. Its vast territorial space put Russia in a unique position in Europe and generated fears about its expansionism. Its huge demographic potential inspired respect and consideration-as well as the feeling that the value of human life was treated as being significantly less in Russia than in Europe. Russia was regarded as possessing enormous resources which might eventually make it extremely rich and powerful were it not for its anachronistic economic system. The impressive military might of Russia has been traditionally perceived as threatening Europe (although, eventually, redirecting other threats from Europe and absorbing them).
For Russia, Europe was both alluring and frightening, tantalizing and disturb#172;ing, radiating light and incarnating darkness. Russia was anxious to absorb Europeès vitalityóand to ward off its contaminating effects; to become a fully-fledged member of the European family of nationsóand to remain removed from it; to enjoy its courtesies and even its devotion but at the same time to inspire fear and trepidation. Indeed, the whole history of Russia is cast in this contradictory feeling: its own centuries-long territorial expansion towards Europe-and memories of invasions from Europe; all the tormented searching of Russian sociological thought with its European-oriented "Westernism"-and anti-European zeal of Orthodox and communal identity; and the 300-year long record of social experiment from Peter the Great to this day, when models imported from Europe evolved into such grotesque forms in Russia that even wider rifts opened between Russia and Western Europe.
Not only this contradictory legacy of the past, but also the intrinsic "common#172;ness" of Russiaès and Europeès destinies endure. There is no doubt that the future of Europe will be fundamentally affected by the future role of Russia on the continent. Whatever the depth of its current crisis, the economic, political and military potential of the country will without question remain a substantial factor influencing the situation in Europe. At the same time, dom#172;estic develop#172;ments in Russia and its place in the overall international system are to a considerable degree contingent upon the depth and the character of its European connection.
In Europe, the overcoming of the cold war division and the emergence of new state actors have transformed many basic parameters of the international system on the continent. These changes are multidimensional; they have occurred in all the major fields of interaction between states and societies, deeply affecting economics, politics, military security and ideology, and have given rise to a whole set of new challenges with the potential for turning the continent into a region of explosive conflicts.
Thus, the legitimacy of frontiers inherited from the post-World War II period is called into question; there are no rules for handling the disintegration of the state, nor criteria for the responses of other states; and the very notion of "sovereignty" has become a matter for serious reassessment. Moreover, many of the existing patterns of behaviour which gradually came to be consolidated during the dÊtente era in order to preserve stability in Europe have become dysfunctional with respect to new developments on the continent. Most impor#172;tantly, the old balance of forces in Europe has been dramatically upset, pushing the states to search for a new status and thereby generating the uncertainties of a transitional period. The new international system on the continent is still in the making, and Russia is undoubtedly one of the major players in the Euro#172;pean arena.
In Russia the "European predicament" is also a matter of special importance. Domestically, notwithstanding all the arguments that support the view of Russia as a specific civilization, its further ascent (or decline) will depend on its ability (or failure) to develop such generically European values as democracy and human rights, freedom and social responsibility, the rule of law and a mar#172;ket economy. Internationally, Russia"s role as great power emerged in Europe in the 17th century and since then has continued to be associated above all with Europe. While Europe is by no means the only foreign policy priority for Russia, it is in many respects the most important one.
Last but not least, both Europe and Russia may have similar concerns and common, interrelated or complementary interests regarding certain trends in the international system, such as the growing role of China and threats emanating from Islamic fundamentalism. Even the USA, in its capacity as the only remaining superpower, may create direct or indirect incentives for a rapproche#172;ment between Europe and Russia.
Thus, the question whether Russia and Europe can operate independently is only theoreticalóin fact irrelevant. Each of them will certainly have other options, but they both are doomed to share the same continent, to co-exist within adjacent geopolitical areas, to influence and be influenced by each other, and eventually to respond to common challenges.
II. A new agenda
The collapse of the post-World War II international order in Europe and the disintegration of the USSR have brought about tectonic shifts in Eurasian geopolitics. This has inevitably put the problem of RussianòEuropean relations into a fundamentally new context in at least three ways.
