Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. Ed. by Vladimir BaranovskyîÁÚÁÄ
Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. Ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky
25. Conclusion (in: Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda. Ed. by Vladimir Baranovsky. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
Vladimir Baranovsky
1. Russia"s relations with, and its place in, Europe are fundamentally affected by the fact that the country is in a state of profound transition: the highly centralized economy based on the overwhelming predominance of state owner#172;ship is giving way to a market economy; the totalitarian political system is being transformed into a democracy; and what used to be a single country-the USSR-has been replaced by 15 new independent states, with the patterns of relations among them still to be crystallized.
None of these processes is complete or has produced any relatively stable pattern. This in itself creates a highly volatile situation. Previous values, beliefs, structures, institutions, links, economic mech#172;anisms and behavioural patterns have been either destroyed or discredited, while new ones are either non-existent or just beginning to emerge. In these circumstances, uncertainty and inconsistency in external policy are inevitable and open up the way for different scenarios of relations between Russia and the outside world, many of which are fraught with unpredictable consequences for international stability.
2. In the most general sense, the changes in Russia are basically irreversible. The country has already passed the point of no return in terms of re-establishing the economic and political system which existed in Soviet times. Even if the backward-looking political forces gain the upper hand domestically, it is certain that they will be unable, and most probable that they will be unwilling to try, to restore the "old order". The traditional attributes of the old order in the field of foreign and security policy-overwhelming ideologically-motivated hostility towards the West, obsession with an unlimited military build-up, challenging involvement in regional conflicts all over the world, and so on-could not be expected to reappear.
3. However, the impact of domestic developments on Russia"s evolving foreign and security policy agenda is of paramount importance. There are numerous distortions in the process of creating a market economy, developing a civil society and establishing democracy. The fact that these distortions are becoming a rule rather than an exception seems to be affecting the character of the emerging regime in the most fundamental way.
Thus, although the model of "pure restoration" seems unrealistic, the future organization of society in Russia remains in many respects unclear and con#172;tinues to give cause for serious concern. So do Russia"s future external inter#172;actions-even if the country proclaims the abandonment of or even actually abandons the "old" foreign and security policy patterns.
4. The profound dislocations and turmoil accompanying Russia"s painful transition to a new political system have dramatically undermined the coher#172;ence of its foreign and security policy, not to mention its manageability. The main domestic factors affecting the formulation and implementation of Russia"s foreign and security policy are the following:
o the disruptive side-effects of economic transformations, including (a) the collapse of industrial and agricultural production, (b) the broadening criminal#172;ization of the society, and (c) the threat of social explosions;
o the unrestrained partisan competition between new political forces oper#172;ating in the absence of established rules of intra-societal dialogue;
o the overall weakness of the state and the predominance of an ungoverned bureaucracy;
o ethno-territorial conflicts within the country, compounded by mass move#172;ments of refugees and migrants; and
o disintegrative trends within the Russian Federation.
Containing these trends and establishing a viable political system are the sine qua non of Russia"s being able to pursue any coherent foreign and security policy. Otherwise, whatever substitutes for a foreign and security policy properly so called will in all likelihood be unpredictable and tend towards an erratic (at best) and hostile (at worst) relationship with the external world.
5. At the same time, the very fact that the state-building is by far the main domestic priority may have disturb#172;ing consequences for Russia"s foreign and security policy making:
o the logic of "external threat" (or, in a milder form, of an "unfriendly environ#172;ment") may re-emerge as an easily available means of domestic consolidation;
o the trends towards authoritarianism may endanger democratic control over foreign and security policy, as well as damaging Russia"s image inter#172;nationally; and
o violent means of containing domestic conflicts may spill over the borders of Russia, threatening relations with its neighbours.
Thus, domestic stability is by no means a panacea against instabilities in Russia"s relations with the external world. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition of stable external relations.