First, today"s Russia represents a peculiar mixture of continuity and discon#172;tinuity with regard to the former Soviet Union and the pre-1917 tsarist empire. The country has certainly inherited much of their legacies, and its oper#172;a#172;tion in the international arena has an undeniable solid historical background. At the same time, Russia has never existed in such a territorial configuration and within such a geopolitical environment as now, which creates considerable confusion with respect to its self-identification in the international arena and, thus, unpredictability and uncertainty about its foreign and security policies.
The very fact that debates continue, even if less intensely, in the political and aca#172;demic communities of the country on the foreign and security policy options available with respect to Europe means that a "window of opportunity" is open for Russia"s strategy in the international arena to be responsive to new realities and to be cooperatively oriented. At the same time, these positive expectations seem to be significantly qualified by two factors. On the one hand, replacing the political terminology of the communist period with a super#172;ficial pseudo-democratic credo is certainly not sufficient for creating a solid conceptual basis on which to build an effective foreign and security policy. On the other hand, a substantial inertia exists both on the level of perceptions, norms and values and in terms of military and political æhardwareè: the legacy of the empire/
superpower mentality endures, the military-industrial complex looks for self-justification and seeks to reproduce itself, and powerful interest groups pro#172;fess a clear sympathy for isolationist protectionism or even confrontational assert#172;ive#172;ness rather than for openness, adaptation and cooperation.
Second, today"s Russia is gradually (albeit not always successfully) getting rid of the old obsessions, suspicions and fears with regard to the West, thereby it would seem clearing the way for a pan-European pattern which could include Russia among the international actors operating on the continent. However, although the collapse of the old regime may have made Russia ideo#172;logically closer to Europe, it is not necessarily making the two more compatible. Iron#172;ically, even the contrary may prove true: it was sufficient for the former Soviet Union simply to proclaim its "Europeanism" to gain a sympathetic reaction from Europe, but this is no longer the case for post-Soviet Russia. Since it pretends to operate as a "normal" member of the international community, the quality of the factors certifying its participation in the family of "civilized" countries (democracy, human rights, market economy and so on) becomes a critical test. It is quite obvious that the country is having serious difficulties in pass#172;ing this test, which may lead to the paradoxical conclusion that Russia would have better chances of interacting with Europe as an "outsiderè rather than as an æinsiderè.
Third, with the end of the bipolar division of Europe, Russia has unexpect#172;edly found itself pushed to the periphery of European political development. What used to be the immediate neighbourhood for the state which controlled half of Europe is now separated from Russia by two territorial belts comprising the former socialist countries and the former western republics of the USSR. Having suddenly become the most remote territory of Europe, Russia has lost some of the options that were available to the former Soviet Union and its ability to affect developments in Europe has significantly decreased. Does this mean that assertiveness with respect to the "lost" territories might give Russia greater weight in Europe? After all, playing on the reluctance of the latter to
re-establish the old confrontational pattern may seemóor may proveóto be a better strategy than looking for painful accommodation with the external environ#172;ment and laboriously developing æconventionalè means of gaining influence and prestige.
This logic seems to be inscribed in the five-year record of post-Soviet Russia"s foreign policy. The excessive euphoria, enthusiasm, hopes, illusions and misperceptions of the initial post-cold war period have given way to calcu#172;lations, statements and actions aimed at promoting Russia as an influential international actor. Deliberations on Russiaès ægreat powernessè, æspecial res#172;ponsibilitiesè and æsphere of national interestè have become a new obses#172;sionósometimes evolving into arrogance, assertiveness and what is clearly perceived as neo-imperial inclinations. In respect of Russia"s relations with Europe, this tendency has been most clearly manifested by Russia"s attitude towards the issue of the enlargement of NATO membership and, to some extent, by its policy within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) area.