6. The political role of the senior military establishment represents one of the key domestic factors which may greatly influence Russia"s relations with the outside world. Although the poor state of the national economy will most probably prevent a significant military build-up in the foreseeable future, the impact of the military on foreign and security policy assessments is becoming more salient because of a number of factors:
o in both the major crises in Moscow in recent years (in August 1991 and October 1993), the ultimate arguments in the power struggle were provided by the military;
o the military is considered to be the only organized force which would be able to operate in the event of major riots or criminal explosions;
o the armed forces may be viewed as indispensable for preserving the territorial integrity of Russia (as was clearly demonstrated in Chechnya);
o Russia"s armed forces provide it with an important lever of influence over a number of post-Soviet states; and
o military power, however diminished and disorganized after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is still regarded as one of the essential components of Russia"s international role.
It would be premature to conclude that the military has become an indepen#172;dent and all-powerful political actor in Russia, but the failures both to reform the armed forces and to establish viable civil control over them are spectacular. Some aspects of Russia"s interaction with the outside world-specifically, in the field of the arms control and with respect to NATO eastward enlargement-seem to have been strongly affected by the military establishment.
7. The status of Russia within the international system, if compared with that of the former Soviet Union, is also characterized by a remarkable transition:
o from confrontational towards cooperative relations with the West (since ideo#172;logical, political and military antagonism has lost its raison d"etre as the basic element of foreign and security policy);
o from the pattern of behaviour of a bloc leader to that of a single player deprived of allies and clients;
o from the unquestioned superpower status of the former USSR to a much more modest ability to influence the world"s development; and
o from a situation of relatively secure relations with its neighbour#172;hood to one in which there are numerous risks in the immediate environment.
Assessing the new reality has been a painful process both for the political elites and for public opinion in general. Adapting to its new status and devel#172;op#172;ing adequate patterns of behaviour remain formidable challenges for Russia.
8. The emergence of independent public opinion and the fact that the mass media are addressing the fundamental issues of foreign and security policy are among the most significant achievements in Russia"s move towards democracy. The "great debate" over Russia"s relations with the outside world has, however, revealed a number of basic incoherences which will be of great relevance to the country"s interaction with Europe:
o the very notion of "national interest" in the international arena often becomes a matter of political gamesmanship and a stake in the power struggle between new political groups;
o old-style political traditionalism has only been replaced by a superficial, pseudo-democratic "credo" which has failed to create an adequate conceptual basis upon which to build an effective foreign and security policy; and
o initial post-imperial frustration coexists, paradoxically, with a residual (or, rather, re-emerging) superpower syndrome.
Thus, Russian foreign and security policy thinking remains in many respects chaotic and conceptually erratic. It is worth noting, however, that debates in Russia have drawn a fundamental division between two broad approaches:
o one which starts with the assumption that Russia"s surest path to security and sound relations with its neighbours is through reassurance-that is, by consciously attempting to alter and eventually to remove the "enemy image" associated by outsiders with Russia; and
o one which is more focused on Russia"s use of power to influence its neigh#172;bours, either crudely and aggressively or in more subtle and refined ways.
The latter approach is considerably more widespread, testifying to a growing assertiveness within the foreign policy community.
9. This trend is also reflected by the extensive reference to the "great-power" predicament of Russia. In a broad sense, the argument points to Russia"s cul#172;tural heritage, gigantic territory, enormous potentials of wealth, consid#172;erable military might and unique geopolitical location; consequently Russia has the legit#172;imate right to prominent international status and should aim to be recog#172;nized in this capacity. Indeed, consolidating (or re-establishing) its great-power status has become a central theme of Russia"s foreign policy debates and, to a signif#172;i#172;cant extent, a constant motif in its actual international behaviour-particularly with respect to Europe.
At the same time, what is striking in these debates is how imprecise and apparently confused most participants are about what is meant by the very notion of an "influential actor" and about what the role of a great power entails-apart from being treated with respect and having a dominant voice in the immediate vicinity. There is remarkably little discussion of what the country should look for in the wider world and what responsibility it should assume-which would proceed from the understanding that there is a basic difference between the status of a great power (accorded by others to Russia) and the role of a great power (which must be defined by Russians themselves).