There are two alternative readings of this phenomenon. It could certainly be ascribed to legitimate-or at least understandable-attempts to overcome post-imperial frustration, to compensate for the mistakes committed in the initial period of the new Russian statehood and to develop an adequate understanding of the countryès national interests in the international arena. Alternatively there could be a more worrying, even alarmist, interpretation-that Russia has opted to aim to re-establish the legacy of the past associated with the USSR or the tsarist empire or with both and to consolidate its international status as an expan#172;sionist, militaristic and confrontational power.
Both these interpretations may be simplistic; both are most probably elements in the more complex reality of the emerging Russian policy thinking and policy making. It is thus important properly to assess the actual combination of these elements, their relative weights and mutual influence, their sources and the resulting output in terms of prac#172;tical policy. Russiaès relations with Europe will first of all depend on these general parameters.
III. The domestic framework
Identification and evaluation of the relative impact of key domestic factors on Russiaès evolving relations with Europe are probably the most logical starting-point of the analysis. Indeed, the policy debates in Russia with respect to Europe have developed across a broad spectrum. The perceptions and approaches of the main political forces in the country are determined by their ideological preferences, but even more so by basic domestic constraints which are a function of the painful process of transition from the old system of organizing society to a new one, with dramatic political, economic and social implications. How the perceived interests of domestic actors are associated with rapprochement with, or alienation from, Europe is a critical question.
Foreign and security policy is also affected by the confrontational pattern of interaction between new actors operating in the absence of established rules and traditions of political dialogue. Moreover, since the "great debate" over the future course of Russia is developing at a time of great domestic flux, the very notion of "national interest" often becomes a matter of political gamesmanship and a stake in the power struggle among competing political groups. Under such conditions, external policy easily becomes a hostage to domestic political conflicts, while consensus on the issues of relations with the outside world either is not looked for or, if exceptionally achieved, remains superficial, fragile and temporary. As for Russiaès partners in the international arena, they have good reason to worry about discontinuity in the event of domestic changes, even if those changes result from democratic elections.
Russia"s recent experience points also to other foreign policy implications of an immature political culture and the questionable viability of the political system. The profound dislocations and turmoil accompanying its emergence out of the Soviet Union have undermined dramatically the coher#172;ence of the countryès foreign and security policy. The rapid rise of new Êlites resulted in insufficient professionalism in addressing foreign policy issuesóa short#172;coming which, in principle, will be corrected by time but which may be especially harmful in the formative period when basic choices are made and priorities defined. The weakness of the political regime was impressively mani#172;fested by attempts to compensate for domestic failures by outward-oriented assertive#172;ness; the latter also had to serve as a sign of the government"s respons#172;iveness to the success of its political opponents.
The chaotic distribution of competence and power between the state"s central authorities is even more disturbing. Different official bodies and personalities, although operating on behalf of the state in the international arena, have not only lacked coordination but in some cases actually conducted mutually exclusive foreign policies. The dramatic interpretation of this phen#172;om#172;enon suggests that Russia is in the thrall of an ungoverned bureaucracy, one free of control by a state above it and by a well-represented public below it. Indeed, the issue is not merely the warped and rudimentary relationship between state and society, but also the simple weakness of the stateówhich is in contrast to many of the popular fears in the outside world that assume a strong and potentially authoritarian Russian state.
Significant implications for Russia"s relations with Europe may be produced by centrifugal trends in Russia calling into question its ability to survive as a single entity. Even more important is Moscowès performance in addressing these trends. Viewed from this angle, the war in Chechnya has become a litmus test in two respects. On the one hand, there are no doubts that the indis#172;crim#172;inate bombing and shelling have destroyed not only numerous villages in Chechnya and its capital, Grozny (with tens of thousands of civilian casualties), but also most of the residual image of Russia"s "Europeanness". On the other hand, the Chechnyan crisis has also clarified the character and the limits of external pressure on Russia in connection with what is recognized as being basically a domestic affair and Moscowès policy of preserving its territorial integrity. The risk of alienating and antagonizing Russia seems to have been judged to be an unacceptable price for demanding in the strongest terms that Russia be internationally accountable.
The war in Chechnya has also revealed a new phenomenon in the Russian politi#172;cal process-the emergence of independent public opinion which might over#172;whelmingly confront the official policy line. Indeed, most of mass media strongly condemned the methods used by the central authorities to æpacifyè the secessionist republic, with criticism sometimes reaching the level of a broad public outcry. It is true that the governmentès immediate reaction to this pres#172;sure was characterized by defiant indifference; but the very prospect of having to pass the ultimate test in the general election by and large con#172;tributed to making the authorities more publicly accountable in their policy. The general public, however, has proved less sensitive towards the problems of relations with the external world-which in principle might allow the govern#172;ment more manoeuvrability.
Among domestic factors affecting Russia"s foreign policy in general and its relations with Europe, economic reforms have undoubtedly a prominent place. Their basic orientation towards the establishment of a free market is certainly making Russia more open and cooperative towards the West. At the same time, the vulnerability and poor competitiveness of the new business Êlites in terms of world market requirements are pushing them to lobby for highly protection#172;ist policies. The political and intellectual weakness of the central administration makes it highly receptive to pressures emanating from powerful domestic interest groups; considerations of controlling oil resources and pipelines seem increasingly to be substituting for a coherent long-term strategy on the inter#172;national arena. Formidable economic constraints will, however, inevitably create serious obstacles to any would-be expansionist policy.
IV. Military security
Military aspects were fundamental to the bipolar con#172;fron#172;tation, providing a certain framework for relations between Europe and the Soviet Union. The collapse of the latter, preceded by the loss of its "outer empire" and accom#172;panied by the defeat of the communist regime, has sub#172;stantially altered traditional assumptions, both in Russia and in Europe, about the role of military factors in their relations.
In Europe, concerns about the "threat from the Eastè have practically evapor#172;ated. Russiaès withdrawal of its armed forces 1500 km away from the centre of the continent has resulted in a new strategic situation. Russia continues to possess the largest armed forces in Europe, and their eventual use, whether for military or for political purposes, is problematic to say the least. The
re-emergence of a military threat from Russia cannot be excluded, but the warning time will be more than sufficient for responding to such an eventuality.
In Russia, the changes in security thinking generated by the controversial reassessment of the countryès overall raison d"Ëtre are considerably more pain#172;ful and ambivalent. Official doctrinal statements declaring that "Russia no longer has enemies" are certainly very important both from the point of view of "high politics" and in terms of ideological reorientation. At the same time they can be either misinterpreted or misleading on the level of practical security policy. The latter, even if the intention is to make a new start, cannot be elabor#172;ated without a relatively clear-cut understanding of its rationale.
Here again, a telling example is Russia"s attitude towards NATO"s eastward enlargement: the argument that it will undermine the country"s mili#172;tary security is in flagrant contradiction with the professed recognition of this alliance as non-threatening and even stability-promoting. It is to be noted, how#172;ever, that NATO, for its part, might (indeed, should) have found signifi#172;cantly more weighty arguments to convince Russia that radical changes are under way in NATO, that it is no longer a cold-war military bloc oriented against an external enemy, and that, in any case, Russia is not viewed as that enemy-although the enlarged alliance will approach its frontiers without considering it as a potential participant.
Among Russian statesmen, soldiers and academics there is a wide range of opinion as to what now constitute the principal military threats to Russia"s security and what the role of the armed forces should be in meeting these threats. Two additional factors contribute to making these debates even more contro#172;versial: on the one hand, the financial burden of preserving a huge mili#172;tary potential is broadly recognized as being prohibitive for a country experiencing enormous economic hardships; on the other hand, a large military establishment is being presented as Russia"s only claim to signifi#172;cant inter#172;national status, since no other means of achieving it, such as ideologi#172;cal attractiveness, economic resources or the existence of a network of clients, is available. Ironically, this was also precisely the theme of great criticism of the state into which the Soviet Union had fallen by its last years.