10. Russia"s role in the post-Soviet geopolitical space is undoubtedly one of the most important and controversial issues in the foreign and security policy agenda of the country. Russia has faced a number of serious disputes with its immediate neighbours springing from their common Soviet heritage over frontiers, the disruption of economic linkages, the inheritance of military forces and the status of national minorities:
o the deep (almost all-embracing) interdependence of the post-Soviet states is coupled with the overwhelming economic, demographic and territorial predom#172;inance of Russia in the area;
o Russia has become directly or indirectly involved in practically all the armed conflicts within the former Soviet Union; and
o the overall model of Russia"s relations with the countries of the Common#172;wealth of Indepen#172;dent States (CIS) still embodies the most serious contra#172;dictions and is by far the most crucial issue for the political future of what used to be the Soviet Union.
Russia"s political mentality has developed from the initial "divorce and for#172;get" approach to a much more assertive one, stipulating that the whole territory of the former Soviet Union should be considered as a zone of Russia"s special interests.
11. Moscow"s policy in the "near abroad" cannot but greatly affect Russia"s relations with Europe, albeit in quite a controversial way.
On the one hand, a number of considerations make the Western countries receptive to Moscow"s arguments:
o Russia"s unique stakes in the post-Soviet space cannot be overlooked;
o Russia has the military and political potential to reduce the scope of conflicts in this area or at least to minimize their spillover effects;
o furthermore, Russia is expected to act as an external stabilizer of domestic turbulence in some CIS countries; and
o finally, Russia"s role in counterbalancing the possible role of the Islamic and, to a lesser degree, the Chinese factors could also be considered as a stabilizing factor.
On the other hand, the self-imposed imperative of Russia"s policy within the former Soviet Union is not only becoming more assertive but also taking on an exclusionary character. There are serious signs that it aims to create (or
re-create) a sphere of influence to which other international actors will be denied access, or their access at least significantly limited. In this respect the debate on the relevance of what is alleged to be a new Monroe Doctrine for the post-Soviet pattern seems highly indicative. Significantly, any suspicion that the Western countries-operating either individually or through their multi#172;lateral security structures, such as NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) or the European Union (EU)-seek to challenge Russia"s influence within the CIS zone elicits increasing nervousness in Moscow.
12. Russia, however, seems excessively optimistic in the wake of its per#172;ceived recent policy successes within the post-Soviet area:
o operating as the Eurasian pacifier would entail much more than mandating its military capabilities;
o even these capabilities are limited in view of the formidable task of conflict management in the numerous areas of instability;
o still more challenging are the economic costs of leadership in relations with the CIS partners; and
o the overall international image of a "new Russia" will be significantly depen#172;dent on its behaviour in the "near abroad".
In all these respects, Russia"s specific interests in the post-Soviet space might be better served by a broader Euro-Atlantic cooperative pattern of relations than by its absence-not to mention confrontation, which is the alternative. However, such an approach would require much deeper "liberal internationalist" thinking than currently exists in Russia. Nor are domestic instabilities conducive to a proper assess#172;ment of long-term foreign policy interests; increasing activism in the "near abroad" becomes a substitute for the spectacular failures within the country and gives the ruling elites an impressive argument against both allegations of weakness and accusations of submission to the West.
13. Russia"s relations with Belarus and Ukraine will have a crucial impact on the future development of the CIS and on the role of Russia both within the post-Soviet space and in Europe. In this respect, however, Russia does not seem to have articulated a serious strategy. Its thinking about its two Slav neighbours is a curious mixture of a conviction of their profound dependence on itself, fear of their possible estrangement, desire for "soft" political control and reluctance to pay for it.
Relations between Russia and Ukraine have been considerably damaged by the excessive post-independence euphoria in Kiev and by the initial post-imperial frustration in Moscow. Both sides, however, are interested in avoiding any major crisis, although elements of low-key confrontation may persist. Ukraine"s ability to succeed economically and in its state building and Russia"s acceptance of it as an independent entity will be crucial for preventing destabil#172;iz#172;ation and ensuring a certain modus vivendi between the two countries.
Belarus is the most "pro-Russian" of the post-Soviet states; public opinion there favours reintegration, whereas the local political elites seem ready to exchange independence for a more secure (albeit lower) political status and economic assets. In fact, Russia is in a position to decide what pattern of rela#172;tionship to choose and whether absorption is a more advantageous model than a protectorate-type association with a junior partner.