Not surprisingly, highly contentious debates rage over proposed doctrinal and organizational reforms of the Russian armed forces. Military reform, which is running into many serious obstacles (or, more accurately, was never started either in Gorbachev"s period or afterwards, having been openly and covertly sabotaged by the top military establishment), remains a sensitive issue on the Russian security policy agenda-not least in view of its potentially explosive implications for the political role of the armed forces. It should be noted, how#172;ever, that developments in Russia have not showed much evidence of the widely shared stereotype of the military as an increasingly influential and inde#172;pendent policy and decision maker.
In a broader sense, threat assessments and visions of available security options are to a significant extent a function of the countryès self-identification in the international arena. Here again, divergent and sometimes incompatible views are a source of considerable confusion: post-imperial syndrome coexists with emerging ambitions for great-power status; nostalgia for the past goes in parallel with alarmism about the future; and Russia"s perception of itself as pre-eminently a European power does not exclude appeals to mobilize its "Asian#172;ness" or to operate as some kind of bridge between North and South; and so on. Against this background, the sporadic ups and downs in Russia"s relations with Europe are by no means surprising.
V. Russia"s post-Soviet identity
Apart from domestic factors, another crucial "independent variable" affecting Russia"s interaction with Europe is the overall developments within the post-Soviet space. Indeed, the emergence of Russia as a sovereign state and inter#172;national actor was inseparably linked with the breakup of the USSR. The new political lites which came to power in Russia at that time played the decisive role in destroying the Soviet Union or, more accurately, in finalizing its self-destruction. However, even if in the immediate post-USSR period they con#172;sidered the option of getting rid of the burdensome, less developed æfraternal republicsè on the basis of a ædivorce and forgetè principle (as in the former Czecho#172;slovakia), that logic did not have chance to prevail. The links between the constituent parts of what was for several decades a single eco#172;nomic and political entity are so significant that to disregard them would be fraught with catastrophic consequences even for Russia, although it is by far the largest and most powerful of the former Soviet republics. Russiaès sensitivity with respect to numerous problems emerging in the so-called "near abroad" is also self-explanatory. It seems only logical that relations with the other post-Soviet states have moved into the focus of Russia"s foreign policy agenda.
There are, however, three aspects of this development which may signifi#172;cantly disturb Russiaès relations with Europe.
First, the means which Russia considers necessary and legitimate for protect#172;ing and promoting its interests in the post-Soviet space could be viewed in Europe as inappropriate or unacceptable. In this respect, it is worth noting the difference between a natural, uncoerced process of reintegration and one that is dictated or manipulated. Many in the West, however, have great difficulty dis#172;tinguishing between the twoóparticularly when distracted by the rhetoric that surrounds the issue.
Second, the forms, mechanisms and ultimate outcome of centripetal trends within the post-Soviet space could be assessed in quite different, if not com#172;pletely opposite, ways. This may become an especially contentious issue to the extent that the building up of a Russia-dominated ævelvet empireè is viewed as effectively the same thing as the re-establishment of the USSR, even if in a reduced formatóa scenario which seems to be feared in the West as the most disturbing one.
Third, Russia"s reluctance to let other international actors operate within its "sphere of vital interests" may also have a discouraging effect on relations between Russia and Europe. In this respect, the worst-case scenario may be rep#172;resented by a transformation of the CIS into a new military alliance operating as a counterweight to an expanded NATO-based Europeóa situation which could not only evolve into a æcold peaceè pattern but result in a new edition of the cold war.
On Europe"s part, the development of positive relations with Russia may require a better understanding of Russian concerns and difficulties in forging satisfactory new patterns with the other former Soviet republics. To some extent these difficulties are psychological in nature, as Russian public opinion still has to adapt itself to the country"s radically changed geopolitical situa#172;tion-a phenomenon not unfamiliar to some former European colonial empires. In Russia, however, the "tragedy of the collapse of a thousand-year state" is broadly perceived as being unique and unprecedented; similar historical pat#172;terns (like those of the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian empires) are considered to be irrelevant. Not surprisingly, even in the most liberal-oriented circles the loss of superpower status and the sudden emergence of new foreign neighbours are sources of considerable unease and confusion, which are often exploited by conservatives, nationalists, proponents of the restoration scenarios, proponents of Russiaès æimperial predicamentè, and so on.
The problems confronting Russia are certainly not only of a psychological character. Of equal, if not greater, importance is the fact that a number of tradi#172;tional parameters affecting the security status of the country, such as access to the open ocean, availability of critical resources and so on, have been signifi#172;cantly altered by the disintegration of the USSR. Furthermore, new problems of the utmost sensitivity have emergedólike that of the plight of tens of millions of ethnic Russians who have suddenly found themselves living outside "their" country. Assisting Russia in looking for civilized and responsible ways of addressing such issues is of paramount importance.
In terms of international stability, Russia"s increasing role in the post-Soviet space might be rationalized by its potential to marginalize or minimize the scope of conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. Indeed, many of these conflicts seem either to be frozen or to have developed in less dramatic forms as compared with the recent past. On the other hand, Russia"s "peacemaking" efforts have promoted, directly or indirectly, its predominance in the CIS area and contributed to suspicions about its actual intentions.
However, such suspicions-whether justified or not-are irrelevant in the light of the reluctance or inability of the international community to become effec#172;tively involved, which actually makes Russia the only instrumental force for containing conflicts on the territory of the former USSR. At the same time, mandating Russia to operate as the Eurasian pacifier would entail much more than its military capabilities, and even these are limited in view of the for#172;midable task of conflict management in numerous areas of instability.
In any case, the conflicts emerging in the post-Soviet space (including those in Russia"s relations with the other former Soviet republics) have already absorbed much of the foreign policy energy of Moscow, and the situation will hardly change in the foreseeable future. The ability of Russia to find convinc#172;ing arguments and effective means for reorganizing the former Soviet geo#172;political space will be vital for Russia"s security and may well constitute the most seri#172;ous test of its maturity. For Europe, promoting such a reorganization together with, and not against, Russia will be crucial for preventing the emer#172;gence of new dividing lines on the continent.
VI. Russia"s European vicinity
Russian-European relations are developing within a multidimensional geo#172;political context; problems emerging in different areas are far from being struc#172;turally the same and may generate dissimilar patterns of relations. In particular, there is a need to focus on the principal geopolitical regions which are of primary importance for Russia"s relations with Europe: the Slav "core area" of the former USSR; the North-West European (Baltic/Nordic) neigh#172;bours; the former Warsaw Treaty Organization members from EastòCentral Europe; the Balkans and surrounding areas; and the Caucasus.
1. Russia"s relations with its two Slav neighbours, Belarus and Ukraine, will be of paramount importance in determining what the future of the Euro#172;pean part of the post-Soviet geopolitical space will look like. A number of questions arise in this regard. Will this æSlav triangleè emerge as a regional entity playing a dominant role in the CIS and infusing the latter with dynamism and cohesion? Or, on the contrary, will the centrifugal forces pre#172;clude any kind of alliance between the three, generating instead acrimony and conflict? Are there grounds for a Russian "dual-track" strategy here-a confrontational course vis-Á-vis Ukraine as a natural rival but rapprochement with Belarus as a potential client? More generally, how will Russia"s policy towards its two Slav neigh#172;bours be incorporated into its global foreign and security policy priorities? Finally, what will be the role of Western attitudes and sensitivities, especially towards Ukraine? Similar questions are appropriate with respect to Belarus and Ukraine themselves; as in Russia, their foreign and security policy choices are also the subjects of domestic debates and controversies on the one hand and external pressures on the other.
2. In the Baltic region, foremost on Russia"s new security agenda are the practical problems that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union, such as the withdrawal of Russia"s residual armed forces and military infrastructure, the status of the Russian-speaking populations and the resolution or marginaliza#172;tion of conflicting territorial claims. A special challenge is posed by the issue of the future status of the Kaliningrad region. In a broader sense, the north-western vicinity of Russia has ceased, with the end of the cold war, to be a strategically meaningful area of EastòWest confrontation, as in the recent past. However, the area remains one of considerable relevance for Russia"s relations with Europe in two respects: first, because of its role in terms of Russia"s strategic interests (the increasing importance of the Kola peninsula in the light of the 1993 Russian-US Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the START II Treaty, access to the open ocean and so on); and second, because of security concerns that the Baltic/Nordic countries might have about Russia.