In any case, Russia"s concerns about the future of the two states have been significantly alleviated. Both seem to have accepted (Ukraine reluctantly, Belarus enthusiastically) that they are in the sphere of Russian influence. Russia will certainly aim to preserve this pattern and to prevent any attempts to undermine it. Whether the three Slav states could constitute a "core area" of a Russia-led alliance as a power pole in the eastern part of Europe remains an open question, although by no means an implausible proposition.
14. In the north-western neighbourhood of Russia, the Baltic/Nordic region, Russia"s geo-strategic position has changed radically with the independence of the Baltic states, the emergence of new state borders and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the area. Russia has actually accepted a reduced position and can hardly aim to re-establish the status quo ante, whatever changes occur on the domestic scene.
However, there are certain enduring factors in Russian policy:
o the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea area and of the Barents region will continue to be considerable in the light of Russia"s renewed emphasis on its great-power status;
o the security role of the Barents region will be crucial because of Russia"s reliance on the strategic nuclear weapons based there and its interest in a "blue-water" navy for the future;
o the Kaliningrad Region is viewed as an important military exclave providing access to the Baltic Sea and mitigating the strategic losses in the area; and
o no Russian government will be able to shirk responsibility for protecting the interests of the Russian populations in the Baltic states.
The increasing overall assertiveness of Russia has also manifested itself with respect to the Baltic states, although here it has an almost exclusively declar#172;atory character. However, there are risks of a return to a strategy of pressure. Russia"s relations with the Nordic countries-which have considerably improved during recent years-may worsen as a result of the more active involve#172;ment of these countries in the future of the Baltic states. Furthermore, Russia may be extremely sensitive to anything it could consider to be an unfavourable alteration of the geopolitical balance in the area, such as the Baltic states joining NATO.
15. After the collapse of the Yalta system and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, East-Central Europe (ECE) ceased to be a matter of immediate security con#172;cern for Moscow. The prospect of NATO"s enlargement eastwards has restored this problem to importance in Russia"s perception.
Russia"s nervous reaction reveals its intrinsic assumption that the ECE region is a kind of "no-man"s zone", where the possible emergence of a hostile coalition should be forestalled by all possible means. However, political con#172;siderations seem to be much more salient than those related to security; Russia fears being relegated to the sidelines of European developments more than unspecified security risks.
In fact, the whole problem has become a hostage of Russia"s painful search for a new international role and its attempts to secure a worthy place in the emerging European system. For Russia, this goal-which is undoubtedly of paramount importance-has completely overshadowed the task of building a friendly environment in the ECE per se, thereby inflicting consid#172;er#172;able damage on Russia"s future relations with the countries of the region, whatever the outcome of the debate on their joining NATO.
16. Russia"s broad objectives in the Balkans may be summarized as follows:
o to ensure that it remains a major player in Europe;
o to demonstrate its abilities both to other international actors and to domestic critics (in particular, in order to defuse and deflect pressures from the national#172;ists); and
o to gain actual or potential allies in the area and to provide a counterweight to the growing influence of other states in the region.
Compared with those in the post-Soviet space or in direct relations with the West, Russia"s stakes in the Balkans are of secondary importance and are insufficient to turn the region into a main foreign policy priority. However, Russia does have some levers in the Balkans. Its mediation efforts there have contributed to Russia"s self-confidence and to the realization of its declared goal of being treated as a great power. Russian involvement in peace settlement efforts in the former Yugo#172;slavia, however limited, may affect the emerging geopolitical configuration of the Balkans.