3. Relations with the former allies in East-Central Europe represent one of the most significant failures of post-Soviet Russia in the international arena, reflecting above all the deficiency in strategic thinking in Moscow. Whether the latter would have been able to launch æa new startè here by disassociating itself from the Soviet-style æbig brotherè patterns of thought and cultivating the links inherited from the socialist past is now a purely theoretical question: this option does not seem even to have been considered seriously. Instead, Moscow has focused on assessing the area through the prism of Russia"s broader strategic considerations; in particular, concerns about the possibility of Russia being isolated from Europe by the much faster Westernization of the former allies became almost hysterical when their joining NATO was put on the agenda. Paradoxically, even if slowing down NATO enlargement eastward may be quite legitimate from the point of view of Russia"s pan-European rationales, this will most probably have to be paid for in terms of Russiaès future relations with EastòCentral Europe. The area where Moscow could real#172;istically count on quite good prospects might be alienated by the over-reaction of the "new Russia" even more than by the practice of the æold USSRè.
4. Further to the south, Russia is facing an increasingly complex set of challenges in the Balkans and surrounding areas. Here, two problems seem especially salient for its foreign and security policy agenda.
The phenomenon of the Trans-Dniester area of Moldova is basically the heritage of the Soviet past facing Russia with a traditional set of questions: how to deal with secessionism in the successor states (especially when there is a great temptation to use it as leverage against them), how to protect the rights of Russians living outside the Russian Federation (or to respond to their irredentist demands), how to channel the withdrawal of residual troops into the "reorganization" of Russia"s military presence, and so on. What makes these problems specific is the fact that Russia has found itself deeply involved in a region with which it does not even have a common frontier. In addition, the prospects for Moldovaès unification with Romania, although admittedly often exaggerated, are by no means insignificant for Russiaès assessment of the geopolitical balance in South-Eastern Europeówhich may only increase Moscowès interest in turning this country into a client state.
The developments in the former Yugoslavia became the first serious test for Russia"s "out-of-area" post-Soviet foreign policy. Although its performance was not much more effective than that of other external "pacifiers", Russia was basically successful in establishing itself as an actor in the areaóeven if in a less prominent role than expected. In terms of Russia"s gaining involvement in European politics it was a major breakthrough. However, a number of key questions have yet to be clarified. What are the implications of the "Dayton logic" for Russian geopolitical interests in the area? How might domestic changes in Russia affect its policy in the former Yugoslavia? And to what extent would Russia be ready and able to take part in the power game in the Balkans?
5. The tumultuous situation in the Caucasus poses some of the most serious challenges confronting Russian foreign and security policy-makers. The high level of domestic political instability prevailing in all three new states in the area, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (although to a lesser degree in Armenia), the divisive role of religion, the trans-border links of numerous ethnic groups and a host of other factors have contributed to making the Caucasus a volatile and conflict-prone region-one which holds grave perils for Russian foreign and security policy. Moscow con#172;siders its stakes in the region to be extremely high. They are linked both to the question of political influence in this strategically important area and at the same time to the fact that Russia is more vulnerable domestically with respect to its policy choices in the Caucasus than perhaps in any other region, given the serious disintegrative trends in the contiguous areas of the Russian Federation. The dilemmas arising here are directly related to the broader issues emerging on Russia"s post-Soviet foreign and security policy agenda ("challenges from the south", the choice between European and Asian priorities, the balance between a regional and a more global focus, the viability of the CIS, and so on) and to the changes taking place in the international system as a whole (the role of the Islamic factor, contain#172;ment of local instabilities, interventionism for peace#172;making, territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, and so on).