17. The Caucasus has become the most turbulent and unstable region of the former Soviet Union, one that is marked by political turmoil and economic collapse as well as by inter-ethnic conflicts that challenge the existing frontiers, the territorial integrity and the domestic arrangements of all the states of the area, including Russia itself. Against this background, Russia faces numerous and often conflicting security interests:
o to contain secessionist trends and territorial and inter-ethnic disputes in the northern Caucasus;
o to prevent a spillover of conflicts in the Transcaucasus into Russian terri#172;tory and to minimize their consequences, especially in the adjacent southern regions of the Russian Federation (refugees, additional ethnic tensions, growing Cossack radicalism, and so on);
o to combine a partial disengagement from the Transcaucasus with estab#172;lishing itself as the guarantor of regional stability;
o to ensure that the ongoing transformation of the political and economic land#172;scape in the three Transcaucasian states does not result in their overall reorientation away from Russia;
o to consolidate its current and future economic assets (especially with respect to the Caspian Sea shelf and oil and gas pipelines); and
o to prevent other international actors from achieving a deeper penetration and involvement in the Caucasus.
Moscow has been more successful in re-establishing a domi#172;nant position with respect to the three Transcaucasian states than in managing the problem of Chechnya"s secession within the Russian Federation. The latter case represents a major failure of Russian policy, leaving its overall prospects in the region highly volatile and uncertain. Furthermore, although the peri#172;pheral status of the Caucasus with respect to Europe facilitates Russia"s goal of "strategic denial" to third countries, its assertive military engagement and taking sides in local conflicts may provide an opening for competing influences from adjacent Middle Eastern countries and politico-religious groups.
18. Russia"s relations with Western Europe (and with the West in general) are promoted by several fundamental factors:
o the ideological parameters of the classic cold-war pattern have become a thing of the past and are unlikely to re-emerge;
o traditional military-related considerations, based on the assumption of a major conflict with the West in Europe, are no longer relevant;
o Russia"s interest in economic links with the West has considerably increased, due both to the imperatives of domestic reforms and to a desire to obtain better positions in the world market; and
o political interaction with the West is essential to respectable international status for Russia.
However, in Russia"s perceptions of-and its attitude toward-the West, a competitive pattern certainly prevails over a cooperative one:
o ideologically, this is manifested by Moscow"s deepening suspicion that, behind the encouraging and supportive rhetoric of the West, there is a strong pragmatic desire to downgrade Russia to or to keep it at the position of a second-rank power;
o the existing incentives for Russian economic neo-isolationism seem to have growing implications for Russia"s foreign policy; and
o in contrast to the initial post-Soviet period, Russia"s relations with the West are no longer regarded as a value per se; instead, the possible scope, forms and concrete parameters of these relations are assessed as a function of other goals and policy aims considered to have a higher priority for the country.
As a result, in developing and even highlighting pragmatic relations with the West Moscow seems increasingly to proceed from the assumption that it would be in Russia"s best interests to oper#172;ate as a leader of an alternative power pole in Europe.
19. This trend has clearly affected Russia"s policy line with respect to the multi#172;lateral security institutions operating in Europe.
Russia"s nervous reaction to the prospect of NATO"s enlarge#172;ment eastward has clearly revealed that the alliance is still perceived as a challenge to Russia"s security interests, all the rhetoric about an emerging strategic partnership with the West notwithstanding. Another and even more significant rationale is to prevent the central security role in Europe being played by a structure to which Russia will not have direct access. Different NATO-centred patterns (the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Partnership for Peace, and even the "16 plus 1" formula) are often suspected of being aimed at downgrading or marginalizing Russia, or else at disengaging it from potential allies in the post-Soviet space. However, some kind of "special rela#172;tionship" with NATO may be considered as a more practical strategy than pro#172;moting the re-emergence of the confrontational model-while not closing off the latter option.
The EU is regarded as being the most powerful economic partner and impor#172;tant political actor in Europe, whereas its security role is assessed as marginal and as not (yet) threatening Russia"s interests. However, EU enlarge#172;ment and expansion of its security dimension, especially if accompanied by a merger with the WEU, may exacerbate Russia"s concerns about its own role on the continent and provoke a stronger reaction from Moscow unless mitigated by significantly stronger incentives for further rapprochement with the EU.
Ambivalent feelings characterize Russia"s current attitude towards the Council of Europe. On the one hand, accession to this structure is viewed as an important political gain which attests to the quality of the changes in Russia. On the other hand, it is feared that failure to satisfy the Council"s high standards regarding human rights and democracy would leave Russia vulner#172;able to severe criticism that might seriously damage its prestige and push it to reconsider the very idea of becoming internationally accountable.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is by far the most attractive multilateral institution for Russia. It corresponds to many of Russia"s concerns regarding Europe and merits its preferential treatment. How#172;ever, Russia"s attempts to increase the role of the OSCE are mostly moti#172;vated by the intention to oppose it to NATO-an effort which cannot but dis#172;credit any pro-OSCE design. Furthermore, Russia seems to fear that the OSCE might limit its freedom of action within the post-Soviet space, particularly with respect to peacekeeping. Thus, while having a clear interest in upgrading the OSCE, Russia remains one of its most "difficult" participants.
The CIS, all its shortcomings and lack of viability notwithstanding, is of key importance for Russia as the structure where it plays an undoubted primary role. Although by no means substituting for bilateral relations in the "near abroad", it certainly provides a means to institutionalize Russia"s sphere of influence within the post-Soviet space and responds to Russia"s understanding of great-power status. In seeking to give a prominent international position to the Moscow-led CIS and to place it on an equal footing with Western institu#172;tions, Russia presumably aims to consolidate its leadership in the shape of the recognized ability to operate on behalf of its clients.
20. Against this background, Russia"s basic options with respect to Europe are: (a) unilateralism (with an emphasis on power politics in promoting Russia"s "special interests" and reluctance to accommodate itself to other inter#172;national actors" interests); (b) a balance-of-power strategy (requiring both cautious selective alliance-building and the skilled application of restraint); and (c) cooperative multilateralism (highlighting the necessity to strengthen multi#172;lateral institutions and to promote great-power cooperation in consolidating stability at all levels of the international system).
In practical terms, Moscow"s policy represents a combination of all three elements, with a gradual shift towards the first, considerable complexities in practising the second and increasing volatility in the third.
21. Similarly, Europe"s options with respect to Russia could be formulated as follows:
o to continue on an ad hoc basis (with limited and largely symbolic steps to ease the hardships of post-Soviet development, a hope that Moscow will be successful in containing domestic tensions and restrain itself externally, de facto acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence and reluctance to get engaged in it);
o to choose a neo-containment strategy (preventively, in order to divert Russia from excessive assertiveness, or as a reaction to Russia"s intensified unilateral#172;ism); and
o to aim to link and weave together the security agendas of Europe and Russia (with the increas#172;ing involvement of Russia in a broader international setting, an adequate adapta#172;tion of multilateral institutions operating in Europe, and careful political engagement by the West in post-Soviet arrangements-on the assumption that promoting Russia"s natural central role in the region should be coupled with cooperative efforts by the other great powers).
Europe remains predominantly attached to the first of these three options-constrained by institutional and policy-thinking inertia, by lack of resources and by the number of other domestic and external challenges-but such a policy line is not sustainable as a longer-term strategy.
22. The integrating of Russian and post-Soviet security with European security is of crucial importance for stability in the post-cold war setting. Regrettably, trends in both Europe and Russia have been gradually sliding in opposite direction-which can, in the long run, significantly damage the security interests of both and put at risk broader international prospects.
Indeed, the most serious threat to the emerging international system on the continent is that Russia will proceed-either deliberately or under perceived domestic and external constraints-from a narrow-minded and self-centred approach to its national security interests without considering those of other states. In turn, these other states might find it quite legitimate to take appropri#172;ate countermeasures. As a result, a new cycle of confrontational developments could start. The rest of Europe, however, will not be innocent if this happens. The chances of this scenario coming about are proportional to the degree of Europe"s indifference to or neglect of the concerns which are pushing Moscow to operate on its own.
The alternative is to develop more active and cooperative relations between Russia and Europe on two tracks-by promoting Europe"s involve#172;ment within the post-Soviet area, on the one hand, and by Russia participating in managing European affairs, on the other hand. On both tracks, Europe"s algorithm should be operating together with, and not without, Russia (let alone against it). On both tracks, Russia"s rationale should consist in taking great-power responsi#172;bility, rather than just searching for token status in the inter#172;national arena. Thus a strong and unambiguous commitment to engage Russia in a broader pan-European security pattern is essential both for Russia and for Europe.