VII. Searching for a role in Europe
The volatility and unpredictability of Russiaès self-identification, its relations with other post-Soviet states and its domestic political developments represent a formidable challenge to European security. The latter is unthinkable without including the æRussia plusè factor. The expansion and proliferation of local con#172;flicts have an intrinsic potential to involve one or more major powers; their strategic concerns may be strained by eventual post-communist "security vacuums"; the well-being of the wealthier part of Europe could be threatened by socio-economic and political developments if they are mishandled in the coun#172;tries in a state of transi#172;tion-refugee movements, criminality, drugs, illegal transfers of arms and fissile materials and environmental degradation. Europe is thus by no means in a position to build up a "Great Wall of China" which would separate it from developments in Russia and Russia"s immediate environ#172;ment, as well as from Russia"s activities within the post-Soviet geo#172;political space.
Europe, for its part, is by no means irrelevant to Russiaès security and to the security of the post-Soviet area at large. Its cooperative engagement is essential for preventing Russia from choosing self-isolation, alienation and the ædo-it-aloneè option.
Against this background, Russia"s relations with the other major international actors in Europe are developing as a combination of variable patterns, some#172;times offering an image of poorly coordinated policies, but more often inscribed into a broader strategy of promoting the countryès role on the conti#172;nent and re-establishing its international status. The West European countries are perceived as providers of economic assistance and partners for addressing issues of common interest, but also as potential rivals who could impede future attempts by Russia to reassert its waning influence on the continent. There are also symptoms of Russiaès re-emerging interest in realpolitik within Europe. In particular, it seems quite possible that playing on the disagreements and contra#172;dictions between Western Europe and the USA will be attractive and temptingóespecially since transatlantic solidarity is now exposed to signif#172;i#172;cantly stronger stresses than in the recent past, when æthreats from the Eastè were a predominant consolidating factor.
In fact, this is an impressive example of the remarkable continuity of some problems, challenges and options inherited from the period of bipolar con#172;frontation. In this context it is to be noted that the "conspiracy mentality" blam#172;ing the West for all the failures in Russia (and, retrospectively, for the collapse of the Soviet Union) has become a more prominent feature of political thinking in the country. One challenging question is the extent to which such a return of cold-war patterns of thought could affect Russiaès future foreign and security policy.
Finally, Russia"s involvement in Europe has to be considered from the per#172;spective of its possible role in an evolving pan-European security architecture. This requires above all clarifying Russian attitudes towards the multilateral security policy-relevant institutions operating in EuropeóNATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Organ#172;ization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU). This task is complicated by the welter of opinions and policy pronouncements coming from Russian research analysts and government officials. Another side of the problem is linked with these institu#172;tions" search for new roles and specific functions in the post-cold war world, which is a painful and controversial process
More generally, the problem consists in identifying means and forms of bilat#172;eral and multilateral security interactions in Europe which would respond to a number of conditions. To sum up only the most important of them, the question is how:
to alleviate the security concerns of the post-cold war inter#172;national actors-without, however, entering into the vicious circle of "security dilemmas" [don"t understand];
to take into account the balance of forces in Europe that is actually emerging, without resorting to traditional power politics in the inter#172;national arena;
to avoid antagonizing Russia-without, however, pro#172;viding it with a right of veto over the security choices of other former socialist states;
to respect the intrinsic centripetal trends and Russia"s legit#172;imate interests within the post-Soviet geopolitical space-withoutt accepting its becoming a "closed area" under Russia"s control; and
to preserve the viabil#172;ity of the existing institutionsówithout denying an eventual option of develop#172;ing new institutional structures.
In a sense, these may be considered as conflicting requirements, but they are commensurate with the challenging task of elaborating and implementing a cooperative strategy aimed at strengthening international stability. The fact that the major geopolitical equations have significantly changed for both Russia and Europe creates new challenges and opens new prospects for their interaction in the security field. The nature of this interaction (cooperative or confrontational) will be of paramount importance for both Russia and Europe; joint efforts by the two are a fundamental condition for organizing a safer post-Soviet and post-cold war international order.
